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eceived wisdom has favoured broad-stroke economic reforms for transition Eu-
rope and Central Asia since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Many have argued that priva-
tization and deregulation would unleash the productive energy of the market and 
attract foreign capital. This advice was seen to bear fruit. Following the transition reces-
sion of the early 1990s, and especially after the crisis of 1998, the region saw a decade of 
broad-based and uninterrupted recovery. Livelihoods improved, and poverty declined on 
average in every country.  
This report builds on evidence that, despite these gains, a significant number of people in 
transition Europe and Central Asia continue to feel dejected, and believe that their position 
in society has declined. While some of these feelings may be rooted in the uncertainty that 
has accompanied market relations and greater freedoms, something more fundamental 
is at play. Even in the decade of recovery and growth, inequalities continued to widen—
especially between central and peripheral regions. The recovery failed to lift significant 
segments of the population out of poverty. Many people fell further behind.  
Fundamental to this analysis is the concept of social exclusion. This report links the social 
exclusion/inclusion paradigm, as developed in the European Union context, with the hu-
man development paradigm, as articulated by Amartya Sen. It starts from the premise 
that people value not only consumable goods and services but also things that cannot 
be consumed—activities and abilities that reinforce human dignity and self-respect. For 
example, we value employment not only because the income derived increases our pur-
chasing power, but also because it makes us feel like worthy members of society. Human 
development is about a growing number of people leading lives that they increasingly 
value. Few of us, however, can engage in all that we value. We find ourselves deprived in 
one or another dimension. When deprivations accumulate, and especially when they start 
to reinforce one another, social exclusion occurs.  
This concept of social exclusion is broad and unabashedly relative. A deprivation occurs if 
an individual does not have the capability of consuming a basic basket of goods, or per-
haps even accessing the internet, when this is expected in his or her social environment. 
While social exclusion is relative, this does not mean that it is subjective, in the sense that 
individuals perceive themselves to be excluded. Exclusion takes place when people don’t 
have the capability of doing well-defined things.
The report emphasizes that social exclusion is not particular to any specific group. It can 
happen to anyone—and it has happened to many in the turmoil of transition, given cer-
tain circumstances and policies (or their absence). At its extreme, social exclusion becomes 
marginalization. This happens all too often for groups, such as ethnic minorities—espe-
cially Roma—or for people with disabilities. However, this report does not equate social 
exclusion with marginalization; nor does it associate social exclusion with specific groups. 
The report captures the complexity of social exclusion through a multidimensional Social 
Exclusion Index, a measure that is based on 24 types of deprivations. The Index is used to 
quantify and compare social exclusion in six countries in the region—ranging from Serbia 
to Tajikistan, with their different levels of development. The threshold at which the number 
of deprivations amounts to social exclusion is a matter of definition, but the report shows 
that the levels are significant in all the countries under any plausible threshold.  
More important, through ample analysis and numerous examples, the report illustrates 
how social exclusion occurs, and how it can be countered through deliberate, inclusive 
policies. For example, a deprivation such as low education level can interact with national 
or local policies—for example, the discontinuation of public transport connecting a vil-
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lage to markets—to deprive an individual of employment. If no other family member has a 
significant source of income, this individual runs a high risk of being excluded. The report 
also makes a convincing case that, in the absence of deliberate and inclusive policies, too 
many people will become excluded, even if sustained growth returns.
The report presents evidence of the strong linkages between exclusion and local charac-
teristics—such as the size and economic structure of the area, the degree to which the area 
is connected to a major economic centre, and the quality of the local environment. This 
speaks to the marked spatial disparities in the region, especially between capital cities and 
remote locations. Social inclusion requires the coordination of national and local policies, 
and most importantly, needs a strong popular voice and participation in identifying the 
right policy choices. 
The report argues that achieving social inclusion is feasible, but it should be pursued sys-
tematically. It requires deliberate, comprehensive solutions that are tailored to specific cir-
cumstances, especially in diverse localities. It also argues that the tailoring is best done 
when those who benefit are included in the policy process. There is no silver bullet.   
The global financial crisis of 2008 has spelled an end to the relatively simple, broad-stroke, 
model of growth that had propelled many countries of the region in the previous decade. 
Looking ahead, a return to sustained growth rates will require more fine-tuned govern-
ment policies aimed at greater competitiveness and productivity. In designing such poli-
cies, one should remember that people’s capabilities are our greatest resource. Growth 
should focus on enhancing those capabilities. A major component of the policy mix should 
be the promotion of social inclusion. This will help to unleash the potential embodied in 
the high levels of human capital that characterize the region.
 
 Kori Udovički 
 Assistant Administrator and Regional Director
 UNDP Regional Bureau for Europe and the CIS
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nderstanding the concept of so-
cial exclusion is critical for assess-
ing the transformations that have 
taken place in the post-socialist countries 
of Europe and Central Asia (ECA).1 Social ex-
clusion deprives people of the opportunity 
to participate in economic, social and civic 
processes, and limits their ability to lead 
productive, creative lives in accordance 
with their needs and interests. Socially ex-
cluded persons find themselves confined to 
the fringes of society. To paraphrase Adam 
Smith, they are not able to appear in pub-
lic without feeling shame. Social exclusion 
occurs in part because growth does not al-
ways translate into increased job opportu-
nities, improved social services, and greater 
opportunities for civic participation.  
The changes that followed the collapse of 
the socialist system have fundamentally 
redefined people’s lives, values and be-
haviour. Transition has brought freedoms 
and choices to many, but deprived many 
others of the ability to live long, healthy 
and productive lives. These deprivations 
have wider social consequences. When a 
medical commission in Moldova rejects a 
44-year-old woman’s application to work 
on the grounds that she has rheumatic ar-
thritis; when a municipality in Kazakhstan 
denies a rural resident the chance to com-
mute to work by cancelling a bus route; or 
when schoolchildren in the former Yugo-
slav Republic of Macedonia shun an orphan 
because they think she is dirty, society as a 
whole loses. Not only do the victims suffer 
increased risk of social exclusion, but also 
society experiences a loss of human re-
sources and productive gains. If high levels 
of social exclusion lead to increased social 
tensions, society must also count the cost 
U
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1/ For the purposes of this 
report, the ‘ECA’ region – or 
simply ‘the region’ – refers 
to the former socialist coun-
tries that have undergone 
a dramatic political and eco-
nomic transformation since 
1989-1991. This report does 
not explicitly refer to Cyprus, 
Malta and Turkey – which 
are also covered by UNDP’s 
Regional Bureau for Europe 
and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States – as 
they do not share the social-
ist legacy or the experience 
of transition. However, the 
report’s underlying analyti-
cal framework and many of 
its conclusions are relevant 
for these countries as well.
Executive summary
of added social protection, policing and 
prisons. A society with higher levels of so-
cial exclusion is not only less vibrant and 
cohesive, but also less safe, productive and 
dynamic. Devoting efforts and additional 
resources to enhancing social inclusion 
ought therefore be a critical policy priority.
Human development and 
social inclusion:  
key linkages
This report confirms that income-based 
measures of poverty are insufficient for cap-
turing the depth and breadth of the depri-
vations in the region today. Analysing the 
transformations through the broader prism 
of human development becomes critical. 
Human development assesses people’s 
well-being beyond income and includes 
people’s ability to live long, healthy and 
creative lives; to advance other goals which 
they have reason to value; and to engage 
in shaping development equitably and sus-
tainably on a shared planet. 
This report integrates the social inclusion 
and human development – two people-
centred concepts that governments in-
creasingly view as integral for addressing 
persistent poverty and shortfalls in educa-
tion and health. While human development 
is recognized as the goal of development, 
social inclusion is important because, as a 
process for removing the obstacles pre-
venting people from realizing their capa-
bilities, it offers a map for how policy can 
be employed to achieve higher levels of hu-
man development.
Given that people are the centre of devel-
opment, this report breaks new ground by 
2looking at social exclusion from the per-
spective of risks faced by individuals–rath-
er than risks faced by vulnerable groups. A 
key message of this report is that anybody 
can be excluded. We assume that individu-
als have a number of characteristics that 
can put them at risk of social exclusion. We 
define those characteristics as social exclu-
sion risks. Being disabled, a workaholic, or 
inadequately educated are just a few char-
acteristics that can put a person at risk of 
social exclusion. 
Not all risks produce social exclusion. 
Whether social exclusion occurs depends 
how risks interact with ‘drivers’ such as in-
stitutions, norms, policies and behaviours. 
For example, anti-discriminatory legisla-
tion can decrease a disabled person’s risk 
of social exclusion. Legislation banning gay 
marriage increases a homosexual couple’s 
risk of social exclusion. Peers who don’t 
value knowledge increase the risk of social 
exclusion for a bright child who is willing 
to study. These are just a few examples il-
lustrating a larger theme: social exclusion 
is not just a problem for disadvantaged or 
marginalized populations. It is a concern 
for everybody, as everybody faces risks.
The local context also influences individual 
risks. Local factors that could augment in-
dividual risks and affect social exclusion 
include available employment opportuni-
ties, distance to urban centres, the state of 
basic infrastructure, or whether a locality 
has been hit by conflict or environmental 
degradation or both. Individual risks could 
result in social exclusion if a member of the 
majority population lived in an area domi-
nated by an ethnic minority, particularly 
if that locality had a history of ethnic con-
flict. Likewise, a person who works to fight 
corruption yet whose mayor takes bribes 
might find that his risk of exclusion could 
be higher.
The report addresses the process of social 
exclusion in its entirety, integrating the in-
dividual vulnerabilities and risks, the driv-
ers of exclusion and the specifics of the 
local context into a comprehensive social 
exclusion chain. Addressing its individual 
components only will not bring about tan-
gible and lasting results. In order to achieve 
social inclusion, concerted interventions 
targeted at the entire social exclusion chain 
are necessary. 
Measuring social exclusion
The report not only advances the concept 
of social exclusion, but also proposes a new 
approach for quantifying it. The approach is 
reflected in the Multidimensional Social Ex-
clusion Index, which captures the complex 
nature of social exclusion. It is based on the 
multidimensional poverty methodology of 
Alkire and Foster which has been employed 
in UNDP’s 2010 Global Human Develop-
ment Report. The index assesses the status 
of people and their households along three 
dimensions: economic exclusion, exclusion 
from social services, and exclusion from civic 
participation. The social exclusion index em-
ploys 24 indicators – eight for each dimen-
sion – that reflect the ways in which people 
are denied access to labour markets, educa-
tion and health systems, as well as to civic 
and social networks. An individual is defined 
as socially excluded if he or she is deprived 
in at least nine indicators. Since a dimension 
contains only eight indicators, to be consid-
ered socially excluded a person must be de-
prived in at least two dimensions. The index 
reflects both the share of people that experi-
ence at least nine out of 24 deprivations, and 
the depth (how many deprivations socially 
excluded people experience on average).
The report then applies this methodology 
through nationally representative house-
hold surveys that were conducted in 2009 in 
the framework of a regional survey,2 hereaf-
ter referred to as the ‘Social Exclusion Survey’. 
Some 2,700 persons were surveyed in each 
of six countries: Kazakhstan, the Republic of 
Moldova, Serbia, Tajikistan, the former Yu-
goslav Republic of Macedonia, and Ukraine. 
Such analysis is important because in order 
to design more socially inclusive policies 
we must first understand the breadth and 
depth of social exclusion. 
The Multidimensional Social Exclusion Index 
introduced in this report is relevant beyond 
the six countries covered by the survey. The 
measurements can be adapted to national 
circumstances. The indicators selected are 
not etched in stone; rather, they are intend-
ed to be a point of departure for national de-
bates on how best to measure social exclu-
sion. Nationally relevant indicators should 
be selected in an inclusive and participatory 
way. The index can also contribute to EU-
level analysis of social exclusion, which has 
focused mainly on income-based measures 
of poverty and social exclusion.
2/  The survey, which was 
carried out in 2009, was 
cost-shared by the UNICEF 
Regional Office for Central 
and Eastern Europe and the 
Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States. In Serbia 
the survey sample included 
internally displaced persons 
as well as members of 
the Roma minority. The 
survey was carried out by 
TNS Slovakia and its local 
branches in the countries 
covered and employed the 
same methodology for all 
countries, thus permitting 
cross-country comparisons. 
Qualitative information 
from focus-group discus-
sions and individual 
interviews with vulnerable 
groups complement the 
quantitative data and 
provide valuable insights 
into the experiences of 
socially excluded persons 
that are difficult to capture 
through traditional 
survey techniques. Finally, 
important information 
comes from seven country 
studies (carried out in the 
six surveyed countries and 
in Uzbekistan). These have 
been prepared in close 
consultation with national 
stakeholders (government, 
civil society, academia) 
who helped to shape both 
the regional and country 
reports.   
3What the new methodology 
reveals
This methodology shows that social exclu-
sion is pervasive in the Europe and Central 
Asia region. According to the analysis, one 
out of every three persons is socially exclud-
ed. One out of 10 is socially excluded in the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
while seven out of 10 is socially excluded 
in Tajikistan. Furthermore, the report con-
firms the hypothesis that economic indica-
tors of social exclusion only partly explain 
this phenomenon. Two other factors – lack 
of access to social services, and lack of ac-
cess to civic and social networks – contrib-
ute equally to social exclusion.
Diverse headcounts but similar patterns
Surprisingly, the analysis reveals that, de-
spite the diversity of the region, the depth 
of social exclusion is remarkably similar 
across the six countries surveyed. In other 
words, a person in the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia faces the same in-
tensity of social exclusion as a socially ex-
cluded person in Kazakhstan. The analysis 
also suggests that people across countries 
adopt similar coping strategies to deal with 
their exclusion.  
The report also finds that jobless growth, 
which has characterized the region in recent 
years, has created a layer of discouraged 
workers (particularly women and middle-
aged persons) who have had to take jobs 
in the informal sector. Such ‘shadow econ-
omy’ employment fails to provide health or 
pension benefits, the lack of which can lead 
to poorer education, health and nutrition. 
Vicious cycles can result. Lower education 
levels can lead to diminished job oppor-
tunities. Lack of transportation in remote 
villages can lead to a diminished ability to 
take part in political decision-making to ad-
dress the lack of transport. Such processes 
can create an entrenched underclass, such 
as we see with Roma.
According to the survey, people don’t trust 
their neighbours. Nor do they trust govern-
ment institutions, which are supposed to 
protect their interests. They increasingly 
rely on informal channels, a practice that 
diminishes transparency and may encour-
age corruption. Such patterns hinder effec-
tive and responsive public administration 
– a prerequisite for inclusive societies. 
Who are most at risk of exclusion?
Applying the methodological framework 
described above and the social exclusion 
measurements, the report goes beyond 
an aggregated headcount of excluded 
populations and brings the reader closer 
to answering the question, ‘Who are the 
socially excluded?’ The data suggest that in 
the case of elderly persons, children, youth, 
rural dwellers, and of the unemployed and 
undereducated, the probability of individ-
ual risks leading to social exclusion is much 
higher than for the population as a whole. 
The elderly experience levels of social ex-
clusion that are often twice as high as for 
the country as a whole. In Ukraine, for ex-
ample, social exclusion among the elderly 
is 43 percent, some 23 percentage points 
higher than the national average. In the for-
mer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, social 
exclusion among the elderly is 22 percent, 
some 10 percentage points higher than the 
national average. On average, 42 percent 
of children (aged 0-15) and 35 percent of 
youth (aged 15-29) live in households that 
are socially excluded in the six countries. 
The share of socially excluded children is 
particularly high in Tajikistan (73 percent) 
and the Republic of Moldova (47 percent). 
Worryingly, children experience the deep-
est levels of social exclusion. 
Likewise, social exclusion among the un-
employed is substantially higher than for 
the population as a whole. Social exclusion 
among jobless workers is 12 percentage 
points higher than among the rest of the 
population in most countries of the region. 
The rate of social exclusion among people 
with low levels of education is two times 
higher than the overall rate of social exclu-
sion in Ukraine, Serbia and the former Yu-
goslav Republic of Macedonia. 
The social exclusion index does not indi-
cate significant gender differences among 
the socially excluded, but this doesn’t 
mean that women and girls are immune to 
higher social exclusion risk. The absence of 
a significant difference can be attributed 
to the way the index was constructed, as 
it was largely based on household-level 
deprivations which do not factor in intra-
household gender disparities. 
While people in all six countries face a 
broadly similar depth of social exclusion 
on average, members of some groups are 
more deprived than others. Such groups 
4can be defined both by ethnicity (such as 
Roma) or status (internally displaced per-
sons, refugees, the homeless). In Serbia, the 
survey was expanded to include Roma and 
internally displaced persons–with striking 
results. The magnitude of social exclusion 
among Roma is 86 percent, and 56 percent 
among internally displaced persons, com-
pared with 19 percent for the rest of the 
population.  
The role of values 
The report suggests that values and behav-
iour matter. The data permit us to correlate 
the exclusion of people with disabilities 
with the local community’s tolerance for 
diversity. When a person with disabilities 
lives in a community that tolerates inclu-
sive education, the magnitude of exclusion 
is only 16 percent. However, this figure rises 
to 30 percent when the community is less 
open to inclusive education. By contrast, 
tolerance of corruption worsens exclusion 
outcomes. The magnitude of social exclu-
sion is nine times higher in villages and 
seven times higher in small towns where 
the majority of respondents tolerates infor-
mal payments.
Spatial aspects of social exclusion  
and mono-company towns
Social exclusion has clear spatial dimen-
sions. The farther people live from urban 
centres, the greater the social exclusion. The 
percentage of socially excluded persons in 
rural areas is almost four times that of per-
sons in urban areas. Living in rural areas is 
a massive disadvantage. With fewer job op-
portunities and networks and less access to 
goods, social services and transport, many 
rural dwellers choose to migrate to urban 
areas, a phenomenon that does not always 
benefit society at large. 
The report finds that social exclusion is 
highest in communities that had been 
dominated by one or two companies prior 
to 1989. This is an important issue. The Rus-
sian Federation, for example, has desig-
nated 335 towns as mono-company towns, 
with a combined population of 16 million 
people. Our data show that if such commu-
nities were to diversify their economic base 
and provide more employment opportuni-
ties, the average magnitude of social exclu-
sion they experience would decrease from 
18 to 11 percent. This would be particularly 
effective for addressing social exclusion 
among young people. The magnitude of 
social exclusion for a young person with 
secondary education in a rural community 
with only one employer is more than three 
times higher than for a young person with 
primary education in a small town with 
multiple employers.  
Recommendations
To reduce social exclusion, governments 
should foster increased employment op-
portunities, particularly where people live 
in mono-company towns. Furthermore, 
policy makers would do well not only to 
boost the number of employers but also to 
increase social services and avenues for po-
litical representation. Local development 
strategies need to consider such activities 
when embarking upon employment gen-
eration programmes. 
Furthermore, governments should address 
the three dimensions of social exclusion—
exclusion from economic life, from social 
services, and from civic life and networks–
in an integrated manner. Simply reducing 
income poverty or addressing one indi-
vidual risk or driver will not eradicate social 
exclusion. Instead, multiple interventions, 
implemented in a concerted manner, re-
flecting the complexity of the problem, are 
needed.  
Policy commitment with clear targets 
There is a need for a long-term policy com-
mitment to social inclusion. Social inclu-
sion should be as high on policy agendas 
as economic growth or poverty reduction. 
As a first step, governments need to adopt 
well-defined strategies for combating social 
exclusion, with clear responsibilities and a 
designated lead agency. The experience of 
EU member states—although developed 
and tested in a different economic and po-
litical context—can be useful in that regard. 
Political will is also necessary to implement 
evidence-based policies with clear social 
inclusion targets and measurable indica-
tors. 
Political commitments need to be matched 
by well-defined targets and transparent 
monitoring based on relevant indicators. 
Without the accountability stemming from 
using such targets and progress indicators 
in a robust and independent monitoring 
and evaluation system, social inclusion will 
remain a slogan. The indicators proposed in 
this report can act as guiding examples and 
5starting points for developing and further 
tailoring indicators to national and sub-
national contexts.  
Preventive focus on individual vulnerabilities 
Addressing individual risks that make peo-
ple vulnerable to exclusion before those 
risks translate into social exclusion should 
take place in two areas that complement 
and reinforce each other. The first encom-
passes the entire range of social services 
that improve individuals’ capacity to re-
spond to exclusion risks. The second area 
largely falls under social protection and so-
cial safety nets. 
 Basic services should be accessible to all. 
They should be appropriate, adaptive and 
flexible. The provision of quality and ac-
cessible education, health, housing, water, 
sanitation and transportation services is 
vital to break the intergenerational cycle 
of social exclusion in the region. Improving 
access to these services for all is a prereq-
uisite for addressing inequality and social 
exclusion.
 Accessible education that adapts to the 
changing economic and social environment 
is particularly important in the context of 
social inclusion. Educational systems’ per-
formance outcomes materialize over gen-
erations. In the region, the achievements of 
the previous system are often perceived as 
‘given’ – which they are not. In fact, while 
the post-transition averages do not place 
the region behind other regions of similar 
development levels, these countries were 
distinctly ahead in such comparisons two 
decades ago. Moreover, some countries 
have gone through a marked absolute 
worsening. Understanding the momentum 
of the educational systems and their po-
tential role in the social exclusion chain is 
crucial for social inclusion.
 Social policies are not currently fulfilling 
their potential to promote social inclusion. 
A legacy of category-based social protec-
tion and a combination of legalism in terms 
of formal rights and discretion in the front-
line bureaucracy, along with stigma, dis-
crimination and formalistic approaches led 
to increasingly poorly targeted benefits. 
A good short-to-medium-term approach 
would be to focus on universal child ben-
efits and the provision of quality social ser-
vices and adequate social pensions. Much 
could be achieved within the existing fiscal 
envelope, if the reallocation of resources 
were based on sound first principles, focus-
ing on actual needs and effective impact 
monitoring. 
 Employability and inclusive markets 
matter. An important way to promote both 
employment opportunities for popula-
tion groups at risk of social exclusion and 
a mindset change in society at large is to 
improve the employability of the labour 
force through improved vocational edu-
cation, active labour market policies and 
through developing or strengthening the 
small-scale private sector, including the so-
cial economy. 
Clear focus on people’s capacities
For social inclusion policies to yield results, 
they need to aim for changes in norms and 
institutions to enable them to identify and 
expand people’s capacities and opportuni-
ties. The report argues for inclusive institu-
tions, education and labour market policies 
to support inclusive, diversified growth 
and to help change mindsets. These would 
gradually change the drivers of social exclu-
sion to begin acting as drivers for inclusion, 
and raise tolerance in society. 
 Governments have a clear responsibility 
for defining and enforcing equal ‘rules of 
the game’ and preventing market failures. 
For that purpose, improving the quality of 
governance is highly important and entails 
improving accountability, strengthening 
national institutions and increasing their 
transparency, thereby decreasing corrup-
tion. It also entails increasing the govern-
ment’s effectiveness in the provision of 
public services. These steps would bridge 
the gap between citizens and the state 
making the former more willing to iden-
tify with—and be part of, included in—the 
scope of activities of the latter.
 People and their well-being are the ulti-
mate objectives of economic development. 
It is of utmost importance that any model 
of development needs to be more oriented 
towards sustainable sources of growth and 
less concentrated in the capital cities. Only 
then can growth markedly reduce the mag-
nitude and depth of social exclusion.  
 Diversifying development opportunities 
is a critical dimension of inclusive growth. 
It entails policies that increase the chances 
for starting small- and medium-sized enter-
prises, decrease the dependency of local 
authorities on central transfers while giving 
6them more responsibility for budget use, 
and strengthening mechanisms to  make 
them  accountable to local populations; 
stimulate local economic development, 
and ‘crowd in’ private investment by pro-
viding an improved business climate, infra-
structure, and communication.
Deliberate efforts to change mindsets
Even the best-crafted policies will not do 
much unless they resonate with the expec-
tations of responsive and supportive con-
stituencies. To have lasting positive effect, 
policies need to be communicated to the 
public and the public needs to see them 
as legitimate and in society’s interest. Seen 
from that perspective, changing mindsets 
towards universally accepted values has 
immediate policy relevance. Values have 
shifted during transition. For example, in 
Central Asia the wholesale rejection of the 
previous system’s values is resulting in a 
return to traditional gender and cultural 
norms, which can create new sources of 
exclusion for women. Decreasing levels of 
solidarity in combination with intolerance 
to diversity can result in increasing discrim-
ination against ethnic minorities, persons 
with disabilities, people with different sex-
ual orientation, people living with HIV, and 
former prisoners. Two additional features 
stand out:
 Changing mindsets requires long-term 
approaches. These include strengthening 
comprehensive anti-discrimination laws, 
policies and institutional mechanisms 
based on respect for human rights, dignity 
and freedom matched by implementation 
capacity. Weak legal frameworks and insti-
tutions result in low levels of acceptance of 
inclusive measures (such as inclusive edu-
cation), and hence also need to be targeted 
by policies.
 Changing mindsets in minority popula-
tions is also important. Inclusion is a two-
sided process in which both the excluded 
and the majority population must accept 
and accommodate the characteristics of 
the other.
Implementing these recommendations 
will not guarantee success. The process will 
differ from country to country. But apply-
ing the policies outlined in this report will 
bring us one step closer to a more efficient 
and sustainable society—one where peo-
ple can realize their full potential.
 
7his chapter introduces the termi-
nology of the report. Drawing on 
the definitions used by the Euro-
pean Union (EU) and UNDP, it defines so-
cial exclusion, social inclusion and human 
development. It then links these three con-
cepts, articulating a single framework for 
social exclusion and human development 
in the Europe and Central Asia region.
Definitions and 
terminology
This report views social exclusion and social 
inclusion through a human development 
lens, which emphasizes the ‘expansion of 
people’s freedoms to live long, healthy 
and creative lives; to advance other goals 
they have reason to value; and to engage 
actively in shaping development equita-
bly and sustainably on a shared planet’.3 
Human development is both about status 
(the achieved level of development) and 
process (the kind of development that is 
people-centred, where people are the ben-
eficiaries and also the agents of change–
both as individuals and as groups).
Human development:   
A people-centred approach
2010 marked the 20th anniversary of the hu-
man development concept, which serves as 
the analytical framework for UNDP’s global, 
regional and national human development 
reports (HDRs). Since the human develop-
ment paradigm was first articulated in the 
1990 Human Development Report, the 
language, examples, and policy recom-
mendations have developed, but the focus 
has remained on people’s lives, freedoms 
and capabilities.4 People are the beneficia-
ries of development, as well as the agents 
who can improve their lives. Resources, 
incomes, institutions, as well as political or 
social guarantees, are all important policy 
goals. Ultimately, however, success must be 
defined in terms of the lives people lead, 
and the capabilities they possess.  
The key aspects of human development 
are not fixed. This flexibility enables the hu-
man development concept to be applied in 
both developing and developed countries 
and to be tailored to different national con-
texts.
‘People are the real wealth of a nation. The 
basic objective of development is to create an 
enabling environment for people to live long, 
healthy and creative lives’. These were the 
opening words of the 1990 Human Devel-
opment Report. The 1991 Human Develop-
ment Report refined the concept in a simple 
sentence: ‘The real objective of development 
is to increase people’s choices’. Additional 
choices include political freedom, guaran-
teed human rights and self-respect – what 
Adam Smith called the ability to mix with 
others without being ‘ashamed to appear 
in public’. It also argued that to advance 
human development, economic growth 
ought to be ‘participatory, distributed well, 
and sustainable’. 
The human development paradigm em-
phasizes two simultaneous processes: the 
formation of human capabilities and the 
use to which people put them. It is there-
fore a destination, a goal for social and 
political processes, as well as a roadmap. It 
refers to the processes and the outcomes of 
development as the expansion of people’s 
choices, capabilities and freedoms. 
The absence of public services, such as so-
cial assistance, health care, education and 
law enforcement, may increase vulnerabili-
ties and limit choices. Authoritarian regimes 
can violate political and civil rights and im-
pose restrictions on people’s freedom to 
participate in the social, political and eco-
nomic life of the community.5 These restric-
T
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inclusion, and human development 
4/ See Alkire (2009) for 
a full discussion of the 
evolution of the Human 
Development Reports.
3/ UNDP 2010b: 22.
“You talk to a person, it seems like you are already friends and sud-
denly you hear – “Excuse me, you are in a wheelchair and I cannot 
invite you to my birthday party … you know, you are in a wheelchair”. 
Or I ask a neighbour to help me go outside and he says – ‘Am I your 
servant who helps you go outside?’” (24-year-old man with a disabil-
ity, urban area, The Republic of Moldova)
5/ Sen 1999.
8tions effectively limit people’s choices and 
thus, their level of development. 
The 2010 Report, Rethinking Human De-
velopment, reaffirms the relevance of the 
human development paradigm in several 
ways. First, measurements of various di-
mensions of human development for 20 
years suggest that the causal links between 
economic development, democracy and 
human development are complex and 
not necessarily linear. Second, the increas-
ing uncertainty within the global financial 
system and the growing challenges posed 
by climate change reinforce the need for a 
broader concept of human development. 
Finally, the new 2010 Human Develop-
ment Index has been adjusted to take into 
account inequality, bringing the question 
of social exclusion to the forefront of the 
global debate.    
Social exclusion:  
denied participation
Social exclusion is seen in this report both 
as a process and an outcome. It is a pro-
cess that pushes certain individuals to 
the margins of society and prevents their 
full participation in relevant social, eco-
nomic, cultural, and political processes. 
As an outcome, it denotes the status and 
characteristics of the excluded individual. 
Social exclusion status has many dimen-
sions – poverty, lack of basic competencies, 
limited employment and educational op-
portunities, as well as inadequate access to 
social and community networks and activi-
ties. Differentiating between exclusion as 
a ‘process’ and as a ‘status’ is important for 
understanding the dynamic relationships 
among the different dimensions of social 
exclusion. A focus-group participant cap-
tured this idea succinctly: “When you work, 
you have friends. As soon as you lose your job, 
you have no friends at all”.  6
The concept of social exclusion has evolved 
with the concept of social rights, rooted in 
the idea of the European welfare state. In 
1974, René Lenoir, the Secretary of State 
for Social Issues in the Gaullist Government 
led by Jacques Chirac in France, in his study 
‘Les Exclus’ defined ‘the excluded’ as  peo-
ple from all social categories who are not 
included in the social insurance systems of 
the welfare state.7 
The concept has been further adapted 
and rearticulated over time. Within the dis-
course of citizenship, social rights and so-
cial justice, the status of ‘being socially ex-
cluded’ is not merely understood as a lack 
of access to goods, but as a lack of access 
to rights. If poverty is defined in relation to 
income or material deprivation, social ex-
clusion is defined in relation to social rights 
such as the right to work, housing, health 
services, and education.8
For Sen,9 social exclusion occurs when one 
does not have the freedom to undertake 
activities that a person would have reason 
to choose.  The process of social exclusion 
is intrinsically linked to the denial of free-
dom. People may be excluded from taking 
advantage of an opportunity because of a 
deliberate policy or practice in society (‘ac-
tive exclusion’), or as a result of a complex 
web of social processes in which there are 
no deliberate attempts to exclude (passive 
exclusion). 
There are many examples of both kinds of 
social exclusion. For instance, unemploy-
ment experienced by a particular group 
of people, such as migrants in their host 
country, on account of specific legal restric-
tions, constitutes ‘active exclusion’. Passive 
exclusion occurs when unemployment re-
sults from a complex web of institutional 
and systemic factors with no employment-
specific decisions involved.
The process of social exclusion, whether 
active or passive, may result in reduced hu-
man capabilities. Reduced capabilities in 
one field might be responsible for depriva-
tions in other fields of life, further fuelling 
the process of social exclusion. Sen refers 
to this as ‘capability failures’ and believes 
that social exclusion plays an instrumental 
role. Social exclusion is multi-dimensional, 
including economic, social and civic di-
mensions. Deprivations in one dimension 
can reinforce deprivations in another, and 
these multiple deprivations can result in 
social exclusion.
Social exclusion is not only characterized 
by material deprivation, but by feelings of 
inferiority, alienation, loss, and shame. Be-
ing socially excluded is both about status 
and self-perception. Social exclusion re-
flects the status of an individual vis-à-vis 
mainstream society. This makes it much 
more relative than income poverty. How-
ever, similar to poverty monitoring, the 
relative nature of social exclusion does not 
preclude its measurement both in relative 
and absolute terms.
6/ UNDP Montenegro 2009.
7/ Lenoir 1974.
8/ Lister 2004.
9/ Sen 2000.
9In essence, social exclusion can be defined 
as the inability to participate in aspects of 
social life that people value and have a 
right to, be they participation in political 
processes, labour markets, education and 
health systems, or cultural life. Exclusion 
is generated by the action (or inaction), 
of a person, a group or an institution. As 
an outcome, the opposite of social exclu-
sion implies social equality. The opposite 
of social exclusion as a process is not just 
‘inclusion’, but expansion of opportunities 
for participation in economic, social and 
civic processes that are considered ‘normal’ 
in mainstream society. This makes the con-
cept closely linked to the human develop-
ment approach, and highlights the restrict-
ed freedoms and contributing factors that 
might lead to social exclusion: discrimina-
tory practices, unequal power relations and 
institutional barriers that prevent access to 
public services and political participation.
Social inclusion: expanding 
opportunities
Social inclusion is also a process and an 
outcome. The European Commission de-
fines social inclusion as ‘a process which 
ensures that those at risk of poverty and 
social exclusion gain the opportunities and 
resources necessary to participate fully in 
economic, social and cultural life, and to 
enjoy a standard of living and well-being 
that is considered normal in the society in 
which they live. It ensures that they have 
greater participation in decision-making, 
which affects their lives and access to fun-
damental rights (as defined in the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union)’.10 This definition merges the desired 
outcome (well-being that is considered 
normal) with the process through which it 
can be achieved (opportunities for partici-
pation).  
The social inclusion approach acknowledg-
es the need to offer those outside main-
stream society a greater say – that is, great-
er participation – as a means to achieve 
well-being that is considered normal. Thus, 
social inclusion is about ‘redistribution of 
social opportunities’ among all segments of 
the population. It can be evaluated against 
the yardstick of a ‘quality of life’ that people 
value. It involves participation and integra-
tion into institutions and social networks.
Thus, social inclusion does not entail simply 
a reversal of social exclusion in terms of sta-
tus. Elements of the process of social inclu-
sion that contribute to overcoming social 
exclusion (like participation and involve-
ment) have intrinsic value. Social inclusion 
involves at least two steps. One is removing 
barriers in a wide sense: barriers to participa-
tion and to access to resources and oppor-
tunities. The second is promoting a change 
in attitudes. Even though legal structures 
might be in place, policies are needed to 
cultivate solidarity, counteract entrenched 
social prejudices, and encourage the partic-
ipation of individuals facing barriers. All are 
important elements of the social inclusion 
process, which involves changing attitudes 
towards what is accepted as ‘normal’. Suc-
cessful social inclusion policies, supported 
by effective implementation mechanisms, 
have demonstrated that prejudices need 
not be passed from one generation to the 
next.  For example, in the majority of OECD 
countries, social norms that had excluded 
women or segregated minorities in the 
1960s became socially unacceptable by the 
end of the 1990s.
Promoting social inclusion requires under-
standing the root causes of social exclusion, 
such as discriminatory actions, failure in ac-
countability of the state and its institutions, 
and structural inefficiencies. Social inclu-
Box 1: UNDP’s body of research on social exclusion and social 
inclusion
This report has been enriched by an extensive body of research 
produced by universities, institutions related to the European 
Commission, as well as by UNDP:
 Social exclusion through a human development lens has been 
analysed comprehensively by the National Human Development 
Report for Bosnia and Herzegovina (2007), Social Inclusion in BiH, 
Croatia (2007), Unplugged: Faces of Social Exclusion in Croatia, 
and Montenegro (2009), A Society for All and Kosovo (2011), 
Social Inclusion.
 Methods for measuring and analysing social exclusion, inequal-
ities, and vulnerability have been developed in Poland (2007), 
Social Exclusion and Integration in Poland: An Indicators-based 
approach, and the Republic of Moldova (2010), Approaches to 
Social Exclusion in the Republic of Moldova: Methodological 
and Analytical Aspects.
 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has produced regu-
lar People-centred Analysis Reports monitoring social exclusion 
and the quality of life over time (2008, 2009 and 2010).
 UNDP in Ukraine has produced a policy and institutional analy-
sis of social inclusion capacities, European Choice and Social 
Sector Institutions (2010). 
10/ European Commission 
2004.
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sion also requires addressing them. For this, 
the human rights-based approach can be 
an important policy tool (see box 2).
The EU has applied, promoted and ad-
vanced the concept of social inclusion 
through direct policies in member states, 
which have had a catalytic effect in the EU 
and beyond. The concept is also undergo-
ing a process of ‘reinvention’ through the 
Europe 2020 agenda, the EU’s growth strat-
egy for this decade. The continuous evolu-
tion of the social inclusion concept reflects 
the need for multiple deprivation analysis 
beyond income, a step towards the human 
development approach. This report con-
tributes to this conceptual convergence 
between social inclusion and human devel-
opment.
Social exclusion, social 
inclusion and human 
development 
Social inclusion and human development 
have both gained popularity in the last two 
decades, but have largely evolved indepen-
dently of each other, without significant 
cross-fertilization. Both are people-centred 
concepts that governments increasingly 
view as integral for addressing persistent 
poverty and shortfalls in education and 
health.  
Human development is the goal of devel-
opment; social inclusion is the means to 
achieve it. Social inclusion involves remov-
ing the obstacles that prevent people from 
realizing their capabilities. However, social 
inclusion is more than just ‘lack of exclu-
sion’. Human development is only partially 
achieved by decreasing social exclusion. 
Achieving human development requires 
deliberate inclusive processes that expand 
people’s freedoms and create an inclusive 
society in which diversity is a source of 
strength. 
The three concepts complement each 
other. The human development para-
digm adds value to social exclusion and 
inclusion. Human development is both an 
evaluative framework as well as an agency-
driven policy framework. Human develop-
ment as an evaluative framework identifies 
shortcomings and inequalities in opportu-
nities for developing capabilities that con-
tribute to social exclusion. In addition, it as-
sesses the outcomes of the social inclusion 
process through a variety of indicators. As 
an agency-driven policy framework, human 
development aims to empower people to 
pursue an improved social, cultural and 
economic environment. It helps to identify 
approaches that address social exclusion. 
It takes into account context—widening 
the focus beyond the excluded population. 
Furthermore, human development helps 
to identify structural failures that prevent 
people from developing their capabilities. 
(Figure 1.1 illustrates the relationships be-
tween the concepts.)
Reversing direction, social exclusion and in-
clusion add value to human development 
by providing a process perspective or, in 
other words, the ‘agency’ of social exclu-
sion (agents, groups, and institutions that 
exclude) to the concept of human devel-
opment. It reinforces the notion of agency 
that exists within the human development 
framework by examining through what 
mechanisms, and as a result of whose ac-
tions, and why, people are excluded. Agen-
cy is therefore a key element in studying 
social exclusion11 and the common denom-
inator between social inclusion and human 
development. 
The social exclusion concept recognizes 
the role of informal and formal aspects. In-
formal ones include values, trust, informal 
economic activities, social groups, family 
ties, or informal networking. These affect 
the process of human development as 
much as formal aspects do, notably institu-
tions, organizations, laws, and norms. So-
Figure 1.1: The relationship between human development, 
social exclusion and social inclusion
Human development 
as an evaluative 
framework
Human development 
as an agency-driven 
framework
Social exclusion 
shortcomings 
Social inclusion 
outcomes 
assesses
Social inclusion 
processes
enables
identifies
11/ Atkinson 1998.
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cial exclusion also provides a new perspec-
tive on human development by assigning 
a central role to relational connections and 
unequal power relationships that are often 
at the root of every type of social exclu-
sion.12 According to Silver,13 social exclusion 
ruptures the bond between society and the in-
dividual. Exclusion thus destroys the much-
needed bond of solidarity and places some 
members of society beyond the margins, 
who then cease to be a cause for concern 
for those inside. Over time, the enhanced 
homogeneity and sense of shared identity 
among the insiders reinforce the social ex-
clusion of those outside.
Monitoring social 
exclusion
Dimensions of analysis
While rooted in the human development 
concept, this report captures the three in-
terlinked dimensions of social exclusion: 
exclusion from economic life, exclusion 
from social services, and exclusion from 
civic life. 
Exclusion from economic life can be seen in 
inequities in assets, incomes and employ-
ment opportunities. Limited access to ma-
terial resources results from exclusion in 
this dimension. Once exclusion occurs, it is 
likely to contribute to further exclusion, not 
only in economic life, but also in the other 
two dimensions.
Exclusion from social services results from 
unequal access to education, health care, 
housing, social protection and so forth. 
People thus excluded have limited oppor-
tunities to enjoy the level of services per-
ceived as ‘normal’. These limited opportu-
nities can be the consequence of material 
deprivation, but they can also result from 
inadequate institutional rules governing 
the supply of such services.
Exclusion from civic and social life and net-
works results from inequalities in political, 
cultural and civic opportunities and power 
(including political, bureaucratic and mili-
tary power), unequal access to justice, lib-
erty and institutions. Reduced participa-
tion in social and political life results from 
exclusion in this dimension. 
There are numerous links between the 
three dimensions of exclusion. Exclusion 
in all three dimensions is both an outcome 
(defining the status of the individual) and 
an element leading to further exclusion in 
all three dimensions. Exclusion in one di-
mension also increases the risk of exclusion 
in the other two. For instance, limited in-
comes may reduce access to social services 
if an unofficial payment is required.
Limited employment opportunities can im-
pede participation in social networks. Lim-
ited educational opportunities often lead 
to lower employment opportunities and 
can reduce political participation to occa-
sional (often manipulated) ballot casting 
without real opportunity to express and 
defend one’s political interests.
Box 2: A rights-based approach to social exclusion – the what, 
who and how of social inclusion
The Human Rights Based approach (HRBA) to development uses 
the conceptual and analytical strength of human rights to analyse 
and address various forms of inequality and exclusion in politi-
cal, economic or social terms. As a development framework, it is 
normatively based on international human rights standards and 
operationally directed to promoting and protecting human rights. 
The HRBA moves development action from the optional realm 
of benevolence (or charity) into the mandatory realm of law. It 
changes the focus from regarding people as passive beneficiaries of 
state policies to active participants in their own development and 
further recognizes them as rights-holders, thereby placing them 
at the centre of the development process. The HRBA addresses the 
‘what’ question: what practices and policies constitute the building 
blocks of exclusion and what needs to be changed. It focuses on 
analysing the inequalities, discriminatory practices, and unjust 
power relations that are the root causes of human rights and devel-
opment challenges, and the processes that exacerbate exclusion 
and ultimately may lead to social fragmentation and conflict.  
In addition, the HRBA addresses the ‘who’ question by specifically 
focusing on groups subjected to discrimination and suffering from 
disadvantages and exclusion. Such groups include children, mi-
norities and women. The twin principles of non-discrimination and 
equality call for a focus on gender equality and women’s human 
rights in all development programmes. With respect to identifying 
the necessary measures that need to taken – the ‘how’ question 
comes into play. In this regard, the HRBA emphasizes participation 
at every stage of the programming process, particularly of those 
who are being disadvantaged. It also emphasizes the account-
ability of the state and its institutions with regard to respecting, 
protecting and fulfilling human rights within its jurisdiction. 
“It hurts a lot, because I think that, at 44, it is still possible to have a 
job, to work, while staying at home is a hard issue... first of all, we are 
assigned to a disability group by a ‘medical commission’, we have no 
right to work, and we also have nowhere to work” (A rural woman, 
suffering from rheumatic arthritis, Republic of Moldova).
12/ Steward et al. 2006.
 13/ Silver 1995.
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The social exclusion chain
Social exclusion is the result of multiple and 
mutually reinforcing deprivations in one or 
more dimensions. This report departs from 
the traditional group-based approach. It 
assumes that each individual has a num-
ber of individual characteristics that can put 
him or her at risk of social exclusion. We 
define those characteristics as social exclu-
sion risks. These can be related to gender, 
ethnicity, language, religion, age, sexual 
orientation, religious beliefs and disability, 
as well as linked to status (income, health, 
employment, education, resources, oppor-
tunities and assets). Being disabled, poorly 
educated, a workaholic, or a fan of a partic-
ular football team can put a person at risk 
of social exclusion. 
Not all individual risks result in social ex-
clusion. Whether social exclusion occurs 
depends on the interaction of risks with a 
set of ‘drivers’ that can be structural, behav-
ioural, or policy-related:
 The first group of drivers relates to how 
public and private institutions and norms, 
including legislation, contribute to exclu-
sion through discriminatory practices or by 
failing to provide opportunities for inclu-
sion or for protection of the excluded. For 
example, the existence of anti-discrimina-
tory legislation should decrease a disabled 
person’s risk of social exclusion. A gay cou-
ple faces a higher risk of exclusion in a state 
where same-sex marriage is banned. 
 The second group of drivers includes 
values (and behavioural patterns), which 
are shaped by discriminatory attitudes and 
cultural practices that regulate norms and 
behaviours in society and among groups, 
but also include forms of self-exclusion. 
For example, a bright child willing to study 
is at higher risk of social exclusion if his or 
her peers don’t value knowledge, or if they 
don’t perceive the acquisition of knowledge 
to be congruent with the majority culture. 
These drivers will also influence structures, 
institutions and policies through, for exam-
ple, changes in political culture. 
 The third group of drivers includes poli-
cies, which reflect and respond to both 
structures and values. For example, even if 
institutional structures to address Roma ex-
clusion (say, in the form of National Coun-
cils for Roma integration) exist, social ex-
clusion of Roma can persist unless explicit 
policies for inclusion are formulated and 
implemented. 
Drivers determine a person’s environment. 
Some are country-specific (like national le-
gal frameworks). Others, however, are gen-
eral to the region (including culture and 
tolerance). Ultimately, these drivers interact 
with individual risks to produce exclusion. 
For example, every person with a disability 
faces some risk of social exclusion, but the 
extent to which this risk results in social ex-
clusion depends on the drivers: the way a 
society views the disability (cultural charac-
teristics), the degree of accessibility of pub-
lic space (physical parameters of the envi-
ronment), and legal protection of rights. 
Apart from drivers, individual risks are also 
influenced by the local context—the pa-
rameters of which shape everyday lives. 
Those parameters include characteristics 
of the local economy (such as employment 
opportunities), history of local conflict, en-
vironmental legacies, the state of basic in-
frastructure, and distance to the capital or 
regional centre (which is usually a growth 
pole). Drivers and the local context are ex-
ternal to the individual. They represent two 
aspects of the environment where individ-
ual risks can result in exclusion. But they are 
different. Drivers have national relevance. 
The local context, however, differs from 
place to place and from region to region. 
As a result, social exclusion can vary from 
locality to locality even if a person has the 
same mix of individual risks.
Social exclusion reflects a dynamic chain 
with multiple feedback loops. The relation-
ship between individual risks and drivers 
results in multiple deprivations. These are 
augmented or mitigated by the local con-
text. The interaction of individual risks, driv-
ers, and the local context can also feed into 
further social exclusion. Together, these 
elements constitute the social exclusion 
chain. 
Contrary to traditional group-focused ap-
proaches, this report maintains that social 
exclusion is not only about disadvantaged 
or marginalized populations outside of 
mainstream society. It is about individual 
risks every member of society faces. Ex-
“Disabled persons find employment in three ways: through (affirma-
tive action), through friends, and by accident, if no one else wants to 
take the job” (a blind person, Serbia).
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ternal factors largely determine whether 
social exclusion materializes or not. These 
external factors include the drivers inter-
acting with the local context. The process 
of translating individual risks into social 
exclusion occurs along the social exclusion 
chain (figure 1.2).  
All elements of the social exclusion chain 
are influenced by legacies of the previous 
system and the specifics of transition in dif-
ferent national settings. The environment 
in which people live, where they develop 
their capabilities and make their choices, is 
a patchwork of elements, old and new, in-
herited and newly introduced during tran-
sition. The resulting mix can be enabling 
or disabling, leading to different levels of 
social exclusion. All this directly influences 
human development. 
The integrated framework of social exclu-
sion and human development put forth 
here is more absolute than the relative EU 
concept of social exclusion, which com-
pares an individual’s situation with those of 
other members of society. The framework 
elaborated and applied in this report ob-
serves and monitors the social exclusion 
status of individuals in relation to their ca-
pabilities. ‘Being excluded’ means ‘facing 
an unacceptable number of deprivations’, 
rather than ‘belonging to a minority isolat-
ed from the majority’. Thus, the inclusion/
exclusion dynamics are not about the re-
lationship between ‘a part and the whole’, 
but about the relationship between an in-
dividual’s actual and potential capabilities.
This framework has important implications. 
First, it suggests that a very high share of 
society can be excluded. Second, it allows 
us to deconstruct social exclusion to gain a 
more precise understanding of its determi-
nants. It links individual risks to drivers of 
exclusion to create a pattern based on the 
‘intersection’ of multiple forms of exclusion 
and discrimination. Also, identifying driv-
Figure 1.2: The ‘social exclusion chain’
Specific local conditions
Predominant industry, 
single or multiple employ-
ment  opportunities, local 
infrastructures, history of 
violent conflict or environ-
mental disasters
of the individual in three 
dimensions – exclusion 
from economic life, social 
services, and civic and 
social participation
Social exclusion status 
Drivers of social exclusion
Structures and institutions;  
values and behaviour patterns; policies
Individual characteristics
(social exclusion risk factors) like  
poor education, disability,  
minority status
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ers in the local context and assessing their 
contribution to social exclusion outcomes 
make it possible to go beyond broad na-
tional generalizations towards targeted 
analysis. For example, a single-parent, a 
person facing long-term unemployment, a 
Roma woman with a number of children, or 
someone living in a rural area all face inter-
secting and mutually reinforcing exclusion 
risks. At the same time, while it is possible 
to discuss the social exclusion of people 
with disabilities throughout the region, the 
extent and nature of their exclusion clearly 
differs from one sub-region to another, as 
well as within countries. Applying the so-
cial exclusion concept in this way can shed 
light on social exclusion patterns in coun-
tries with a given transition experience. It 
can also illuminate the pre-transition lega-
cies that a country faces, as well as offer a 
basis for future evidence-based inclusive 
policy design and monitoring.
Social exclusion enables us to better under-
stand inequalities and the underlying pro-
cesses in countries with medium to high 
human development levels. This makes it 
relevant for the Europe and Central Asia 
region. The concept is even more pertinent 
given the region’s transition history. Social 
exclusion would still exist had there not 
been transition. Exclusionary structures ex-
isted before transition. Similarly, the specif-
ics of inclusion are related to the specifics 
of transition in individual countries. Thus 
incorporating the influence of legacies into 
the analysis is a key part of this report’s con-
ceptual framework.
Major findings of this 
chapter
This chapter has put forth a conceptual 
framework for social exclusion, which im-
pedes people’s participation in various 
spheres of life. Social exclusion not only af-
fects disadvantaged or marginalized popu-
lations. It can affect everybody, since each 
of us faces risks. Social exclusion stems 
from deprivations experienced along three 
dimensions: economic exclusion, exclusion 
from social services, and civic exclusion. 
Individual risks interact with drivers and lo-
cal context to produce social exclusion. The 
interaction of these elements can result 
in further exclusion. Like human develop-
ment, social exclusion is both an outcome 
and a process. The framework outlined here 
can help turn the social inclusion concept 
into a powerful policy tool, enabling us to 
better understand unequal development 
outcomes. This tool will help to address 
patterns of social exclusion, as well as to 
serve as a basis for evidence-based, inclu-
sive policy design and monitoring. 
The next chapter analyses more deeply 
how people are excluded in the three di-
mensions of social exclusion, and identifies 
those deprivations that are particularly rel-
evant to the region.
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his chapter contextualizes the 
multidimensional data analysis 
presented in subsequent chapters. 
It outlines some of the key features of the 
transition dynamic that have characterized 
the Europe and Central Asia region, not just 
the six surveyed countries. Furthermore, 
it highlights aspects of the region’s recent 
history that have impacted social exclusion 
in the three dimensions discussed in chap-
ter one—exclusion from economic life, ex-
clusion from social services, and exclusion 
from participation in civic and social life 
and networks. The three dimensions are 
used to construct the Social Exclusion In-
dex presented in chapter three.
Transition in the Europe and 
Central Asia region 
The Europe and Central Asia region is di-
verse (box 3). Differing initial conditions 
and EU accession processes, as well as the 
diversity of transition strategies pursued, 
have all contributed to the heterogeneity 
of the region. While this diversity compli-
cates intra-regional comparisons of social 
exclusion, analysis of sub-regional data re-
T
Chapter 2: Dimensions of exclusion 
in the region
Box 3. The definition of the region 
For the purposes of this report, the Europe and Central Asia region is defined to include those states that fall 
within UNDP’s Regional Bureau for Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)—except Turkey, 
Cyprus and Malta, which do not share the legacy of socialism. To take account of intra-regional differences, we 
further group countries into three sub-regions:
 SEE (Southeast Europe): Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo,* the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia.**
 CEE (Central and Eastern Europe): The Baltic countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Central European 
countries, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia–all members of the EU.
 CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) and Georgia.*** The countries in this sub-region fall into three 
groups: Western CIS (Russian Federation, Belarus, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine), Caucasus (Azerbaijan, 
Armenia, and Georgia) and Central Asia (Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan).
Figure 2.1: GDP per-capita trends 1990-2008 (as а percentage 
of 1990 values) 
*/  Kosovo is hereafter referred to in the context of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999).
**/ All except Albania emerged after the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
***/ Georgia withdrew from the Commonwealth of Independent States after the conflict with Russia in 2008. Turkmenistan is an unofficial associate member. In 
this report we will use the abbreviation CIS loosely, as a geographical grouping for all the former Soviet Republics excluding the Baltic states. 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank (2010).
Note: GDP per capita is in purchasing power parity terms with constant US$. 
The base year is 1990 (with a value of 100). 
veals some general trends that merit dis-
cussion. 
By the first half of the 1990s, the transition 
recession had taken its toll (figure 2.1). Most 
countries resumed positive growth only in 
the second part of the decade.  However, 
the growth was not accompanied by a cor-
responding recovery in employment (fig-
1990 1995 2000 2005 2008
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Figure 2.3: The Human Development Index, 1990-2007
Figure 2.2: Employment ratios (in percent), 1990-2008
Figure 2.4: Income inequality as measured by the Gini 
coefficient, 1989-2005
Sources: Employment ratio—TRANSMONEE Database UNICEF (2010) and Eurostat (2010); HDI—UNDP Human 
Development Report 2009 and 2010; Gini index—UNICEF 2001; TRANSMONEE Database UNICEF (2010)
Note: The employment ratio is the number of employed as a percent of the population aged 15-59 (aged 15-64 
for the EU-15). Sub-regional averages were weighted by population shares. 
ure 2.2). Human development in the West-
ern CIS and Central Asia followed a similar 
pattern, falling in the early 1990s but rising 
in the latter part of the decade (figure 2.3). 
Countries experienced a significant increase 
in income inequality (figure 2.4) within and 
across sub-regions, followed by some level-
ling off starting in 2000. To some extent, the 
observed differences in sub-regional trends 
can be explained by poor data quality due 
to inadequate estimates of income derived 
from informal activities, difficulties in cap-
turing the highest decile (in some contexts 
associated with the shadow economy and 
even with criminal activity), uneven territo-
rial coverage of household budget surveys, 
or inadequate sampling construction.  The 
trend however is consistent, with different 
patterns of reform in countries and sub-re-
gions. Clusters of countries have emerged 
with similar levels of income and income 
inequality (figure 2.5).
The dynamic of social exclusion unfolds 
within this larger context. We will now ex-
plore this dynamic further by elaborating 
the three dimensions of social exclusion 
that were introduced in chapter one. 
Exclusion from 
economic life
Economic exclusion marginalizes indi-
viduals in the distribution of economic 
resources. From the human development 
perspective, this hinders the development 
of people’s capabilities, which help them to 
satisfy their needs and exercise their rights, 
enabling them to make choices to attain 
the living standards and quality of life 
that they value. Economic exclusion limits 
people’s access to the labour, financial and 
housing markets, as well as to goods and 
services. This leads not only to income pov-
erty, but also to reduced access to services 
such as education, health care and social 
insurance—ultimately resulting in a loss of 
capabilities.
The feedback loops are crucial. For exam-
ple, exclusion from the labour market leads 
to the loss of critical social benefits – such 
as health care, pension and disability in-
surance – which increases the risk of long-
term exclusion. Furthermore, economic 
exclusion resulting from poverty and mate-
rial deprivation reduces opportunities for 
education and participation in social net-
1990 1995 2000 2005 2008
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works. Economic exclusion contributes to a 
culture of poverty characterized by feelings 
of powerlessness, discouragement and de-
spair.
Access to decent work is one of the most 
important conditions of inclusion, because 
it can lead to improvements in other areas 
of life.  However, participation in economic 
life does not always lead directly to eco-
nomic inclusion. Examples include informal 
labour that is not adequately remunerated, 
employment that is not decent,  or lucra-
tive-but-illegal jobs. The ILO’s Decent Work 
Agenda identifies four strategic goals: cre-
ate decent and productive employment; 
promote access to social protection; foster 
respect for labour standards; and initiate 
stronger dialogue among interest groups. 
These objectives apply to all women and 
men, to employees and the self-employed; 
and to those who work in the formal and in-
formal economies, in the private and public 
sectors. They are also relevant for people 
who work at home.
The main elements of exclusion from eco-
nomic life are income poverty, unemploy-
ment, and lack of access to assets and capi-
tal. They will now be discussed in turn.
Income poverty
Income poverty is an obvious aspect of eco-
nomic exclusion, but it implies much more 
Figure 2.5: Income versus inequality, 2005
Source: World Bank PovCal Database
Figure 2.6: The percentage of households with per capita 
consumption below three poverty lines
than limited consumption. Poverty increas-
es people’s vulnerability to social exclusion 
in other areas of life. For example, children 
of parents who are struggling to make ends 
meet often drop out of school to get a job. 
Income poverty limits the opportunity to 
participate in public life, particularly in pe-
riods of structural transformation when the 
old ‘non-monetary’ channels of inclusion, 
such as free access to childcare, have disap-
peared without affordable market-based 
alternatives. 
In the 1980s, income poverty had been de-
clining (figure 2.6). In the early 1990s, pov-
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erty increased on an unexpected scale.14 
This happened in part because the rela-
tively low poverty levels of the 1980s had 
been financed by international borrowing. 
Thus, falling poverty in the 1980s did not 
reflect sustained gains in competitiveness 
and economic efficiency, but rather deficit 
spending.15  In subsequent years, coun-
tries have had to service the debt, which—
together with the transition recession and 
the Russian crisis—helps to explain why, in 
2005, a significant portion of the region’s 
population – approximately 142 million 
people – were living below the 4.30 PPP$/
day poverty line. 
The distribution of poverty between and 
within countries is even more important. 
Geographically isolated regions and ru-
ral areas, particularly those far from urban 
centres, were largely the poorest, pointing 
to a structural form of spatial economic ex-
clusion. Everywhere, poverty dropped sub-
stantially between 1998 and 2003, most 
notably in capitals (table 2.1). 
However, in some countries, small- and 
medium-sized towns and cities are nearly 
as poor as rural areas, or are even worse off. 
This is due partly to land reform, which in 
some cases provided agricultural land to 
rural dwellers, while citizens in ‘other urban’ 
areas (such as in ‘mono-company’ towns) 
very often lost their main source of employ-
ment, and did not have access to land. As a 
result, they had no opportunity to practice 
subsistence farming, which meant that the 
sharp food price increases of 2008 affected 
them greatly.
Poverty is also particularly prevalent 
among some ethnic minorities (especially 
Roma), refugees and internally displaced 
persons (IDPs), as a consequence of violent 
conflict), women (through exclusion of la-
bour markets and lower wages) and, last 
but not least, children. Child poverty often 
reflects the social exclusion of households. 
Children experience exclusion in their daily 
lives, but are also vulnerable as ‘adults-in-
progress’. The effects of childhood exclusion 
heighten the risk that children will grow up 
with low skills and poor health. In parts of 
the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Republic 
of Moldova, the levels of child poverty are 
particularly high (figure 2.7).  Children who 
experience poverty are usually part of fam-
ilies that have been hit by unemployment 
(or that have fallen into low-paid employ-
ment), often with many children, living in 
rural areas, or as refugees and IDPs.16 
Unemployment
Employment provides more than a wage. 
When people are excluded from formal 
employment, they are not only cut off from 
income and related benefits, but also from 
broader opportunities. Poor employment 
opportunities are a major contributor to 
exclusion from economic life.
The first years of transition saw sharp in-
creases in unemployment, straining the so-
cial fabric. The labour market offered new 
opportunities, but also demanded new 
skills, resulting in mismatches between the 
skills employers needed, and those which 
Table 2.1: Spatial distribution of consumption poverty 
(1998-2003) (in % of population)
Figure 2.7: Percentage of children living in households with daily 
per capita consumption below 2.50 US$ PPP in 2005
% Population 1998 1998 1998 2003 2003 2003
Capital Other 
Urban
Rural Capital Other 
Urban
Rural
FYR Macedonia* N/A N/A N/A 4 5 3
Serbia and 
Montenegro
N/A N/A N/A 6 4 9
Moldova** 42 70 74 27 48 47
Kazakhstan 7 25 40 2 14 31
Tajikistan 73 90 92 54 73 76
Uzbekistan 24 50 60 4 43 55
Source: World Bank (2005: 242-4)
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*/ The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is referred to as “FYR Macedonia” in the figures and tables. 
**/ The Republic of Moldova is referred to as “Moldova” in the figures and tables.
Source: UNICEF (2009)
14/ Milanovic 1998; UNDP 
1999; World Bank 2005.
15/ Gaidar 2007.
16/ FAO, 2007.
Table 2.2: Percentage of people by employment status (November 2009) 
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people possessed. These mismatches were 
more prevalent in certain sectors and age 
groups. Without effective retraining oppor-
tunities, people with obsolete skills found 
themselves vulnerable not only to poverty 
but also to exclusion in other dimensions 
(from civic life, for example). In some cases, 
this process has led to the marginalization 
of whole groups, further amplifying soci-
etal strains. 
Unemployment is not the only cause of 
poverty and vulnerability. An increasing 
number of people have been forced to 
take low-skill jobs or employment in the 
informal sector – thus joining the ranks of 
the working poor. In the region, economic 
exclusion often occurs because of labour 
informality, inactivity and under-employ-
ment. Informality has broader implications 
for social exclusion, eroding the tax base, 
institutions and societal norms. 
In the 1990s, employment ratios in the for-
mal sector fell substantially below those 
found in OECD countries, or in the EU-15 
(figure 2.2). This is particularly apparent 
in SEE, in the CIS (to varying degrees) and 
in the Caucasus. These data underlie the 
widespread problem of ‘inactivity’, as many 
under-skilled workers have become dis-
couraged from looking for work. While un-
employment was only between 4-10 per-
cent in the six countries surveyed in 2009, a 
much larger portion of workers were ‘inac-
tive’ (table 2.2). 
It is important to understand how transition 
has affected the position of women and 
men in the labour market. Under socialism, 
countries had often strongly encouraged 
women to work, in part by offering compa-
ny-sponsored childcare. However, women 
were often the first to be laid off during the 
transition recession of the early-mid 1990s. 
The impact of the 2008-09 global crisis is 
more nuanced. Women have faced a lower 
risk of being laid off, both because male-
dominated sectors such as construction 
have been among those most severely hit 
by the crisis, and because firms could save 
more by firing men, who tend to receive 
higher remuneration. But this gender ‘ad-
vantage’ is dubious, as women must gener-
ate higher incomes to support their house-
holds. Overall, inactivity among women 
in 2009 was higher than inactivity among 
men in all countries according to the ‘Social 
Exclusion Survey’ (table 2.2).  
Exclusion from the labour market is espe-
cially pronounced among ethnic minori-
ties, internally displaced persons (IDPs), 
and persons with disabilities. Within each 
category, women are more vulnerable than 
men, particularly in occupations with com-
parable remuneration. Figure 2.8 illustrates 
this vulnerability in Serbia.
 Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Employed 61 39 46 41 57 46 47 24 47 37 57 39
Unemployed 8 5 8 5 9 10 5 4 10 10 6 4
Pensioner 14 20 19 21 16 14 7 9 11 11 18 31
Children, 
students 6 6 10 11 6 6 10 8 5 8 10 8
Inactive 11 30 17 22 13 24 31 55 27 34 9 18
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Working status Kazakhstan Moldova Serbia Tajikistan FYR Macedonia Ukraine
Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009
Source: For the general population, youth and the Roma - LFS 2009, and for IDPs and people with disabilities - LSMS ‘07
Figure 2.8: Unemployment rates of the working age 
population (15-64) in Serbia 
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The regional youth unemployment rate is 
very high. In 2008 it was 17 percent. This 
represents a serious structural problem, 
given the aging population and retirees’ 
reliance on state pension benefits. Young 
people are needed to pay into the pen-
sion system to ensure sufficient funds to 
support retirees. With only limited employ-
ment opportunities, young people are of-
ten forced to take low-skilled employment, 
to leave the labour market, or to migrate to 
another country. The global economic cri-
sis has also hit youth hard. Unemployment 
rates for youth increased by 3.5 percentage 
points in SEE and CIS between 2008 and 
2009. This is the largest annual increase in 
youth unemployment rates ever recorded 
in any region.17 
Access to assets and capital
Transition has led to a skewed distribution 
of wealth. Many households have faced 
higher utility bills after privatization be-
cause hefty government subsidies for util-
ity companies were cut. Unable to pay the 
higher tariffs, many poor households were 
disconnected from utility networks.  
In many cases, privatization resulted in 
‘privatizing the profits and nationalizing 
the losses’ of state-owned enterprises, 
leading to a massive appropriation of capi-
tal. Particularly in CIS countries, economic 
wealth is now very concentrated, often in 
the hands of a small group of individuals. 
This massive asset inequality emerged in a 
very short period of time—after decades 
of state ownership. Because of an inherited 
legal framework that was not designed to 
regulate private monopolies, together with 
gaps and inconsistencies in newly adopted 
legislation, asset inequality has remained 
an obstacle to fostering inclusive growth. 
Most countries have been slow to develop 
inclusive financial systems, which can in-
crease efficiency and well-being by provid-
ing resources for secure forms of savings 
and monetary transactions.18 They also 
help people to avoid the need to tap infor-
mal and often exploitative credit sources.
Exclusion from social 
services
Social services offer a wide range of oppor-
tunities critical for human development. 
Like employment, education and health 
have intrinsic value and are important for 
social inclusion. The same applies to other 
essential social services like social protec-
tion (including social insurance, social assis-
tance and social services), access to housing 
and basic infrastructure, transport, energy, 
and information and communication tech-
nologies. Exclusion from social services re-
fers not only to whether such services are 
available and at what level of quality, but 
also to accessibility and affordability by dif-
ferent population groups—issues that this 
section examines in depth.
In the 1990s, the quality of social services 
and utilities deteriorated rapidly, in particu-
lar in the CIS and in part of SEE.19 Employer-
provided social services disappeared, and 
extended state provision or market-based 
alternatives had not yet come to replace 
them. The level of incomes and pensions 
was too low to generate sufficient demand 
for market-based social services provision. 
Attempts at decentralizing responsibilities 
to local administrations without provid-
ing them adequate resources have fur-
ther weakened the social infrastructure, in 
particular in rural areas and small towns. 
Capital-city centred models of growth and 
opportunities for employment abroad ad-
ditionally undermined finances and gov-
ernance capacity at local levels, which was 
already weak at the beginning of transition. 
All this contributed to exclusion from social 
services, either through reduced access or 
through reduced affordability.
Privatization of public utilities (water, sani-
tation and electricity) has often contributed 
to exclusion. While increasing efficiency, 
privatization failed to live up to expectations 
because there was no effective regulatory 
framework and genuine competition. State-
owned monopolies were often replaced by 
poorly regulated private monopolies. Pub-
lic subsidies for utilities (heating, water and 
electricity supply) subsequently fell sharply, 
placing cost-recovery out of reach even 
though prices of services increased sub-
stantially after privatization. In cases when 
subsidies were retained, they dispropor-
tionately benefited the more affluent seg-
19/ EBRD 2007a. EBRD 
(2007b) discusses the 
private sector’s options for 
improving services, but also 
notes that people’s satisfac-
tion with the quality of 
public services is low, some-
time in spite of relatively 
high spending rates.
17/ ILO 2010.
18/ Sarma 2008.
“If you are not associated with a party, you cannot get a job” (Urban 
youth, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).
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ments of the population, contributing to 
the exclusion of the poor. Moreover, social 
disruption and the destruction of physical 
infrastructure in war-affected areas and 
countries, notably in the former Yugoslavia, 
the Caucasus and in Tajikistan, made the 
sustainable delivery of social services and 
the effective maintenance of public utilities 
nearly impossible, with serious implications 
for social exclusion. 
Early childhood, education 
and training, and life-long 
learning
Pre-school years are immensely important 
for child development and for equality of 
opportunity. Both are vital for preventing 
the social exclusion of children, particularly 
for children from vulnerable groups who 
face the highest risk of exclusion.20 While 
pre-school facilities had been widespread 
in the region before transition, they were 
employed unevenly. In rural Central Asia, 
Azerbaijan and parts of SEE, children were 
traditionally kept within the extended fam-
ily until school age.21 Recent data on pre-
primary enrolment rates show consider-
able differences among countries, ranging 
from over 80 percent of 3-5/6 year-olds in 
Belarus, Estonia, and Hungary to just 7 per-
cent in Tajikistan (figure 2.9). 
Rural-urban disparities exist in pre-school 
education, as well as in enrolment rates by 
income quintile. There is also an increas-
ing gap between ‘elite’ kindergartens and 
‘mainstream’ (usually underfunded and 
overpopulated) facilities. As a result, in-
stead of equalizing opportunities through 
a ‘fair start for all’, pre-school and early 
childhood services themselves contribute 
to early exclusion and segmentation, par-
ticularly for minorities and marginalized 
groups. Poverty and prejudice contribute 
to extremely low enrolment rates of chil-
dren in pre-school education, augmenting 
the barriers they face later at school. The 
case of the Roma is an extreme and vivid 
illustration of this phenomenon. 
The region as a whole has high levels of pri-
mary school attendance, which is compul-
sory from six or seven to 14 or 16 years of 
age. However, household survey data tend 
to show lower enrolment rates than those 
based on administrative data, presumably 
because there are incentives to keep re-
ported rates high to access resources and 
maintain staffing levels. Rates tend to be 
lower in rural areas, for poor households 
and for some ethnic groups, notably Roma 
children in Central, Eastern and Southeast 
20/ Kertesi, Kezdi 2006.
21/ UNICEF 2009: 25.
Percentage of children aged 3-6 enrolled in pre-school education, 2008/2009
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Figure 2.9: The percentage of children enrolled in pre-school rises with income
Note: GDP per-capita is expressed here in purchasing power parity terms with constant US$.  Source: TRANSMONEE Database UNICEF (2010).
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Europe. While official figures tend to over-
estimate Roma attendance rates since the 
proportion of Roma declaring themselves 
as such in the census is quite low, Hoel-
scher suggests Roma enrolment in primary 
education is rarely above 50 percent, with 
much lower completion rates.22 
A related problem in Central, Eastern and 
Southeast Europe is the enrolment of a 
high number of Roma children in special 
and remedial education or segregated into 
primarily Roma classes or schools. These 
practices are a complex result of spatial seg-
regation, the choices made by parents of 
non-Roma children, as well as de facto or de 
jure discrimination. Of particular concern is 
the evidence from some Roma rights NGOs 
that placement of Roma in special schools 
is rarely based on ability and is often with-
out explicit parental consent.23 The meagre 
education Roma children receive in this 
manner compromises their future personal 
development, according to the European 
Court of Human Rights.24 Emphasizing the 
fundamental nature of prohibition of racial 
discrimination, the Court has condemned 
segregated education in cases against a 
number of countries and urged govern-
ments as well as other state parties to take 
action. The results, however, remain to be 
seen. 
The educational integration of children 
with disabilities is an important part of the 
social exclusion challenges in the region. In 
this field, the legacy of stigma and lack of 
quality services has combined with poor re-
sources to produce a situation where chil-
dren with disabilities are placed in special 
schools. These are often institutions remote 
from centres of population and which allow 
limited access to parents. More generally, 
there is still little mainstreaming of children 
with disabilities into integrated schools and 
classrooms and a lack of a rights-based ap-
proach to deliver good quality, coordinat-
ed, community-based support services.25 
Universal education?
While public funding for education in parts 
of the region is nominally on a par with the 
rest of the EU, structural problems in the 
educational sector persist. These relate to 
problems providing the skills demanded 
by the labour market, and to problems of 
continuing education and retraining. In 
most of the region, educational exclusion is 
less a matter of coverage and formal enrol-
ment and more a matter of substance and 
quality.
Education has tended to be relatively pro-
tected. Most countries increased funding 
Figure 2.10: Government health expenditure as a percentage of GDP (1995-2008)
Source: TRANSMONEE Database UNICEF (2010).
23/ ERRC 2005.
24/ ECHR 2007.
25/ Sammon 2001.
22/ Hoelscher 2007.
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for education in the late 1990s, returning 
to pre-transition levels. Still, gaps remain in 
terms of enrolment and performance, and 
in terms of how schools prepare poor and 
excluded groups for the labour market. In 
many countries a parallel supply of educa-
tional services has emerged (in the form 
of high school and university exam prep 
courses). Concentrated in big cities, this 
parallel supply has served to channel stu-
dents and teachers away from provincial 
schools. Many of these rural schools have 
become unattractive for teachers, trig-
gering a vicious circle of declining quality 
and funding. Public funding has tended to 
focus on maintaining compulsory educa-
tion and on basing teacher pay only loosely 
on educational results. As a consequence, 
inequalities in access and opportunities 
have strengthened as poor and excluded 
families are unable to afford school books, 
travel and clothing. 
Traditionally, education systems in socialist 
countries spent heavily on university edu-
cation, and much less on vocational and 
skill-oriented training. Professional edu-
cation was seen as a less prestigious area 
of last resort, and vocational training was 
predominantly carried out by state-owned 
enterprises training their own staff. Such 
training was the first to be cut during post-
privatization restructuring, and the state of-
ten could not fill the gap. At the same time, 
vocational offerings were often outdated 
and unappealing.26  
Long-term unemployment—particularly 
among youth—has reinforced the ‘univer-
sity bias’ of educational systems. Academic 
education is still free in most countries and 
is thus a preferable alternative to unem-
ployment. However, the mismatch between 
educational curricula and the needs of the 
labour market limits the ability of higher 
education to enhance social inclusion. This 
leads to a significant number of frustrated 
middle-aged professionals vulnerable to 
social exclusion due to their obsolete skills.
Affordable health care?
Given the intrinsic value of health from 
the human development perspective, ac-
cess to healthcare is critical for social in-
clusion. Both financial and structural rea-
sons account for health care exclusion. 
Countries in the region face severe bud-
get constraints, as well as difficulties in 
implementing reforms that balance qual-
ity services, access for all, and efficiency. 
As a result, inequalities in access to health 
care and in terms of health outcomes have 
been growing throughout the region. 
While in general, public expenditures on 
health have been maintained both as a 
percentage of GDP and in terms of ex-
penditure per person, they are still low, 
particularly in the Caucasus and Central 
Asia (figure 2.10). The gap is increasingly 
being filled by private spending. In coun-
tries where public expenditure on health 
is less than 3 percent of GDP, private 
spending in 2006 represented at least 
50 percent of overall health expenditure, 
except in Kazakhstan.27 This increases the 
risk of exclusion from health services for 
poorer households. 
Both the amount of resources devoted to 
health services and the way these funds 
are being utilized are major concerns. The 
health care system in most countries of the 
region continues to devote a disproportion-
al share of resources to hospital care at the 
expense of preventive care. In addition, the 
gap between operating costs, which are ris-
ing, and health insurance revenues, which 
are not keeping pace, is imposing huge 
strains on health insurance systems. This is 
so because the cost of inputs has increased 
rapidly (in part owing to new medical and 
pharmaceutical technology, as well as to 
the collapse of the domestic pharmaceuti-
cal sector in many countries and the result-
ing switch to more expensive imported 
supplies). At the same time, revenues from 
health insurance contributions remain very 
low, in part owing to widespread labour 
market informality that contributes to un-
der-insurance of health risks. 
While universal access is still formally guar-
anteed in several countries, it has been 
‘de facto eroded in a non-transparent way, 
especially for the poorer sections of soci-
ety’.28 The Social Exclusion Survey finds that 
a significant share of  households have to 
pay out-of-pocket or informal payments 
In the hospital in my municipality, the doctor did not treat me for the 
illness I came for, but told me: “If you can’t stop being a faggot on 
your own, I’ll send you off to Lazarevac, where they’ll sort it out with 
electric shocks, and there’s a really nice treatment, they show you a 
really handsome man, really pretty, and then they show you a car ac-
cident, and then again a nice man, and then again someone stabbed, 
and so on... ” (Focus group participant, gay person, Serbia).
26/ EBRD 2007a; Cazes 
and Nesporova 2007a; and 
Nesporova 2002.
28/ UNICEF 2009: 76.
27/ UNICEF 2009: 75.
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for drugs and services in the countries sur-
veyed (figure 2.11). Moreover, the probabil-
ity of not consulting a health professional 
when seriously ill is higher for those over 
65 and for those with lower levels of educa-
tion. Reasons include lack of money to pay 
for treatment; reliance on self-treatment; or 
distance to reach a health facility.29
Significant disinvestment over the years 
has resulted in eroded health care facili-
ties and emigration of trained medical staff, 
adversely affecting the sustainability and 
accessibility of health services and exacer-
bating individual risks of social exclusion. 
There is also concern about the migration 
of health workers from rural to urban ar-
eas.30 In Albania, for instance, infant mortal-
ity rates are about 50 percent higher in rural 
areas, with rates in different districts vary-
ing from under five to over 35 per 1,000.31
A two- or three-tier health system is emerg-
ing in the region, with the poor more likely 
to receive minimal care—or none at all. 
Advances in health care and the growth 
of privatized health care services for those 
who can afford them, sometimes within 
formally public health care facilities, have 
tended to skew priorities in favour of treat-
ment of diseases of affluence over and 
above diseases of poverty throughout the 
region. People from Roma communities 
and refugee populations, as well as those in 
agriculture, the informal and in some cases, 
the self-employed sectors visit health ser-
vice facilities less frequently, have to travel 
further, and spend a greater proportion of 
their income on health care. 32 
Two broad groups facing acute health ex-
clusion are older people and people with 
mental illness. The elderly face challenges 
in terms of appropriate long-term care ser-
vices which are neither fully hospital-based 
nor reliant on informal family and kinship 
care.33 New member states of the EU spend 
significantly less on long-term care than 
the old member states and are much less 
likely to offer a tailored mixture of servic-
es.34 Persons suffering from mental health 
problems face a striking lack of commu-
nity-based psychiatric services. Indeed, in 
many cases, living conditions in long-term 
residential facilities may breach human 
rights. Progress has been limited since tran-
sition even in new EU member states, with 
‘pockets’ of more progressive provision of 
mental health amid lamentable practices 
across the board.35
Exclusion from health care, education and 
employment can be found widely among 
people living with HIV.36 In Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia (excluding Central Europe) 
an estimated 1.5 million people were liv-
ing with HIV in 2008, an adult prevalence 
of 0.7 percent. This is higher than in all 
other regions of the world except the Ca-
ribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa. It reflects 
an increase from around 900,000 people in 
2001, with 110,000 new infections and ap-
proximately 87,000 adult and child deaths 
due to AIDS in 2008.37 It is estimated that 
about 90 percent of those infected live in 
the Russian Federation and Ukraine, where 
infection rates are 1.1 and 1.6 percent, re-
spectively. Some suggest that Russia will 
face the greatest number of AIDS-related 
deaths in the next five years. Rates are 
also high in Estonia (1.3 percent) and in 
Latvia (0.8 percent).38 Injecting drug us-
ers, sex workers and their sexual partners 
remain the groups most at risk. Significant 
problems remain in terms of attitudes and 
awareness which often act as barriers to 
access for social services, prevention, treat-
ment and appropriate long-term care. 
Social protection 
Social protection systems (social assistance, 
social insurance benefits, social services, 
social work, and counselling services) can 
be crucial sources of last-resort support 
Figure 2.11 Share of respondents saying unofficial payments are 
needed for medical treatment (in percent)
29/ Balabanova et al. 
2004.
32/ European Commission 
2009.
33/ World Bank 2007a.
34/ ESN 2009.
36/ UNDP 2008.
35/ http://www.soros.org/
initiatives/health/focus/
mhi/about/about/more.
30/ Skeldon 2005: 7.
37/ UNAIDS 2009: 11.
38/ http://www.avert.org/
aids-russia.htm.
31/ European Commission 
2008: 147-8.
%
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to the extreme poor as well as to the ex-
cluded, or to those at risk of exclusion. Such 
systems can help people avoid or manage 
risks, thereby promoting people’s re-entry 
into productive roles. They can help deal 
with the consequences of exclusion and 
can also work against some of the drivers 
of exclusion, such as extreme poverty and 
exclusion from the labour market. 
The limited fiscal envelope makes it un-
avoidable to introduce targeted elements 
into the social protection system in the re-
gion. Targeting can be carried out through 
means testing (targeting those who satisfy 
minimum income criteria), or can be cate-
gory-based, i.e. targeted at certain popu-
lation groups, such as families with more 
than three children. Meanwhile, selected 
universal social protection programmes 
can also be retained. They are easy to ad-
minister, and avoid the problems and costs 
of means testing, which can be problemat-
ic in countries where informal earnings are 
prevalent. When financed adequately, they 
can also have a high redistributive impact.  
Social services reforms have affected ser-
vice delivery and outcomes. During early 
transition, serious disinvestment occurred 
and elements of social services were placed 
on a market basis.  Some countries delayed 
reforms, maintaining formal equality of 
access to services alongside a de facto de-
terioration in provision. Social protection 
schemes in many countries in the region 
have been ‘captured’ by particular interests 
or groups,39 leading to slower reform and 
under-coverage of those groups that pos-
sess less political power. 
Pensions constitute important source of 
incomes for elderly groups and the perfor-
mance of pension systems has important 
implications for social exclusion. The old 
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system appears finan-
cially unsustainable in countries with age-
ing populations. Low and declining rates of 
social insurance contributions, exacerbated 
by high levels of informal employment, low 
employment rates and high youth unem-
ployment make prospects bleak in many 
ECA countries. Low replacement rates pro-
vide further disincentives for formal sector 
employment and for contributors to join 
the system. 
Several groups are at risk of being com-
pletely excluded from pension benefits. 
Most migrants lack social insurance both in 
the host and sending countries. Even if they 
are insured, pension contributions made in 
one country are not usually transferable to 
another, raising the prospect of working 
migrants ending up with no pension when 
they reach retirement age. This would pose 
a considerable challenge for countries with 
a high share of migrants. The large share of 
the workforce in informal-sector employ-
ment (e.g., over 50 percent of employment 
in Central Asia) is set to be left out of the 
pension system. Women working in the 
household, the self-employed in agricul-
ture, and discouraged job seekers all face 
similar risks of pension exclusion. Low pen-
sion levels are (and will likely remain) a ma-
jor factor contributing to the risk of income 
exclusion for elderly people throughout the 
region. The size of the pension is often too 
low to guarantee a decent standard of liv-
ing, and there appear to be significant dif-
ferences between pension levels for men 
and women even within CEE. 
Unemployment compensation schemes 
are now prevalent in CEE and CIS countries 
(only Tajikistan does not have one). Howev-
er, only 20–30 percent of the unemployed 
actually receive unemployment benefits in 
most of the transition countries. In the CIS, 
unemployment benefits have always been 
low, resulting in (i) only a small share of the 
unemployed registering themselves offi-
cially;40 and (ii) workers being more reluc-
tant to part with their jobs, which may have 
contributed to the slower pace of enterprise 
restructuring. On the positive side, unem-
ployment and other social benefits boost 
incomes more in economically depressed 
regions, due to intra-country differentials 
in the cost of living. Also, while workers 
who receive unemployment benefits or so-
“We have no social worker. No services. There is a person with a dis-
ability in our village; he is old, 71 years. We asked for a social worker 
for him, but we were told that it was impossible and that there should 
be at least three such people in the village and that nobody would 
come for one man. Therefore, when he scrapes himself, neighbours 
help him. We have seen a social worker once. He came by bicycle, 
asked about our life and needs, and then disappeared. He said that 
there was no transport to get here from Zarya, a remote village, and 
that it was necessary to hire a car. Social protection employees came 
once using a state vehicle to distribute pensions and allowances. 
After all documents had been prepared, they collected 300 Tenge for 
petrol from each person, for whom they had prepared documents. 
They explained that although it was a state car, petrol should be paid 
by those people for whom documents were prepared. That is the sort 
of social protection we have” (Resident of a remote village, Kazakh-
stan).
39/ Cerami and Stubbs 
2010.
40/ Rutkowski et al 2005.
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cial assistance tend to remain unemployed 
somewhat longer, benefit recipients are 
more likely to find new jobs, and these jobs 
are more likely to match the job seekers’ 
skills and preferences, decreasing their risk 
of social exclusion in the long run.   
Budget cuts in many countries have trans-
ferred social protection functions to family, 
community and similar informal providers, 
with adverse consequences. These forms of 
social protection provision are underdevel-
oped, under-funded and, frequently, not 
mainstreamed into statutory social protec-
tion systems. Traditional community-based 
systems of support and solidarity have also 
been eroded in the transition period and 
were often unable to pick up the social pro-
tection functions being imposed on them. 
Ultimately, the household was the last line 
of defence against social strain, and bore 
the heaviest burden in terms of taking on 
the ‘off-loaded’ social protection responsi-
bilities.
There is a persistent over-emphasis on in-
stitutional care for some groups, contribut-
ing to their social exclusion. Abandoned, 
orphaned, neglected or ‘at risk’ children, 
young people in conflict with the law, and 
children and adults with disabilities face 
this risk. In some western CIS countries and 
Balkan states, the rates of institutionaliza-
tion remain worryingly high, despite recent 
reform measures (figure 2.12). The lack of 
sound community-based services to help 
families at risk makes it difficult to acceler-
ate the process of de-institutionalization. 
Official statistics on the share of children 
in institutional care may understate the 
true rates, and the share (not numbers) of 
children being placed in institutions may 
have continued to grow during the years of 
rapid economic growth.41  Such care tends 
to be in remote geographical settings with 
too little attention paid to non-institutional 
solutions, and to abruptly end after a child 
reaches 18 years of age. 
Social protection systems remain inflex-
ible in the region. They remain slow to re-
spond to new needs ‘reflecting the weak 
tradition of social work, community-based 
Figure 2.12: Number of children in institutional care per 100,000 people 18 years or 
younger (2006)
Source: TRANSMONEE data UNICEF (2010).
41/ Everychild 2005.
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services and combining cash with individ-
ual casework’.42 Moreover, for children and 
adults with disabilities, they are still based 
on rather crude medical assessments of 
capacity, tend to encourage passivity and 
dependency rather than being supportive 
of diverse forms of social integration, and 
are rarely complemented by services tai-
lored to the specific needs of this popula-
tion group. 
Housing and living conditions
With a high rate of dwelling ownership, 
housing deprivation in the region is more 
related to the quality of housing and access 
to basic infrastructure than to the unavail-
ability of housing as such (except for some 
Roma communities).  Depreciation of the 
housing stock—not maintained for de-
cades—is a common problem, largely due 
to weak public finances and income pover-
ty in the first decade of transition. The same 
applies to basic infrastructure like water 
supply, sanitation or heating. Problems also 
persist with access to basic utilities in rural 
areas. Problems of overcrowding, quality 
of housing stock, and access to basic utili-
ties (figure 2.13) are most pronounced in 
rural areas, among poorer sections of the 
population, and among some minorities. 
Extreme housing deprivation is experi-
enced most acutely in Central Asia, as well 
as—more broadly—by refugees, IDPs and 
Roma .
The ‘Social Exclusion Survey’ (table 2.3) con-
tributes important details to this picture. It 
reveals noticeable differences in terms of ba-
sic infrastructure not just between groups of 
countries (the two SEE countries, Serbia and 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
and the rest covered by the survey). In most 
cases there are significant access shortfalls 
for households in the bottom income quin-
tile and households in rural areas. 
Source: UNICEF (2009: 29).
Figure 2.13: Percentage of urban and rural populations living in 
dwellings not connected to a public water network, 2005-2006
Table 2.3: Lack of Access to Utilities (in %)
 KAZ MLD SRB TAJ MCD UKR KAZ MLD SRB TAJ MCD UKR KAZ MLD SRB TAJ MCD UKR
Income 
quintile Access to water and sanitation by household income status
Bottom 
Quintile 61 50 7 63 4 35 74 73 20 80 11 51 72 67 46 71 17 49
Top 
Quintile 12 21 2 44 1 4 25 50 1 44 0 10 19 29 18 44 7 11
Type of 
settlement Access to water and sanitation by type of settlement
Village 74 59 6 78 2 45 89 85 9 95 6 69 87 74 37 84 41 6
Small town 17 10 2 40 0 13 35 48 4 59 3 23 33 34 11 49 0 20
Regional/
economic 
centre
5 11 1 16 0 3 19 28 1 27 2 10 17 22 5 30 3 11
Capital 8 0 0 3 1 0 17 4 0 12 1 0 12 2 11 13 6 0
Total 43 38 4 61 1 20 58 58 5 78 3 33 56 50 22 69 14 31
Running Water Flushing indoor toilet Sewage system
42/ UNICEF 2009.
FYR Macedonia
Serbia
Georgia
Kyrgyzstan
Armenia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Kazakhstan
Uzbekistan
Montenegro
Albania
Azerbaijan
Moldova
Tajikistan
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The homeless suffer from extreme hous-
ing exclusion (box 4). Given that home-
lessness is a relatively new problem in the 
ECA region, there are no reliable statistics, 
not least because homeless people tend 
to be missed by most large-scale sample 
surveys. In several ECA countries, in par-
ticular in the CIS countries such as the 
Russian Federation, a substantial group of 
homeless is left without any form of social 
protection. Children living in the streets 
often experience violence and abuse. In 
2007 the State Duma approved a law to 
provide state support to homeless peo-
ple.
Refugees and displaced persons also suf-
fer from serious housing exclusion. They 
lack a viable long-term living solution, 
both in their home country and in the 
country where they currently live. There 
are almost 1.5 million refugees and IDPs 
in the region, with the highest shares in 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Bosnia and Herze-
govina and Serbia.43 
Many people in the region, including 
displaced persons and urban migrants, 
face severe challenges in terms of prop-
erty rights. For instance, over half of Roma 
households in Montenegro have no legal 
title to their homes, which leaves them 
vulnerable to forced evictions.
Throughout SEE, many Roma live in segre-
gated settlements that are overcrowded, 
provide poor shelter, and are often not 
connected to public water and power net-
works. Almost a quarter of Roma house-
holds in Montenegro live in overcrowded 
shacks, while one third do not have access 
to running water.44 The situation is also 
dire for the comparatively more devel-
oped new EU member states, where many 
Roma settlements do not meet basic stan-
dards. 
Access to Energy
In recent years, access to reliable and af-
fordable energy has become a key issue 
for social exclusion. The major challenge 
however is more related to affordability 
and availability of service and less to ac-
cess. 
The region is characterized by almost uni-
versal connection to the electricity grid— 
the only exception is Tajikistan, where 6 
percent of households reported being 
without electricity in the Social Exclusion 
Survey. According to the World Bank, the 
reliability of supply is generally a greater 
issue than connectivity. In Albania, Geor-
gia, Kyrgyzstan (except in the capital), Ta-
jikistan, and Turkmenistan, only a minority 
of users had electricity 24 hours a day.45 
In terms of social exclusion, the cost of 
energy plays a large role, since poor and 
vulnerable households spend a high 
proportion of their income on energy. 
Box 4: The homeless 
The respondents surveyed for the ‘Social Inclusion Survey’ com-
prise a randomly selected sample with one feature in common: 
they all have a home. Many people, however, do not. The homeless 
do not fit into traditional sampling models and thus researchers 
can miss them. That does not mean they do not exist.
Homelessness is increasingly an issue in the region, Russia includ-
ed. A recent report published by the Institute for Urban Economics* 
in Moscow sheds light on the ways people can become homeless 
as well as on the destructive implications for the individual.
In Russia, a major driver pushing people into the street is the 
requirement to register where they live. Although the former 
propiska system has been eliminated, registration is a prerequisite 
for state benefits, social services, etc. A stamp in the ID card is still 
needed to get a job, receive medical care, place a child in kinder-
garten, receive social benefits, or even collect veterans’ entitle-
ments. And people can lose the stamp for various reasons – family 
conflict (husband moves out of the home but has nowhere go), 
fraud (real estate sharks convince somebody to sign a misleading-
but-binding contract to sell his or her flat), problems with the 
law (when a person has nowhere to go once he or she gets out of 
prison). The most frequent reason, however, is economic—when 
people lose their jobs, they can no longer make payments on their 
homes. 
Homeless people are not just those who have lost the will and 
energy to persevere, who only want to find food and a place to 
sleep for the night, and who want to keep warm in winter. Actually, 
these fully marginalized people are a minority among the home-
less. The majority are ordinary people who had the misfortune to 
find themselves on the street in a vicious circle of marginalization.
The number of homeless is estimated at 1 to 4 million in the re-
gion. Is there light at the end of the tunnel for people on the street? 
Official recognition is already a success of some sort. A number 
of NGOs and local administrations are working on addressing 
the problem by providing temporary shelters, safe accommoda-
tion in winter, or helping to restore the full-fledged legal status of 
homeless citizens. Legislative changes are being discussed as well. 
Knowledge and experience are being accumulated. Hopefully, it 
will not take long to reach a critical mass and bring about sustain-
able change.
* Е. Kovalenko, Е. Strokova (2010) Homelessness: Is there a Way Out? Moscow: Institute for 
Urban Economics.
43/ UNHCR 2009.
44/ UNDP Montenegro 
2009.
45/ World Bank 2005: 174.
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Throughout the region, the burden of pay-
ing energy bills has increased as a result 
of subsidy cuts, price and tariff increases, 
increased reliance on more expensive 
sources, and increased enforcement in 
case of non-payment. In cases where 
regulation is inadequate, there is a risk of 
passing on only energy price increases to 
the end user, and not price declines. A re-
cent World Bank report noted the serious 
impact of energy poverty during the crisis 
throughout the region, with the effects 
worst among the poorest households and 
in rural areas.46 Given the need to price en-
ergy appropriately (to reach cost-recovery 
for well-regulated utilities, and to elimi-
nate energy subsidies), adequate social 
protection will need to be made available 
to those in need, together with facilitat-
ing their access to energy-efficient, low-
carbon technology.
Mobility and transportation
Transport is critical for access to employ-
ment, health and education. Nevertheless, 
access to quality and affordable transpor-
tation is much less in focus than access 
to energy. This should change, since lack 
of transport can contribute significantly 
to social exclusion. The World Bank Rural 
Access Index calculates the share of rural 
dwellers living less than two kilometres 
from the nearest all-season road using 
household budget survey data. The index 
is lowest in Albania (31 percent), a still 
rather low 56 percent in Ukraine, 57 per-
cent in Uzbekistan, and around 66 percent 
in Belarus, the Republic of Moldova and 
Turkmenistan.47 As for railway transport, 
cutting costs by cancelling less profitable 
routes disproportionately affected remote 
rural areas, raising the risk of isolation and 
related exclusion of their populations.
Disabled persons are often excluded from 
public transport. Both the inaccessibility 
of buildings and people’s attitudes, such 
as when taxi drivers refuse to take dis-
abled customers, are legacies of the past 
that have not improved sufficiently during 
transition.
ICT and the digital divide
Low internet and ICT penetration rates 
contribute to the ‘digital divide’ in the re-
gion and are often referred to as ‘e-exclu-
sion’. The phenomenon is widespread and 
may even be growing throughout the ECA 
region, diminishing access to information 
and participation in social networks. In 
terms of internet use, it is clear that the 
proportion of users is closely related to 
overall levels of human development. But 
even in the richest countries of the region, 
more than one third of the population 
does not use internet. 
Given the increasing importance of the 
internet as a medium for information ex-
change and access to knowledge, this has 
far-reaching consequences in terms of 
participation in economic, political and 
social life, particularly for young people. 
It also tends to exacerbate the exclusion 
of an underclass that is trapped within 
a circle of deprivation, lacking access to 
modern information channels so vital to 
success in contemporary society. This is 
worrisome because access to ICT could be 
highly effective in alleviating social exclu-
sion stemming from physical remoteness 
or from limits in access to some public ser-
vices. The ‘Social Exclusion Survey’ found 
that a significant part of the population in 
the CIS cannot afford a computer or inter-
net access (table 2.4).
“Public transport is non-existent. Before we had a bus assigned to us 
by a farm director, but then it was cancelled because there were not 
enough people using it. They said that the cost was too high” (Resi-
dent of a remote village, Kazakhstan).
Table 2.4: The percentage of people who cannot afford 
electronic equipment
Landline 
phone
Cell phone Internet Computer
Kazakhstan 20 14 42 38
Moldova 7 15 41 39
Serbia 5 3 20 15
Tajikistan 39 18 67 68
FYR 
Macedonia 7 2 13 11
Ukraine 12 7 32 26
Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009.
47/ http://www.
worldbank.org/trans-
port/transportresults/
headline/rural-access/
rai-updated-modelbased-
scores5-20070305.pdf.
46/ World Bank 2010.
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Exclusion from social 
networks and civic 
participation 
The key concept for inclusion in civic pro-
cesses is participation. Exclusion from civic 
and social life and networks therefore refers 
to denied participation in different aspects 
of political, cultural and civic activity. These 
include engagement in the electoral pro-
cess, the right to elect and be elected, free-
dom of expression and association, access 
to justice and information, and public and 
political security.  
Exclusion from civic and social life and net-
works occurs not only through formal in-
stitutions but also through lack of access 
to informal structures and opportunities. 
Informal social networks and formal civic 
institutions are complementary avenues 
for participation in public life.
Two aspects of civic, cultural and political 
exclusion are noteworthy when looking at 
social exclusion: the development of politi-
cal culture and social capital. Political cul-
ture refers to the values about the nature of 
authority, the role of individuals or groups 
(e.g., women) in public life, and prevailing 
role models. Political culture is reflected 
in political participation beyond turnout 
at elections (which itself is low in several 
countries), and levels of public confidence 
in state institutions. Social capital is based 
on norms of reciprocity and mutual trust,48 
increased through social networks and in-
dividuals linked through them. Research 
suggests that societies with higher level of 
social capital stand a better chance of be-
coming democratic and stable. Social capi-
tal is especially important for low and mid-
dle-income transition countries that face 
the triple challenge of democratization, 
economic development and avoidance of 
violent conflict.49
Civil society participation
Data from the ‘Social Exclusion Survey’ sug-
gest that while citizens are disillusioned 
with politics, they are keen to form net-
works among next of kin, or in their com-
munities. Clearly, throughout the region, 
post-independence states continued to 
rely on strong pre-existing social organiza-
tions.50 For example, the politics of clan and 
kinship play an important role in the Cen-
tral Asian political landscape (in Uzbekistan 
and Turkmenistan in particular), while indi-
vidual and civic activism is rather limited.51 
Furthermore, traditions of ‘tribal democ-
racy’ among nomadic peoples in countries 
such as the Kyrgyz Republic contrast with 
traditions of hierarchy and authority that 
characterize the settled agricultural society 
of Uzbekistan. As such, civic engagement is 
rather active at the community level in Kyr-
gyzstan, while in Uzbekistan the mahallas 
(self-governance institutions) provide an 
important community framework for ac-
tion. 
In this sense, Central Asian countries seem 
not to differ much from SEE and the Cau-
casus but do differ from the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe, which are 
organized more around individual initia-
tives and civic engagement. The tradition 
of association has been strong in CEE (for 
example, Solidarnosc in Poland, and Char-
ter 77 in Czechoslovakia), and these forms 
of civic engagement and activism contrib-
uted to the political change of 1989. Civic 
engagement further evolved in Central 
and Eastern Europe in the 1990s: indepen-
dent media flourished and the number and 
reach of civil society organizations, such as 
trade unions, professional and consumer 
associations, religious organizations, and 
environmental groups rose rapidly. More 
recently, the European Union has enhanced 
incentives for developing civil society in EU 
accession countries through e.g., legal re-
quirements and human rights charters.
Nevertheless, involvement in civil society 
organizations (CSOs) has remained rela-
tively weak in the region.52 The sector, for 
example, employs only 2 percent of the CEE 
population (and even less in the Western 
CIS, Caucasus, and Central Asia) compared 
with 7.8 percent in the United States or 5 
percent in France and Germany. An impor-
tant civic difference between post-socialist 
states and the EU 15 is the extent to which 
the new institutions are responsive and 
accountable to citizens, and the extent to 
which informal groups and networks wield 
control, exert influence, and broker relation-
ships between public and private sectors. 
“We do not go anywhere. We have no club, as it was closed and 
turned into a hostel. There are no facilities for the rural population, no 
post office” (resident of remote a village, Kazakhstan).
48/ Putnam et al. 1993.
51/ Collins 2006.
50/ Social organizations 
are largely involuntary, 
promoting communal 
norms and values, unlike 
the individualist and 
voluntary associations that 
de Tocqueville and others 
have argued are the basis 
of Western and democratic 
civil society.
52/ Rose-Ackeman 2001.
49/ Kuzio 2001.
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One important factor could be funding—
the majority of CSOs struggle to make ends 
meet, primarily responding to external do-
nors’ priorities rather than advocating for 
the needs of local communities. 
With countries of the region graduat-
ing from donor support, the CSO scene is 
changing. Some organizations have folded 
up, or started to provide consultancy ser-
vices, rarely focusing on community-level 
activities. As a result, the CSO community 
has split into two groups: ‘professional’ 
donor-driven organizations with access 
to resources but weak links to local com-
munities, and a group of small (usually 
community-focused) organizations doing 
small but tangible things at the local level 
and facing problems of raising even small 
amounts of funding. These groups’ contri-
bution to social inclusion is quite different. 
Bridging the gap between the two—e.g., 
through volunteerism—is therefore a ma-
jor challenge with important implications 
for social inclusion, particularly at the local 
level.53
Levels of trust, participation 
in civic networks and social 
capital
Social networks, civic participation and 
trust are weakening in the region. Social 
networking has become more important for 
getting ahead in life, while trust in people, 
neighbours and formal institutions is very 
low. Studies also suggest that while people 
don’t trust institutions on the whole, they 
often trust the people they know in these 
institutions who help them get things done. 
Such attitudes can contribute to a deeper 
sense of injustice (by those who don’t have 
such connections), and to a breakdown in 
the social contract. 
The Social Exclusion Survey found high lev-
els of mistrust in the six surveyed countries, 
with no significant gender differences. As 
table 2.5 shows, this lack of trust is slightly 
higher among those in the bottom quintile 
of the population in terms of consumption. 
The most mistrustful are in Serbia, where 
this level was 80 percent, and in the Repub-
lic of Moldova (73 percent), while citizens of 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan are more trusting. 
On the other hand, people reported a high 
level of trust in acquaintances and people 
within their social network throughout the 
region, indicating that people are invested 
in their private circles.
The ‘Social Exclusion Survey’ found civic 
participation to be very low in the six sur-
veyed countries. Participation in any kind of 
association, club or leisure group is lowest 
in Central Asia (Tajikistan (21 percent) and 
Kazakhstan (21 percent), followed by the 
CIS (Ukraine (26 percent) and Moldova (25 
percent)). Participation is higher in South-
east Europe, where almost 40 percent of 
respondents reported being active in some 
kind of civic activity. 
Some 28 percent of men and women re-
ported that cultural events accounted for 
their participation in civic life. Youth–par-
ticularly those between the ages of 15 and 
24–said they preferred cultural events (45 
percent). Cultural life also appears to be 
considerably more pervasive in capital cit-
ies, especially when compared with villag-
es. Respondents in Kazakhstan (18 percent) 
and in Tajikistan (15 percent) cited distance 
as a reason for not participating more in 
cultural events. 
Six percent of respondents in the Social In-
clusion Survey reported taking part in some 
political party activity (a distant second be-
hind participation in cultural events). Politi-
cally active men in Tajikistan and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia account 
for 14 and 9 percent of survey respondents, 
respectively. At 4 percent, Kazakhstanis re-
ported the lowest participation in political 
parties. 
Table 2.5: Percentage of people who disagree with the 
statement: “Most people can be trusted”.
People can’t be 
trusted
Bottom quintile Other quintiles
Kazakhstan 42 41 42
Moldova 73 73 73
Serbia 80 86 78
Tajikistan 57 63 56
FYR Macedonia 57 61 56
Ukraine 46 48 46
53/  In Albania, the Re-
public of Moldova and the 
former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, the numbers 
of people volunteering in 
organizations are higher 
than in the EU. Voluntary 
participation in religious 
and cultural organizations 
is the most popular form 
of volunteerism, followed 
by sport organizations, and 
labour movements. Youth, 
and people with higher 
education are more active 
volunteers, and volunteer 
rates are slightly higher 
for men. 
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Women are strongly under-represented 
in political life. The proportion of women 
members of parliament is only 15 percent 
in the region, with considerable variation 
across countries. Women in Georgia and 
Albania hold only around 6-7 percent of 
seats; this figure is 9 percent in Armenia 
and Romania, rising to 30 percent in Kyr-
gyzstan and the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia.54
Survey respondents reported low partici-
pation in labour movements, which ranked 
third. Only four percent of respondents 
reported taking part in demonstrations, 
which ranked last. Men were found to be 
more active than women, except in Kazakh-
stan and the Republic of Moldova. Overall, 
survey respondents reported little interest 
in politics. They said they refrain from po-
litical activities because they cannot affect 
change, and also because they fear there 
might be negative consequences.
A recent National Human Development 
Report from Bosnia and Herzegovina has 
emphasized the distinction between inclu-
sive and exclusive social capital. The former 
is fostered through open and diverse social 
networks; the latter through closed net-
works that often require considerable ef-
fort or cost to be admitted, or are based on 
certain social attributes that cannot be ac-
quired (box 5).  The key conclusions of the 
report underscore the linkages between 
those forms of social capital that can foster 
social inclusion and those that entrench 
social exclusion. In this respect, personal 
and family connections have been found 
crucial for obtaining employment or state 
services. In different ways and contexts, the 
use of personal and family connections to 
help gain access to services, employment or 
privileges, or to enable ‘jumping the queue’ 
is widespread throughout the region. It ex-
acerbates inequality and social exclusion 
for those lacking effective connections.
Ethnic tensions are prevalent in several 
countries. In Serbia and the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, data indicate that 
the young population feels the intensity of 
ethnic strife most: 34 percent of students in 
Serbia and 46 percent in the former Yugo-
slav Republic of Macedonia reported feel-
ing considerable tension between ethnic 
groups. Some 8 percent of respondents in 
Kazakhstan and 21 percent in the Republic 
of Moldova reported the existence of eth-
nic tensions within the same age group 
(15-24 years). 
Social capital contributes to well-being 
and social inclusion. Weak social capital 
perpetuates social exclusion, which further 
erodes inclusive social capital. This in turn 
may lead to greater reliance on family and 
kinship ties, reinforcing exclusive types of 
social capital. Lack of trust in people who 
are different may also contribute to social 
exclusion. Similarly, a lack of trust in insti-
tutions leads to a breakdown in the social 
contract between citizens and the state, 
and fosters a reliance on informal channels 
for accessing institutions, a practice that 
can feed corruption. Mihaylova55 suggests 
that the unequal distribution of social and 
cultural capital, in part a legacy of social-
ism, contributes to educational inequalities 
and hence exclusion from the opportunity 
to acquire skills that could enable full par-
ticipation in society. 
Box 5: The ties that bind
 The National Human Development Report from Bosnia and Her-
zegovina for 2008 addresses the issue of social capital. It finds that 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a society dominated by strong familial 
ties. People are more likely to spend time with, and have trust in, 
their immediate social network of family, friends and close friends. 
This applies equally across ethnicity, age, gender or location. Eth-
nic minorities living in an area with a majority population gener-
ally possess weaker social networks. Finally, only about 10 percent 
of people feel that most people can be trusted.
The analysis suggests that social networks matter. Those who 
have weaker social networks have fewer people to rely on for help, 
feel more isolated, and have lower levels of trust. Groups more 
likely to suffer from social isolation include IDPs, minority return-
ees, the elderly, women in rural areas, and people with minimal 
education. The elderly are most likely to possess inferior networks. 
People in the Republika Srpska are more likely to suffer a lack of 
networks than those in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Those who lack 
networks have lower levels of social capital and higher levels of 
material deprivation.
Social networks and inclusion are strongly correlated. The use of 
štela – personal and family connections – is widespread through-
out society and is present in most relationships between people 
and service providers in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Some 95 percent 
of survey respondents reported that having a štela is always or 
sometimes useful for access to basic social services. Some 86 
percent  of people see personal connections as the only way to get 
a job, and most people use family connections in their search for 
employment. But those networks are also a double blessing. The 
use of štela not only limits access and produces inequalities within 
society, but also significantly disempowers people.
Source: UNDP BiH (2009: 22).
54/ UNDP 2010c.
55/ Mihaylova 2004.
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Major findings of this 
chapter
This chapter has analysed how people are 
excluded along three dimensions: exclu-
sion from economic life, exclusion from 
social services, and exclusion from social 
networks and civic participation. Exclu-
sion from economic life can result from 
inequalities in access to resources. These 
inequalities are attributable to location 
(spatial poverty) and status (being a child, 
woman, minority, etc). Although average 
poverty rates were declining through 2005, 
poverty has remained entrenched in rural 
areas and small towns. Poverty has also re-
mained prevalent among certain groups: 
youth, ethnic minorities, people living with 
disabilities, and IDPs. 
Exclusion from the labour market greatly 
affects the status of the individual. Persis-
tent high unemployment tears the social 
fabric. Given the high rates of youth un-
employment, present trends could create a 
‘lost generation’ of young people who are 
unable to produce the income needed to 
support themselves. The transition reces-
sion and subsequent jobless growth in the 
region has also created a layer of discour-
aged workers, especially among women 
and the middle-aged.
Deteriorating social services hampered by 
partial reforms have led to exclusion from 
social services, impairing people’s educa-
tion, health and nutrition. Social protection 
is still largely category-based, provided to 
certain groups rather than to those in need. 
Social services are often ‘captured’ by inter-
est groups, while those in need lacking an 
effective political voice end up with little or 
no access.
Growing disparities have emerged in the 
educational system. Teacher quality, class 
size and equipment have worsened in re-
cent years. Most schools emphasize uni-
versity rather than vocational education, 
leading to a mismatch between the knowl-
edge people attain and the skills the labour 
market demands. Lack of affordable and 
accessible transport and in some cases, 
lack of affordable and reliable utilities, has 
significantly contributed to inequalities in 
educational outcomes in the region.
Networking has become increasingly im-
portant for social advancement. But trust in 
people, neighbours and formal institutions 
is weak according to those surveyed. Reli-
ance on informal channels spawns corrup-
tion. These behavioural patterns create ad-
ditional barriers to effective and responsive 
systems of public administration.
Social exclusion has led to some disillusion-
ment with the reform process. While peo-
ple under socialism lacked the freedom to 
fully participate in society, many now lack 
the ability or interest in the opportunities 
offered by transition. Low levels of political 
engagement have contributed to social ex-
clusion. 
The next chapter introduces the multidi-
mensional social exclusion index, which 
captures multiple forms of exclusion in a 
single measure. It helps to identify people 
who are experiencing simultaneous, over-
lapping deprivations.
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o measure and monitor a complex 
phenomenon like social exclusion, 
a framework is needed that reflects 
its complexity. This chapter introduces a 
multidimensional index to measure and 
monitor social exclusion. The index allows 
us to quantify how people experience so-
cial exclusion. It also gives governments a 
tool that they can use to pursue targeted 
social inclusion policies. The measure fol-
lows the methodological framework out-
lined in Chapter one, and it enables us to 
quantify the outcomes of the social exclu-
sion chain.
How to quantify 
social exclusion?
Several approaches to measuring social 
exclusion have been developed. UNDESA 
(2010) has provided a good overview of the 
challenges of measuring social exclusion. It 
has also identified principles and proper-
ties for social exclusion indicators. Accord-
ing to UNDESA, social exclusion needs to be 
studied both through objective (verifiable, 
quantitative) indicators as well as through 
subjective ones, which capture the views of 
those experiencing social exclusion. 
The European Union has introduced indica-
tors for monitoring poverty and social ex-
clusion over time across its member states 
(box 6). Other organizations – such as the 
World Bank, the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), and 
the United Nations – use different measures 
and indicators to capture absolute and rela-
tive poverty, deprivation and inequality.  
Building on the well-established, largely 
income-based EU measures of poverty and 
social exclusion, the measure put forth in 
this report covers a broader set of dimen-
sions. It is based on the Alkire and Foster56 
methodology of multidimensional poverty 
monitoring which has been applied to 104 
countries in the 2010 UNDP Human De-
velopment Report. Our measure has been 
adapted to account for the diversity of the 
T
Chapter 3: The multidimensional 
social exclusion measure
Box 6: The EU approach to measuring poverty and social exclusion
Although the European Union is made up of (mostly rich) countries, the rest 
of Europe and beyond can learn from its experience in combating poverty 
and social exclusion. Since 2000, the European Union has aimed to make 
a decisive impact on the eradication of poverty and social exclusion in its 
Member States through the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), an ap-
proach to governance that relies on the voluntary cooperation of Member 
States. A key element of the OMC is a set of indicators (known as “the 
Laeken indicators”) that were agreed jointly by the European Commission 
and Member States to monitor progress towards the EU’s social inclusion 
objectives.     
The European Council Summit adopted the Laeken indicators in 2001.* 
Since then, the European Union has developed them further. Aiming to 
reflect major objectives for social protection and inclusion, the indicators 
cover poverty, inequality, labour market access, in-work poverty, access to 
health care and education, as well as housing standards, material depriva-
tion, and child well-being.** 
The main source for the ‘commonly agreed EU indicators’ is the Statistics on 
Income and Living Conditions (SILC), which reflect a complex matrix of data 
on income, social exclusion and living conditions. These indicators have 
been used to assess progress in EU member states. Until recently, they were 
not accompanied by quantitative targets. This changed in spring 2010, 
when the European Council set a single EU headline target: lifting at least 
20 million people out of poverty by 2020. 
The main measure of income poverty in the EU list of indicators is rela-
tive: the poverty threshold is not an absolute amount, but 60 percent of 
the median disposable income in a given country. The advantage of this 
measure is that it is not influenced by the large income disparities between 
old and new Member States, and thus can be used across the Union. But it 
has limitations.
In the new EU member states, where a large share of households practices 
subsistence agriculture or other forms of home-based production, poverty 
measures based on expenditures may better reflect living standards. The 
EU has intensified efforts to go beyond a purely relative income poverty 
measure by developing additional indicators that reflect multiple depri-
vations. It is also strengthening its statistical capacities to measure child 
poverty and child well-being, homelessness and the exclusion of persons 
with disabilities.***  
* In December 2001 the European Council adopted the Laeken Declaration on the Future of the 
European Union, committing itself to building a more democratic, transparent and efficient Union.
** The European Commission, Portfolio of indicators for the monitoring of the European strategy 
for social protection and social inclusion (The European Commission, 2009).
*** European Social Situation Observatory, http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.
jsp?catId=676&langId=en; Study on Child Poverty and Child Well-Being in the EU (2010), http://
cordis.europa.eu/wire/index.cfm?fuseaction=article.Detail&rcn=21909.
56/ Alkire and Foster 2007.
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Europe and Central Asia region. It builds on 
the variety of approaches to monitoring so-
cial exclusion that have been implemented 
in the region (box 7).  
The social exclusion measure presented in 
this report captures social exclusion along 
various dimensions in a single, method-
ologically robust figure. The measure has 
two components: the social exclusion 
headcount (the share of people facing a 
number of deprivations above a certain 
threshold) and the multidimensional social 
exclusion index. The index is the headcount 
weighted by the intensity of exclusion (the 
average number of deprivations each so-
cially excluded household experiences). 
The deprivations are expressed in terms of 
24 indicators – eight indicators for each of 
the three dimensions of social exclusion 
(figure 3.5 and Annex 3). The indicators 
were selected based on the analysis of the 
three dimensions of exclusion, informed 
by findings from focus group discussions, 
from national consultations, as well as from 
relevant international literature. For exam-
ple, indicators have been selected (and in 
some cases modified) from EU surveys, the 
European Quality of Life survey, social capi-
tal surveys and the ‘missing dimensions of 
poverty’ surveys piloted by the Oxford Pov-
erty and Human Development Initiative. 
Robustness checks (see Annex 2.2) have 
been carried out to ensure that the individ-
ual indicators are not correlated, and that 
each individual indicator is relevant for ex-
plaining social exclusion in the six surveyed 
countries.  
In the first dimension – economic exclusion 
– indicators reflect deprivation in incomes 
and basic needs; employment, financial 
services and material assets; amenities that 
households need but cannot afford; and 
dwelling size. The second dimension – ex-
clusion from social services – encompasses 
education and health services, as well as 
public services. The third dimension—ex-
clusion from civic and social life—covers 
deprivation in political, cultural and social 
networks, as well as reflects diminished op-
portunities for social and civic participation. 
In a departure from past analysis, these in-
dicators reflect capability deprivations—
which mirror the real opportunities that a 
person has based on personal and social 
circumstances57—rather than item or ne-
cessity deprivations, which reflect material 
items that people need but cannot afford. 
Box 7: Promising approaches to collecting data on social  
exclusion 
In order to measure social exclusion, some prerequisites must be met. 
Cross-ministerial and cross-departmental cooperation is required, since 
social exclusion encompasses cross-cutting dimensions.  In order to build 
policy-relevant social exclusion indicators, data must be disaggregated. 
Furthermore, data sources such as the household budget survey (HBS) 
and labour force survey (LFS) also need to be of higher quality, capable 
of being decomposed into various social groups and localities. Linking 
data from various sources (particularly from national and sub-national 
register systems) can help measure social exclusion.
The task is challenging for two reasons. National statistical offices have 
limited capacity to produce disaggregated data in areas beyond poverty, 
such as social participation and social networks.  Furthermore, institu-
tional settings often make it difficult to combine various data sources to 
produce multi-dimensional results (since social exclusion encompasses 
cross-cutting dimensions, cross-ministerial and cross-departmental coop-
eration is required, which is not always easy to achieve).
Despite these challenges, some countries have been successful at putting 
together social exclusion measurements. In Poland, for example, social 
exclusion estimates are based mainly on ‘administrative’ data collected 
by the National Statistical Office from public and private entities (about 
80 percent of all data), or based on statistical data collected by local 
administrations. These data are disaggregated by territory down to the 
gmina level—the lowest level of public administration—and in some 
cases down to the city district level. 
A good example of linking data from different sources (surveys, adminis-
trative data and censuses), is the Small Area Estimation Technique, which 
estimates incomes, poverty and unemployment statistics at the powiat or 
district level.* The Polish experience using the Small Area Estimation tech-
nique is very useful, as this method does not require extensive datasets 
at individual levels, and requires fewer efforts to produce disaggregated 
data (UNDP Poland, 2007). 
The Republic of Moldova is developing its own system to monitor social 
exclusion by adopting measures employed by the European Union. An ad-
hoc Module on Social Exclusion has complemented the household budget 
survey. This Module comprises a set of social exclusion indicators used 
by other EU member states,** a list of EU indicators established by the 
European Commission, indicators monitoring the National Development 
Strategy, and the MDGs in the national context (UNDP Moldova, 2011). 
The Serbian government has also taken steps towards adapting EU meth-
odology. The Statistical Office is planning to implement the first EU-SILC 
survey, which will provide reliable data for comparative analysis over 
time, by states (EU and associated countries), and at the sub-national 
regional level.***
* The The powiat level is at the NUTS4 level. NUTS refers to the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for 
Statistics.
** http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/soc-prot/socincl/final_joint_inclusion_report_2003_
en.pdf.
*** The Serbian Parliament has adopted a Law on statistical regionalization that recognizes regions 
in accordance with NUTS rules. This will both improve regional governance and solve problems of interna-
tional comparability of Serbian statistical data.
57/ Nussbaum 2000.
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The indicators selected should not be un-
derstood as ‘fixed’, but rather as a point of 
departure in national discourses on mea-
suring social exclusion, where nationally 
relevant indicators should be selected in 
an inclusive and participatory way.58  Spe-
cifically, such decisions on measuring so-
cial exclusion have to involve those who 
experience social exclusion, so that they 
have a say in the choice of indicators and 
thresholds (i.e. when someone is consid-
ered to be socially excluded). Furthermore, 
adequate attention must be paid to those 
who experience social exclusion but who 
are ‘invisible’ from the standpoint of statisti-
cal instruments (such as homeless people, 
street children, adults and children living 
in institutions, ethnic minorities, migrants, 
and people living with HIV).
Each of the three dimensions of social ex-
clusion has equal weight, as does each 
indicator. The indicators chosen for this 
social exclusion measure are objective: 
they reflect status, rather than perceptions. 
Still, there is an element of subjectivity in 
the assessment of needs (‘the household 
needs certain amenities but cannot afford 
them’) and in the assessment of frequency 
of social contacts (rare or infrequent social 
contact with family, relatives or friends) 
that also reflect the relative nature of social 
exclusion. Whether or not a household per-
ceives to ‘need’ certain amenities also de-
pends on what is ‘normal’ in a given society 
(see box 8).
We define an individual as socially excluded 
if he or she is deprived in at least nine indi-
cators. There are two reasons behind this 
choice of threshold. One is to apply a con-
servative threshold that does not inflate the 
multiple deprivation headcount. Alkire and 
Foster suggest selecting the minimum ac-
ceptable deprivation count required to be 
considered socially excluded.59 Nine indica-
tors also reflect the minimum number that 
is needed for an individual to be socially ex-
cluded in more than one dimension, since 
one dimension contains only eight indica-
tors. (For a more detailed explanation of how 
the cut-off of nine was selected, please see 
Annex 2.3.)
While choosing the same threshold for the 
six countries allows cross-country com-
parisons, national evidence-based policy 
analysis can (and should) apply nationally 
agreed thresholds. Indeed, Alkire and Fos-
ter do not provide a method for selecting 
Box 8: What it means to be deprived: Clarifying the survey 
methodology 
Lack of basic household items can indicate deprivation—but not 
always. Some households can afford items such as televisions, 
computers and ovens but not want them. Therefore, the survey 
methodology took ‘lack of certain household items’ to indicate 
deprivation only when households need such items but can’t af-
ford them. 
This methodology has allowed us to make a number of revealing 
observations. For example, most households have television sets 
in the region. On average only 3 percent of households cannot af-
ford them. However, in Moldova this figure was higher—5 percent. 
For computers, the picture is different. Only 9 percent of house-
holds have one, while 60 percent cannot afford one. In Ukraine, 49 
percent of households reported that they do not have one and do 
not need one. (Ukraine is the only country where this percentage 
outweighs those who can’t afford one).  In Tajikistan, the opposite 
was reported: Some 72 percent of households do not have a com-
puter because they can’t afford one. 
Local conditions also influence household perceptions of needs. 
For example, households do not consider owning a gas oven to be 
important when they reside in areas that lack a gas supply. The 
share of those who reported that they do not need a gas stove is 
highest in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia 
(77 and 73 percent, respectively). This is because many areas in 
these countries lack a gas supply.
Whether people perceive a need also depends on resource endow-
ments and opportunities. For example, the highest share of house-
holds that need—but can’t afford—an electric sewing or knitting 
machine can be found in Tajikistan, a country endowed with cot-
ton. Many women there are unemployed and their husbands work 
abroad, thus they would have the opportunity to sew and knit this 
cotton provided they could afford sewing and knitting machines.  
Such machines are not just household ‘amenities’ but tools for 
women to work more productively and independently.
58/  On the selection of 
capability indicators and 
dimensions see Alkire 
(2008), Robeyns, (2005), 
and Sen (2004).
59/  Alkire and Foster 
2007.
the cut-off value. They only suggest ways of 
arriving at a reasoned evaluation. Every de-
privation measurement is based on a judg-
ment about what threshold to use – just as 
is the case when selecting poverty lines. 
Further explanation about the survey meth-
odology needs to be made. First, the Social 
Exclusion Survey captures social exclusion 
at one point in time (November 2009, see 
Annex 1.2). However, in order to add a more 
dynamic element, some questions compar-
ing current and pre-transition periods were 
also included. Second, while the survey fo-
cuses on the six countries surveyed, the is-
sues it reflects apply to the other countries 
in the region. Thus it is possible (with certain 
limitations) to extend the analysis to other 
countries. The limitations mainly stem from 
data constraints (see annex 1). For example, 
since the survey took the household as the 
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unit of analysis, intra-household inequali-
ties cannot be reflected without making 
further assumptions. Furthermore, the 
measure cannot be disaggregated by pop-
ulation groups such as ethnic minorities, 
internally displaced persons, and persons 
with disabilities. The survey did not obtain 
a representative sample of these groups.
Level and depth of 
social exclusion in 
the region 
The results of the Social Exclusion Sur-
vey shed light on the breadth and depth 
of social exclusion in the region. Table 3.1 
captures social exclusion in terms of head-
count, and intensity. It also presents the 
multidimensional Social Exclusion Index 
which integrates the headcount and inten-
sity of social exclusion.60
The data show that more than one out 
of three persons in the region is socially 
excluded, with a wide range of variation 
across countries. Social exclusion in Tajiki-
stan is the most acute, with 72 percent of 
the population found to experience nine 
or more deprivations. While the share of 
people considered to be socially excluded 
varies significantly across the six countries, 
the intensity of their exclusion is found to 
be quite similar despite variations among 
countries in terms of population size, GDP 
and human development levels. The inten-
sity of social exclusion ranges from 43 per-
cent in Ukraine (where socially excluded 
people face on average 10.4 deprivations 
out of 24) to 46 percent in Tajikistan (where 
socially excluded people face on average 
11.1 deprivations out of 24).
The Social Exclusion Index can be disag-
gregated by dimension, which provides 
information about the contribution of each 
dimension to the overall social exclusion 
index. This creates opportunities for policy 
makers to see the composition of social 
60/  More on the multidi-
mensional exclusion index 
can be found in Annex 2.
Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009.
KZH MLD SER TJK FYRM UKR
Magnitude of social exclusion
(A) Social exclusion headcount (%) 32 40 19 72 12 20
(B) Intensity: Average number of 
deprivations among the socially 
excluded
10.5 11 10.8 11.1 10.8 10.4
(C) Intensity: Average share of 
deprivations (the number of 
deprivations as a percentage of the 
24)
44 46 45 46 45 43
Social Exclusion Index (A) *(C) 14 18 8 33 5 9
Contribution of dimensions to the Social Exclusion Index
Economic exclusion 34 32 31 39 30 28
Exclusion from social services 34 39 38 34 38 36
Exclusion from participation in civic 
and social life and networks 32 30 31 27 32 36
Table 3.1: Social exclusion in the six surveyed countries
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exclusion in their area of interest. The data 
clearly indicate that social exclusion is not 
determined by economic factors alone. In 
five out of six countries61 all three dimen-
sions contribute roughly equally, while ac-
cess to social services contributes slightly 
more than the other two. This reinforces 
the message that in order to tackle social 
exclusion, all three dimensions must be ad-
dressed equally: focusing solely on poverty 
reduction or economic inclusion is not suf-
ficient..
Structure of deprivation
The data indicate that the distribution of 
deprivations across the three dimensions 
of social exclusion is relatively similar in the 
surveyed countries (see figures 3.1, 3.2 and 
3.3). In the economic dimension, social ex-
clusion is largely a result of the lack of ac-
cess to finance, housing, household ameni-
ties and information and communications 
technologies, while income poverty and 
unemployment seem to play a smaller role. 
As discussed in Chapter two, lack of access 
to finance is prevalent in the region, ham-
pering people’s ability to act upon business 
opportunities. The unemployment indica-
tor contributes only minimally to depriva-
tion. This can be explained by the preva-
lence of informal employment. Since the 
unemployment indicator does not reflect 
the insecurity of such employment, it po-
tentially understates the level of social ex-
clusion that people face. 
In the social services dimension of social 
exclusion, the contribution of individual 
indicators to deprivation is more varied 
among the six countries. Lack of access to 
transportation and health care accounts for 
a significant portion of social exclusion in 
all surveyed countries. Inadequate heating 
is a major contributor to social exclusion 
in the Republic of Moldova, the former Yu-
goslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia, 
while lack of access to safe water is most 
prevalent in Kazakhstan, the Republic of 
Moldova and Tajikistan. 
In the civic dimension, lack of participation 
in civic, political and social activities con-
tributes substantially to social exclusion in 
all six countries. As discussed in Chapter 
two, perceptions that institutions are insuf-
ficiently representative and disillusionment 
with political parties contribute to low civic 
engagement, and to low levels of social 
capital and solidarity. People believe that 
connections are more important for get-
ting ahead in life than civic engagement.
61/  Tajikistan is the 
exception, where economic 
exclusion contributes the 
most to social exclusion 
outcomes.
Figure 3.1: Composition of the economic dimension  
Percentage contributions of individual deprivations to the economic dimension
Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009.
%
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Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009.
Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009.
Figure 3.2: Composition of the ‘social services’ dimension
Percentage contributions of individual deprivations to the social services dimension
Figure 3.3: Composition of the ‘civic’ dimension
Percentage contributions of individual deprivations to the civic dimension
Figure 3.4 illustrates deprivations in indi-
vidual dimensions for the region (the pro-
files of individual countries are provided in 
Annex 3). This figure provides additional 
insights into the relative importance of 
various indicators, both for people who are 
deprived in a specific indicator while their 
total number of deprivations is less than 
nine, and for those whose total number of 
deprivations exceeds this threshold (and 
thus are socially excluded). For instance, 50 
percent of respondents do not have run-
ning water or are not connected to a sew-
age system. For 29 percent of respondents, 
this made them socially excluded, accord-
ing to the multidimensional measure. 
Transportation
Health care
School drop out
School materials
Medication
Low education
Heating
Water
Civic participation 
Social participation clubs
Social participation culture
Political participation
Social participation private
Support networks
Social ties friends
Social ties family
%
%
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Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009.
Figure 3.4: Social exclusion is the product of a wide range of deprivations
Percentage of people deprived in each indicator by social exclusion status
Incomes: At risk of poverty rate 
(60% of median equivalent expenditures)
Subjective basic needs: 
Unable to meet basic needs 
Employment: 
Unemployment (ILO definition)
Financial services: 
No bank account on own name
Housing deprivation: Unable to afford a bed for 
every HH member, or livingroom furniture
Amenities: Can’t afford washing machine, 
freezer or microwave
ICT: Can’t afford 
a computer or internet 
Overcrowding: Households with 
less than 6m2 per person
Public utilities: Households with 
no running water or sewerage system 
Public utilities: Households heating 
with wood or with no heating
Education: Low educational achievements 
(basic schooling) and early school leavers
Education: Unable to afford 
books for children
Education: Household with children 
not in school / preschool
Health care: Unable to afford medication 
or dental checks for children
Health care: Unmet medical needs due 
to barriers in health care system
Cultural opportunities: Unable to afford cultural 
events, or unable to attend due to distance
Social capital: Rare or seldom contact 
with family/relatives 
Social capital: 
Rare contact with friends 
Social capital: Lack of support networks that 
could help in emergency situations
Social participation: Can’t afford socializing 
with friends or family 
Social participation: Can’t afford books, 
cinema or theatre 
Civic participation: No participation 
in elections due to ineligibility or distance 
Civic participation: No participation/membership 
in associations, teams or clubs 
Civic participation: No participation 
in political/civic activities
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Social exclusion and the 
Human Development Index
Before the 2008-2009 financial crisis, coun-
tries in the region had been experienc-
ing declining poverty rates and positive 
GDP growth. However, this did not always 
translate into more job opportunities for 
all, let alone improved social services and 
greater chances for civic participation. The 
multidimensional social exclusion measure 
presented in this report captures within-
country inequalities, complementing the 
traditional GDP measure in a critical way. 
Figure 3.5 depicts the inverse relationship 
between the Human Development Index 
(HDI)62 and the share of socially excluded 
persons in a country. To a certain extent, 
Serbia and Kazakhstan are outliers, with 
higher shares of excluded persons than 
their HDI values might suggest. This find-
ing illustrates the overlapping but different 
concepts underlying the two indicators. 
HDI reflects aggregated development out-
comes (and comprises mainly national-lev-
el outcome indicators), while the social ex-
clusion indicator focuses on deprivations, 
opportunities and inequalities. Social ex-
clusion is more sensitive to inequalities in 
opportunities within countries, and helps 
us to better understand the complex dy-
namics of human development in all coun-
tries, even those with high HDI and low 
poverty rates. 
Individual characteristics 
and their impact on social 
exclusion
National averages are too general to cap-
ture the way different segments of the 
population – the elderly, youth, women 
and so forth – experience social exclusion. 
The data often are not specific to these seg-
ments, which experience varying levels of 
social exclusion. Breaking down the data by 
age, gender, area of residence and employ-
ment status offers a richer picture—one 
that is much needed for formulating poli-
cy—than simply looking at the population 
as a whole. 63
Age is an important contributor to social 
exclusion (figure 3.6). The data indicate that 
the elderly experience the highest levels of 
social exclusion in the surveyed countries 
—45 percent of the elderly are excluded 
compared with the regional average of 
31 percent. The intensity of deprivations 
among the elderly is highest in the Repub-
lic of Moldova and in Tajikistan.
Figure 3.5: Human development and social exclusion
HDI versus the percentage of the population that is socially excluded
H
D
I (
20
10
)
Percentage of socially excluded people
Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009 and HDR 2010.                   Note: The sizes of the bubbles represent the size of each country’s population.
62/  The HDI combines 
normalized measures of life 
expectancy, educational 
attainment, and GDP per 
capita.
63/  Since the measure is 
constructed using house-
hold-level information with 
responses assigned to every 
member of the household, 
the decomposition refers to 
the share of children, youth, 
elderly, unemployed, poorly 
educated etc., living in 
households that face more 
than nine deprivations. 
43
Children emerge as the second most vul-
nerable group after the elderly, using both 
weighted and unweighted averages (see 
annex 2.5). One reason is their dependence 
on their parents – if their parents are ex-
cluded, they will most likely be excluded 
as well. In addition, children face other ex-
clusion risks related to their local environ-
ment (schools, day-care, etc). The data in-
dicate that children experience significant 
levels of social exclusion in each surveyed 
country except Ukraine. In the case of the 
Republic of Moldova, the share of excluded 
children (47 percent) is particularly high 
compared with the share of excluded youth 
and adults. The difference can be attributed 
to high labour migration by parents.
According to the data, the percentage rates 
of social exclusion for women and men are 
roughly equal. But this finding needs to be 
treated with caution. The index is unlikely 
to reflect the depth of gender inequalities. 
Only 8 out of the 24 indicators employed 
in the index reflect individual characteris-
tics that vary for women and men; the rest 
reflect household characteristics, which 
are shared by all household members, re-
gardless of gender. The analysis of second-
ary data used in this report suggests that 
gender differences still exist and gender 
stereotypes are critical impediments to so-
cial inclusion. Societal norms may serve to 
discourage women from participating in 
social and political life, or even from trav-
elling alone to attend a public event. Fur-
thermore, individual vulnerabilities of men 
and women translate into exclusion differ-
ently for each group. For example, women 
generally earn lower wages than men, but 
men are more likely to lose their job in an 
economic crisis because of their higher 
salaries.  
Figure 3.6: Social exclusion and age
Social exclusion of children, youth and elderly
Children (0-14 years) Youth (15-29 years) Adults (30-64 years) Elderly (>65 years)
Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009. Note: The regional average is the unweighted average of the six countries. Merging the 
individual country data sets into a regional database and analysing the results by sub-samples 
raises the sample size, and makes the disaggregation more robust.
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“There was an advertisement for communal services, park maintenance, and I 
took it, filled in the leaflet, sent it in and everything was ok. Two days later they 
asked me to take a medical exam. I went to the exam, and I passed.  Then on the 
first day, the employer said, ‘All right, is there someone with prior convictions 
here?’ I had not dared to tell him, because I was afraid that if I had told him he 
would not hire me. He took the list and said: ‘Oh, well, you’ve been convicted not 
once, but several times.’ And I said yes, but where did you get that from? And he 
said, ‘Well, we got it all.’ All right, then why was I asked to go to the medical exam, 
if there was a problem? The reason was that I was convicted several times. That 
was the only reason why I couldn’t work” (Former prisoner, multiple convictions, 
Serbia).
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Where one lives (whether in a rural or urban 
area) is also an important risk factor. In five 
out of the six countries surveyed, social ex-
clusion is higher in rural areas than for the 
country as a whole (figure 3.7). 64  The further 
people live from the capital city, the higher 
the magnitude of social exclusion. Rural 
areas suffer from lower employment and 
income opportunities. Rural dwellers also 
face a more limited supply of goods, social 
services, transportation and networks. With 
their higher levels of economic activity and 
strong social networks, urban areas provide 
more employment opportunities. 
Across the six countries surveyed, the share 
of socially excluded people in rural areas is 
almost four times higher than the share in 
urban areas. Resulting from growth strate-
gies that favour urban areas, rural-urban 
imbalances perpetuate a cycle of exclusion: 
high levels of exclusion drive more people 
to cities, further depriving rural localities 
of opportunities and depleting social net-
works. A closer look reveals that living in a 
rural location significantly contributes to the 
social exclusion headcount, and the most 
extreme forms of social exclusion are pre-
dominantly found in rural locations.  Rural 
dwellers make up 82 percent of those suf-
fering from extreme social exclusion (people 
who are deprived in more than 13 indica-
tors).  Only 19 percent of rural households 
do not experience social exclusion, while 72 
percent experience nine deprivations—the 
minimum needed to be classified as socially 
excluded.  
Unemployment and low education also con-
tribute significantly to social exclusion. Both 
are related: low education levels tend to raise 
the risk of unemployment. Survey data indi-
cate that the rate of social exclusion among 
respondents who identified themselves as 
unemployed is higher than for the popula-
tion as a whole in each country (figure 3.8). 
Unemployment is also likely to constrain 
access to social services, and to reduce par-
ticipation in civic and social forums. As for 
education: in Ukraine, Serbia, and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, people 
with low levels of education experience 
twice the level of social exclusion than the 
general population (figure 3.9). 
 The data also indicate that employment is a 
necessary but insufficient condition for pre-
Figure 3.7: Location matters
Social exclusion by respondents’ settlement type
Village Small town Regional or economic centre Capital 
Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009.                         Note: The regional average is the unweighted average of the six surveyed countries
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“Even if you have work experience, but if next to you there is a recent 
graduate from Transnistria, and you have a diploma from the Repub-
lic of Moldova, the person from Transnistria  is preferred” (Female, 39 
years old, rural area, Republic of Moldova).
64/  The exception is the 
former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, where regional 
or economic centres are 
found to have a higher level 
of social exclusion.  
Social exclusion headcount of the poorly educated as a percentage of the national average
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Social exclusion of the unemployed
People who reported they were unemployed National average
Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009.                         Note: The regional average is the unweighted average of the six surveyed countries
National averageRelative exclusion of the poorly educated
Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009.                         Note: The regional average is the unweighted average of the six surveyed countries
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Figure 3.9: Good education matters 
Figure 3.8: Employment is critical for avoiding social exclusion
venting social exclusion. While 84 percent 
of people who are not socially excluded 
have a job, on average 43 percent of the 
employed are still socially excluded, with 
exactly nine deprivations. Some 27 percent 
of people suffering from extreme exclusion 
(13 or more deprivations) are employed. 
While people in all six surveyed countries 
face a similar intensity of social exclusion, 
certain groups face significantly higher 
risks. The survey for Serbia, which over-
sampled Roma and internally displaced 
persons (IDPs), finds that 86 percent of 
Roma and 56 percent of IDPs are socially 
excluded, compared with 19 percent of the 
general population. The intensity of exclu-
sion is also much greater. The average num-
ber of deprivations experienced by socially 
0
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excluded Roma and IDPs is 15.2 for Roma 
and 13.2 for IDPs, respectively, compared 
with 10.8 for the general population. Fur-
thermore, for any given cut-off, significantly 
more Roma and IDPs are socially excluded 
as compared with the general population 
(figure 3.10). This is true even when income 
indicators are taken out: Roma and IDPs are 
also more deprived in the non-material di-
mensions of social exclusion.
The data also indicate that factors like un-
employment and disability substantially 
increase the risk of social exclusion of Roma 
and IDPs. For example, the share of socially 
excluded is 92 percent among unemployed 
Roma and 97 percent among those with 
disabilities (compared with 86 percent for 
Roma). The share of the socially excluded is 
76 percent among unemployed IDPs and 73 
percent among IDPs with disabilities. While 
it is not surprising that social exclusion in-
creases for Roma and IDPs who face several 
overlapping risks, disability has a lower im-
pact on the exclusion of IDPs, suggesting 
that disabled IDPs might have slightly bet-
ter access to social safety nets than disabled 
Roma. 
Differences also exist in how much each 
dimension of social exclusion contributes 
to the exclusion faced by Roma, IDPs and 
the general population in Serbia (table 3.2). 
While economic exclusion contributes most 
significantly to social exclusion for IDPs, 
exclusion from social services contributes 
most significantly to exclusion in the Roma 
community and in the general population.  
Analysing the deprivations experienced by 
Roma and IDPs as compared with the gen-
eral population yields further insights. In the 
social services dimension of exclusion (fig-
ure 3.11), deprivations contribute in varying 
magnitudes across the three groups. While 
deprivations in education and health con-
tribute more significantly to exclusion for 
Roma, they are less pronounced for IDPs and 
the general population. The picture is simi-
lar when looking at the three groups in the 
other two dimensions of exclusion. 
People’s subjective perceptions are equally 
important as their measured social exclu-
sion. People who do not face capability de-
privations may still feel left out of society. 
The Social Exclusion Index measures primar-
ily capability deprivations, not subjective 
feelings towards others. However, the sur-
vey also addressed individual respondents’ 
subjective assessments: Do they perceive 
themselves excluded or not?  
The survey analysis reveals two partially 
overlapping groups: those facing capability 
deprivations, and those who feel left out of 
society (who may or may not face capabil-
ity deprivations). The people in the ‘area of 
General 
population
Roma IDPs
Economic exclusion 31 36 41
Exclusion from social/public services 38 38 31
Exclusion from participation in civic and social life and networks 31 26 28
Table 3.2: Sources of social exclusion for Roma, IDPs and the general population in Serbia (percentage 
contribution of each dimension to social exclusion by group)
Social exclusion headcount for Roma, IDPs and the general 
population in Serbia
Threshold General population Roma IDPs 
Percentage of people considered 
‘socially excluded’ for each cutoff
 value
Deprivation cut-off value
Figure 3.10: Vulnerable groups and social exclusion
Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009 .
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overlap’ have the highest risk of social exclu-
sion. 
Figure 3.12 presents the share of people fac-
ing the ‘dual risk’ of measured and perceived 
social exclusion in the six surveyed countries. 
This group is largest in Serbia, the Republic of 
Moldova and Ukraine (12 percent, 11 percent 
and 10 percent of respondents, respectively). 
The lowest percentages of people facing the 
‘dual risk’ are found in the former Yugoslav Re-
public of Macedonia and Tajikistan. 
Some other interesting observations can also 
be made. In the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, for example, the majority of 
people who feel ‘left out’ of society are not so-
cially excluded. In Tajikistan, by contrast, most 
people who are socially excluded do not con-
sider themselves to be excluded. 
Contextual factors could explain these find-
ings. In the case of the former Yugoslav Re-
public of Macedonia, increasing inequality in 
opportunities may have dampened people’s 
hopes after the initial euphoria of indepen-
dence, when the anticipation of an immedi-
ate economic miracle was replaced by the 
realization that reality would be different. In 
Tajikistan, by contrast, the low percentage of 
people who consider themselves excluded 
might be explained by the fact that a major-
ity of people (above 70 percent) are socially 
excluded. Paradoxically, this might skew 
people’s perceptions towards feeling not ex-
cluded – because many others experience 
the same deprivations. 
It is also useful to plot the level of dissatisfac-
tion with living standards against the actual 
level of social exclusion. The two show a clear 
correlation (figure 3.13), which is not surpris-
ing. People’s level of dissatisfaction is strongly 
related to their capability deprivations. By 
contrast, the correlation between people’s 
subjective perception of being ‘left out of so-
ciety’ and their measured social exclusion is 
weaker.    
Limitations of the index
The multidimensional social exclusion index 
is not perfect. It does not incorporate all di-
mensions of exclusion, such as incidence of 
violence, owing to data constraints. Further-
more, some indicators—although the best 
available—are far from ideal. For example, 
the incidence of ‘heating with wood’ could 
indicate that households face social services 
exclusion, or could simply indicate that heat-
ing with wood is most cost-efficient. Doing 
To what extent do individual deprivations contribute to social services 
exclusion?
Excluded and feel left out of society
Excluded but don’t feel left out of society
Figure 3.12: Actual exclusion is different from perceived 
exclusion… 
Figure 3.11: Similar levels of social exclusion but 
different structures
Share of people who feel left out of society, are socially 
excluded, or both
Not excluded but feel left out of society
Transportation
Health care
Medication
School drop out
School materials
Low education
Heating
Water
Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009. 
Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009 .
so can constitute a health risk when a proper 
ventilation system is lacking, but can be safe 
if such system is available. On the other hand, 
heating with wood is a reasonable proxy for 
material deprivation because wood—unlike 
coal or oil—can be collected (and is being 
collected) by vulnerable populations for free. 
The health dimension suffers from different 
problems. Due to data constrains, health in-
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dicators are overrepresented by input indi-
cators (number of doctors, expenditures on 
health, access to services, and affordability). 
What really matters, however, is not how 
much is put into the system, but the result 
(the mortality or morbidity rates, or func-
tioning failures). All this suggests that fur-
ther work is needed both in defining better 
indicators for individual dimensions and in 
designing better data collection instruments 
to yield reliable data. 
The index is also not immune to subjective 
interpretations by survey respondents in the 
six indicators where respondents report on 
their status. Subjectivity may also explain 
why Serbia and the former Yugoslav Re-
public of Macedonia have different levels of 
multidimensional social exclusion, despite 
their broadly similar socio-economic situ-
ations and their common history as part of 
one federal state under socialism. This might 
be due to the differing ways the peoples of 
these two countries have identified with the 
break-up of Yugoslavia. Respondents in the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia may 
have given more positive answers because 
they may have looked at the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia as an opportunity for indepen-
dence, while respondents in Serbia may view 
the break-up of Yugoslavia less positively.  
Major findings of this 
chapter
This chapter has elaborated a multidimen-
sional Social Exclusion Index that is sufficient-
ly complex to match the nuances of social 
exclusion, yet simple enough to be widely 
understood and employed. The methodol-
ogy yields robust, policy-relevant results. By 
incorporating non-income dimensions, this 
measure assesses people’s well-being in a 
more meaningful manner than GDP alone. 
This conclusion may be known to human 
development practitioners, but it is not yet 
widely accepted by mainstream develop-
ment experts. 
The analysis in this chapter leads to a number 
of conclusions. For most countries surveyed, 
lack of access to public services makes a 
slightly greater contribution to social exclu-
sion than economic exclusion. Insufficient 
opportunities for civic engagement are also 
important in explaining social exclusion. De-
spite the heterogeneity of the region, the 
intensity of exclusion is just as high in South-
east Europe as in Central Asia. 
The multidimensional Social Exclusion Index 
can also help to prioritize social inclusion 
initiatives so that they target those most in 
need. Since the elderly, children, and youth 
experience the highest magnitude of social 
exclusion in the region, these groups should 
receive priority. This is also the case for Roma. 
Data on Roma and IDPs for Serbia indicate 
much higher levels and depth of social ex-
clusion for these groups than for the general 
population. The severity of the problem for 
Roma increases when they face additional 
risks, such as disability. 
The social exclusion measure described 
above has helped to identify the individuals 
and population groups that are simultane-
ously excluded from economic, social and 
civic life. In addition, it has helped to reveal 
how they are excluded in terms of multiple 
forms of deprivation. However, it cannot 
provide answers on why people are exclud-
ed. Therefore, one must identify the drivers 
of social exclusion, which take into account 
institutional, structural and behavioural pro-
cesses. This is the task of chapters four and 
five: introducing drivers and the local con-
text to better capture the social exclusion 
chain. 
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Percentage of socially excluded people
Social exclusion by people’s dissatisfaction with living 
standards
Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009.                          
Note: The regional average is the unweighted average of the six surveyed countries.
Figure 3.13: Social exclusion correlates with people’s 
dissatisfaction with their living standards
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he drivers of social exclusion refer 
to institutions, processes, societal 
norms and attitudes. Their interac-
tion with individual risks can produce or 
mitigate social exclusion. Understanding 
these drivers helps us to move beyond the 
symptoms of social exclusion to the under-
lying causes. 
As outlined in Chapter 1, three groups 
of drivers are part of the social exclusion 
chain underpinning this report. These are 
(a) structures and institutions, (b) values and 
behavioural patterns and (c) policies. Any 
society is shaped by its institutions, norms 
and behavioural patterns. Policies—tai-
lored by politicians to the demands of their 
constituencies—reflect and respond to 
these patterns. This chapter will analyse the 
implications of this chain for social exclu-
sion, examining the relationship between 
the Social Exclusion Index introduced in 
Chapter 3 and other factors acting as driv-
ers of social exclusion. In particular, the 
chapter investigates the relationship be-
tween social exclusion and models of eco-
nomic growth, decentralization and social 
policies. As in chapter 2, the analysis draws 
on data derived from the Social Exclusion 
Survey, as well as on secondary sources, 
to capture policy and institutional aspects 
that household surveys overlook. This ap-
proach allows us to generalize the analysis 
across the entire Europe and Central Asia 
region.
Structures and 
institutions as drivers 
of social exclusion 
and inclusion 
Institutional drivers refer to how public and 
private institutions and legislation contrib-
ute to exclusion through discriminatory 
practices—or how they neglect to provide 
opportunities for inclusion. Institutions—
public or private—can either exclude peo-
ple from social services directly, or they can 
aggravate social exclusion by failing to re-
spond to those who are at risk of exclusion, 
due to simple oversight, lack of commitment, 
or inadequate resources. While they may be 
dutifully fulfilling their mandate, institutions 
can also foster social exclusion by failing to 
create opportunities for those who are likely 
to experience social exclusion. 
Legislation may also deepen the exclusion 
of some social groups if it is discriminatory. 
More common are gaps in legislation—
when no effective anti-discrimination laws 
exist. Even more common, however, is lack 
of enforcement.
The legacies of the past
Pre-transition (and post-transition) heritage 
contributes to social exclusion. The social-
ist system was built on the promise of an 
egalitarian society. As a result, it promoted 
the universal right to education, health care, 
and comprehensive social protection. This 
system attained universal or near-universal 
access to basic education and health ser-
vices, as well as achieved dramatic declines 
in illiteracy (nearly eradicating it in urban ar-
eas).  However, it fell short in the civic partici-
pation aspects of human development.65
State socialism generated its own patterns 
of social inclusion and exclusion. Socialist 
society was inclusive of those who professed 
to share its principles—providing some gen-
uine opportunities for social mobility—but 
there were also serious exclusionary tenden-
cies, in some cases reaching overt repres-
sion. 
Egalitarian and communal in ideology, so-
cialism introduced category-based social 
protection instruments, targeted at certain 
population groups. These were easier to ad-
minister through command and direct con-
trol. A consequence was the excessive em-
phasis on institutional care for some groups, 
such as persons with physical or mental dis-
abilities. This focus remains a prevalent fea-
ture of the social assistance systems in many 
countries of the region today.
T
Chapter 4: Drivers of social  
exclusion
65/  Ivanov and Peleah 
2010.
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Socialism solidified elitism and failed to 
tackle exclusion through a legacy of no-
menklatura rule, producing mistrust in 
citizen-state relations. Transition ushered in 
alternative power structures, notably clan-
based clientelism in Central Asia (box 9) 
and ethnic-based structures in the former 
Yugoslavia.
As Figure 4.1 shows, in all countries except 
Kazakhstan, people think that connections 
today matter more than they did 25 years 
ago. This reflects the survival of old nomen-
klatura elites, or the emergence of equally 
powerful successors in the post-transition 
reality.
Figure 4.1: Connections mattered then… and matter now
Box 9: Social exclusion in Central Asia and the impact of legacies
The Social Exclusion Index shows that people in 
Central Asia face a particularly high risk of social 
exclusion. However, in Tajikistan the average number 
of deprivations per person may not be higher than in 
other – wealthier – parts of the region, and widespread 
economic exclusion may have even contributed to a 
lower degree of subjective dissatisfaction with living 
standards. 
Economic growth has not led to the creation of decent 
jobs for the large rural populations of Central Asia, 
leading to widespread underemployment, large 
concentrations of rural poverty, and the emergence of 
labour migration—internal and external—as a domi-
nant coping mechanism. Economic exclusion in turn 
contributes to exclusion from social services, due to 
the inability of the people with low-incomes to make 
informal payments, which augment the extremely low 
shares of GDP spent on health. Economic exclusion 
is in many cases being passed on to future genera-
tions, as urban/rural differences mean, for example, 
that children are denied access to decent secondary 
schooling, and may face pressures to stay at home to 
help with the household.  Younger children lack access 
to pre-school education, which would help give them 
a good start and make up for disadvantages they may 
face at subsequent levels of education. Lack of invest-
ment in social infrastructure has left rural popula-
tions without guaranteed reliable sources of energy, 
heating, or running water, compounding income and 
employment insecurities. 
Independence has weakened institutional structures 
and capacity which, to some extent, has been offset by 
the strong tradition of family or ‘clan’ ties and commu-
nity structures. These had always played an important 
role in the Soviet period, but became more important, 
if not more transparent, during transition. While they 
provided valuable informal networks of support, they 
also contributed to the non-transparent capture of po-
litical and economic power by various clans. Appoint-
ments to positions of political and economic respon-
sibility tend to be allocated on the basis of trust and 
patronage, rather than through competitive selection, 
raising the risk of exclusion of non-connected mem-
bers of the population. Power structures are based on 
a delicate balancing of the allocation of privileges and 
power between clan structures to maintain political 
and social stability and the lack of dissent by rival 
clans. Apart from contributing to political exclusion, 
this balancing arguably contributes to the inability of 
economies to benefit from the efficiencies of market 
systems. It also encourages a preference for eco-
nomic growth models that guarantee rents (unearned 
income) and control over rent allocation to people in 
privileged positions, rather than those which could 
guarantee a more equal distribution of the benefits 
of growth, including through greater employment 
creation. 
The tradition of clan structures and patronage, as well 
as social relations based on hierarchy and authority, 
together with the preference for strong executive bod-
ies rather than legislative bodies (inherited from the 
Soviet period) makes stakeholder participation and 
civic control and accountability difficult. Together with 
the slow reform process in budget allocation and plan-
ning, this legacy weakens the quality and availability 
of social services, and hence contributes to exclusion 
from social services at the local level.  
How important are connections to people with political power 
for getting ahead today vs 25 years ago?
Today
25 years ago
Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009.
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Institutional transition and 
governance
The political and economic transformation 
created new public and private institutions, 
new forms of relationships between private 
and public organizations, and new forms of 
governance. Figure 4.2 shows governance 
indicators on the rule of law, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality and cor-
ruption. Given the diversity of the region 
and individual countries, it aggregates data 
on a sub-regional level.  
Central and East European countries have 
succeeded to a large extent in creating effec-
tive and efficient governance systems that 
respect the rule of law and human rights. 
Source: Governance Matters 2009, Worldwide Governance Indicators, 1996-2008 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp.
Note: Government Effectiveness: Perceptions of the quality of public services, civil service and degree of its independence from political pressures, quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. 
Regulatory Quality: Perceptions of the ability of government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. 
Rule of Law: Perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in, and abide by, rules of society, and in particular quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, police, and courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
Control of Corruption: Perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests. 
Figure 4.2: Differences in governance across the region 
Governance indicators (regional averages), 2008 
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In these countries, the state has played a 
positive role in creating an enabling envi-
ronment for social inclusion. This includes 
translating EU regulations based on the EU 
Charter (Copenhagen criteria), reforming 
institutions and strengthening their ca-
pacities, and setting adequate standards in 
service delivery. In addition, workable qual-
ity control mechanisms and accountability 
measures have been put in place to ensure 
citizen representation and participation 
in political decision-making. However, de-
spite these reforms and EU accession, dis-
criminatory practices, biases within institu-
tions, and inadequate legal frameworks still 
produce social exclusion.  
In Southeast Europe, the prospect of ac-
cession to the European Union is a strong 
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nation legislation. Governance and the rule 
of law developed in different ways in the 
Western CIS, Caucasus and Central Asia, in 
some cases with limited levels of success.   
During transition, emerging institutions 
were often driven by the ‘new elite’, which 
in some countries did not differ much from 
the old nomenklatura. Institutional gover-
nance was generally weak in terms of ac-
countability, transparency and inclusion, 
although substantial improvements have 
been noted in a short time-span, particu-
larly in the new EU-members and accession 
countries. 
One example where new values were 
co-opted by old patterns of behaviour is 
freedom of expression. This freedom was 
among the first achievements of transition 
but was not sufficiently matched by insti-
tutional checks and balances. As a result, in 
many countries limited freedom of speech 
was replaced by greater freedom of expres-
sion, but with questionable policy impact. 
The region has become much more un-
equal in terms of income and wealth. 
Strong monopoly positions and imperfect 
market institutions—notably weak bank-
ing systems and at times corrupt tax and 
customs authorities—have played a role 
in this. While the resulting level of inequal-
ity compares with other parts of the world, 
the abruptness of this shift was new in the 
Europe and Central Asia region. This speed 
of the change served to heighten people’s 
subjective perception of exclusion.
Governance effectiveness has implications 
for social inclusion. Although data from the 
survey alone is not sufficient to quantify the 
relationship between governance drivers 
and social exclusion, it is possible to corre-
late information from various data sources 
to draw some conclusions. Figure 4.3 illus-
trates the relationship between social ex-
clusion and improvements in governance 
(the latter reflecting the World Bank gover-
nance indicator), while figure 4.4 shows the 
relationship between social exclusion and 
the quality of the business environment 
(using the number of procedures neces-
sary to start a business as a proxy). In both 
cases there is a clear positive correlation, 
demonstrating the importance of effective 
institutions to mitigate individual risks and 
thereby reduce the likelihood of social ex-
clusion.
Figure 4.3: Effective governance reduces social exclusion
Figure 4.4: ...So does a friendly business environment
Social exclusion and government effectiveness
Government effectiveness
Number of procedures to set up a business
Social exclusion and the business environment
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Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009 and Governance Matters 2009, Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, 1996-2008 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp.
Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009 and Governance Matters 2009, Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, 1996-2008 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp.
incentive to strengthen policies, legislation 
and institutional capacities. However, sig-
nificant weaknesses remain in the account-
ability of institutions and in the indepen-
dence of the judiciary and law enforcement 
bodies, especially in terms of anti-discrimi-
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Rule of law and social inclusion
Transition has created challenges for legal 
and judicial institutions. It has involved in-
creased independence from the executive; 
new roles for judges, lawyers, and other 
personnel; a rapid increase in institutional 
capacity to handle legal cases efficiently 
and effectively,66 and, most importantly, a 
new vision that has included widening ac-
cess to justice for marginalized communi-
ties and disadvantaged groups. 
While a large body of new legislation and 
far-reaching changes to existing law and 
procedures continue to be developed and 
implemented, prosecutorial and legal aid 
systems in large parts of the region have 
been slow to change from the Soviet model. 
Defendants, particularly those from margin-
alized groups, have few safeguards against 
state abuse. Public interest litigation ‘to 
precipitate social change through court-or-
dered decrees that reforms legal rules, en-
forces existing laws, and articulates public 
norms’67  is relatively new in the region. 
Judicial and legal reforms took a ‘top-
down’, state-centred approach. Judicial and 
legal reforms were undertaken in transition 
countries to create new, specialized consti-
tutional courts staffed with new judges to 
hold governments accountable and institu-
tionalize the protection of civil and political 
rights. Yet early judicial reform efforts lacked 
the detailed procedural and organizational 
changes necessary to make courts more ef-
ficient and accessible. Some of those initial 
reform initiatives were undertaken without 
adequate and appropriate consultation 
with the beneficiaries, particularly margin-
alized and ‘invisible’ groups. A balanced, 
multi-level approach in improving access 
to justice and human rights was missing 
from the regional discourse. These aspects 
raised concerns about the commitment of 
the state to law and human rights as the 
principal framework for policy and execu-
tive authority, and weakened the impetus 
to law reform through litigation and civic 
engagement. 
Figure 4.5 shows the inverse relationship 
between the rule of law, as measured by 
the World Bank governance indicator, and 
social inclusion. Moldova appears to be an 
outlier, indicating that in Moldova other 
drivers may have offset progress in the rule 
of law, exacerbating social exclusion. 
Labour market institutions
The labour market is one of the important 
channels through which social exclusion 
risks materialize for many individuals. The 
transition recession—dramatic in most 
countries—contributed to a deterioration 
of social protection, social services and, 
most importantly, triggered high unem-
ployment. 
UNICEF argues that most of the emerging 
inequality (and poverty) was caused by 
fundamental changes in the labour mar-
ket and in the institutional environment. 
It cited several micro-level factors in ad-
dition to high inflation and the failure to 
stabilize the economy..68 These included 
low earnings, not reflecting productivity, 
which led to the rise of the working poor; 
to falling formal employment and to rising 
self-employment; to the diminished role 
of the state, to less income redistribution; 
and to state capture, monopolistic control 
of certain sectors, and to corruption. These 
factors were indeed among the main prob-
lems in most economies of the region in 
the first decade of transition.  
Earlier work by UNDP, UNICEF and the World 
Bank have shown convincingly that the 
1990s, or the first decade of transition, saw 
Social exclusion and the rule of law
Rule of law
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66/  Anderson, Benstein 
and Gray 2005.
67/ Hershkoff 2005.
68/ UNICEF 2001.
Figure 4.5: Improved rule of law mitigates social exclusion
Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009 and Governance Matters 2009, Worldwide Governance Indicators,  
1996-2008 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp.
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many losers and few winners.69  An elevat-
ed feeling of social anxiety and uncertainty 
accompanied changes in national identity 
and economic, social, and political struc-
tures. Adapting to the new conditions was 
difficult and slow, as seen in such countries 
as Ukraine, which reflects the transforma-
tion reality experienced by most countries 
in the region (see Table 4.1). These changes 
led to the perception by an equally large 
share of men and women (and an even a 
larger share of the elderly) that opportuni-
ties had deteriorated since 1989 (see figure 
4.6). Meagre chances for better living stan-
dards and access to employment top the 
list of grievances in all countries.  
Limited employment opportunities—part-
ly reflecting ineffective labour market insti-
tutions—can contribute to social exclusion 
(figure 4.7). 
Finally, data from the Social Exclusion Sur-
vey show how labour market institutions 
such as employment agencies can be uti-
lized to address social exclusion (figure 4.8). 
This argues for strengthening active labour 
market interventions, which assist people in 
finding productive employment. The ben-
efits of such employment go well beyond 
income. A productive job helps people to 
maintain skills and motivation, and to re-
duce marginalization and degradation.
Table 4.1: Adapting to a new life in Ukraine
Percentage of people … 1997 1999 2001 2003 2007 2009
Who are actively involved in life today 7.3 7.4 7.2 8.3 16.0 18.0
Who are seeking their place in life today 36.3 36.6 38.0 30.5 32.5 33.6
Who do not wish to adapt to the present situa-
tion or wait for a turn for the better
44.9 46.7 43.3 36.2 37.6 34.0
Who are not able to decide 11.4 9.3 11.5 25.0 13.0 14.4
Source: Ukrainian Society 1992 – 2009. Dynamics of Social Changes. Institute of Sociology of NAS of Ukraine, 2009. – p.192.
Figure 4.6: Disappointed by transition
Percentage of people who believe that they have inferior opportunities to those in 1989
Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009
Achieve a good 
standard of living
Express what you 
think
Achieve the level of educa-
tion that you desire
Have a good job
69/ UNDP 1999, UNICEF 
2001, World Bank 2000 and 
World Bank 2005.
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Policies as drivers of 
social exclusion or 
inclusion 
While the link between policies and social 
exclusion is indirect, and hence difficult to 
attribute and quantify, it exists. This section 
will analyse models of economic growth, 
fiscal decentralization, social policies and 
approaches to regional imbalances. All of 
them contribute to the dynamics of social 
exclusion. 
Growth models 
Varied growth paths can be explained by 
different legacies, but also by different 
strategies of enterprise privatization and 
restructuring.70 We distinguish between 
broad-based growth versus spatially and 
sectorally unbalanced or ‘growth pole’-
based growth. Most of the CIS countries fall 
into the latter category, while several of the 
EU-10 and SEE transition countries pursued 
more broad-based growth, which is associ-
ated with lower degrees of inequality.71 In 
some cases, the unbalanced, capital city-
centred growth models created new exclu-
sionary structures. In addition, centralized 
planning left a large number of mono-
company towns as a legacy. These exclud-
ed whole communities from economic as 
well as social and civic opportunities and 
continue to have very limited economic al-
ternatives. 
Growth models can also be distinguished 
according to openness, with more open 
systems (such as the Baltic states) at one 
end of the spectrum, and semi-closed sys-
tems relying heavily on import substitution 
(such as Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) at 
the other end. Furthermore, countries also 
differ in the extent to which they rely on for-
eign direct investment, foreign borrowing, 
remittances from migrants, development 
aid, as well as differ in their  level of domes-
tic savings, which affects their investment 
and consumption. 
In transition economies, the following sec-
tors stand out, as drivers of growth over the 
past two decades:
Extractive industry and mining: The hydro-
carbon sector emerged as an engine of 
growth in a number of ECA countries, no-
tably Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia and 
Figure 4.8: Labour market institutions foster social inclusion
Figure 4.7: Insecure employment and social exclusion
Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009.
Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009.
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Turkmenistan. Metal exports contributed 
substantially to foreign exchange earnings 
in Ukraine, Armenia, and Tajikistan. High 
commodity prices during part of the 2000s 
were a key underlying factor driving growth. 
However, job creation associated with such 
70/ Guriev and Ickes 2002.
71/ Cornia and Popov 
2001.
56
growth was minimal, with employment 
gains mostly limited to highly specialized 
skilled labour. Hence, without strong spill-
overs to other sectors, this growth model 
contributes to more exclusive and capital-
intensive growth, which creates economic 
enclaves and leaves a large fraction of the 
population excluded from economic par-
ticipation. Social inclusion can be fostered 
through revenues generated from extract-
ing industries, but in most countries, social 
inclusion was modest at best. In fact, if not 
matched by strong governance capacity 
and an effective system of checks and bal-
ances, misallocation and corrupt use of rev-
enues can increase social exclusion. 
Manufacturing industry (including SMEs): The 
contribution of the manufacturing industry 
to social inclusion is important, although 
it often remains limited to urban areas. In 
many of the ECA transition countries, em-
ployment was concentrated in large indus-
trial state enterprises that tended to hoard 
labour. Compared to extractive industries, 
manufacturing is more labour intensive, 
with more forward and backward linkages 
to other parts of the economy. Therefore, it 
has the potential—realized in many coun-
tries of the region, especially in those more 
open to trade—to reduce economic exclu-
sion through the labour market. Impor-
tantly, migrant workers have taken many 
industrial jobs, resulting in cross-border 
benefits . 
Except in some EU-10 transition countries, 
the small- and medium-sized enterprise 
sector has been slow to make a significant 
impact on economic inclusion by raising 
employment and incomes. Except in parts 
of Central Europe, experience has not been 
a key characteristic of the private SME sec-
tor—which has the highest job creation 
potential. Large numbers report that they 
do not know what steps to take to pur-
sue a business idea: 67 percent of survey 
respondents in Tajikistan, 64 percent in 
Kazakhstan and Ukraine.72 Moreover, the 
regulatory environment in most countries 
in the region remains restrictive. Together 
with administrative barriers, this imposes 
burdensome transaction costs and hinders 
private sector development. The best social 
inclusion outcomes are likely to occur when 
SMEs join large companies’ supply chains, 
when barriers to entry and exit are low, and 
involvement in production is linked to op-
portunities for improving skills and partici-
pation in the knowledge economy.
Agriculture with a primary cash crop: Agricul-
ture has the potential to foster social inclu-
sion, primarily by decreasing rural poverty. 
Cotton tops the list of export commodities 
in Uzbekistan. Together with strong import 
substitution, it financed the development 
of other industries, notably the natural gas 
sector.73 It has also played an important role 
in Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. Unfortu-
nately, agriculture-led growth was not pro-
poor and also faces serious sustainability is-
sues in many parts of Central Asia. Poverty 
remains more widespread in rural than in 
urban areas in most countries. To realize the 
social inclusion potential of agriculture, ef-
fective policies are needed to develop local 
markets and facilitate access for producers 
to markets. Land reform and the diversifi-
cation of agricultural output (often difficult 
for political reasons) are important to make 
these gains sustainable.
Service sector, construction and real estate: 
These are highly cyclical sectors that con-
tributed significantly both to the observed 
rapid growth in the early 2000s, and to the 
decline during the global crisis. Soaring 
bank lending contributed to this, especially 
in the Baltic states, but also in Central Eu-
rope, Bulgaria, Armenia, Kazakhstan and 
72/ Similarly large rates 
are seen in the other survey 
countries: 54 percent in 
the Republic of Moldova, 
50 percent in the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Mace-
donia; the rate is 38 percent 
in Serbia.
Table 4.2: Official aid and remittances
Official Aid/
GDP (%)
Official Aid/
GDP (%)
Remittance/ 
GDP (%)
1990-1998 1999-2006 2007
Albania 16.6 6.7 10.1
Armenia 9.9 8.4 9
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 30.8 9.6 …
Georgia 5.3 6.8 6.8
Kyrgyz 
Republic 10.7 13.3 19
Moldova 2.4 7.4 38.3
Tajikistan 6.2 11.7 45.5
FYR 
Macedonia 2.2 5.8 3.6
Uzbekistan 0.6 1.4 …
Source: World Development Indicators Database (2008).
73/ Cornia et al. 2003.
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Georgia. In these and also in some other 
countries, speculative developments in 
the real estate sector led to a bubble, with 
painful consequences for social inclusion. 
The initial spike in demand for construction 
services attracted investment and labour 
into the sector, which boosted internal mi-
gration and drained resources from other 
sectors, notably agriculture. These effects 
persist, undermining social inclusion. 
Migrant remittances: Migration was driven 
by ‘distress push’ and ‘demand pull’ factors. 
The former originates in poverty, vulner-
ability and social exclusion, while the latter 
arises from, and is influenced by, opportuni-
ties in emerging local industries, booming 
urban economies, and demand for foreign 
labour. Remittances very often reduce pov-
erty, but migration has also strong social 
exclusion effects, as family structures are 
disrupted, and potential exists for discrimi-
nation against migrants in the ‘receiving’ 
country. Since most migrants are involved 
in the informal sector and lack social insur-
ance, the pension systems of the source 
countries may experience huge stress in 
the future. Realistic assessment of the ben-
efits of large-scale migration requires that 
future costs to the pension system be taken 
into account. 
Official data on remittances are typically 
estimates of flows through the banking 
system and informal transfers. Remittances 
amount to just under 6 percent of GDP in 
Bulgaria and Romania, but 10 percent of 
GDP in Albania and almost 20 percent in 
Kyrgyzstan. In the Republic of Moldova, 
remittances account for 38 percent of GDP, 
eclipsed only by Tajikistan, where the rate 
was 45.5 percent of GDP in 2007 (table 4.2). 
The recent financial crisis led to a sizable 
decline in these shares in 2009 as employ-
ment of migrants in the receiving countries 
fell, rapidly transmitting the impact of the 
crisis to source countries, although remit-
tances recovered in 2010.
Official development assistance: Some econ-
omies in the ECA region (such as Armenia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of 
Moldova, the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajiki-
stan) have received large amounts of ODA 
in the past, and this generally continues to 
be the case. Official aid flows were impor-
tant drivers of growth in these economies. 
The social inclusion impact of an ODA-dom-
inated model of growth is highly depen-
dent on the quality and appropriateness 
of policies pursued in recipient countries. 
Though ODA has the potential to improve 
social inclusion, massive inflows can skew 
local actors’ incentives and shift attention 
away from sustainable sources of growth.
The informal economy: In various ECA tran-
sition economies, the informal (or shadow) 
economy is still pervasive. Large shares of 
women are often involved in this sector. 
Activities not prohibited by law but out of 
the tax office’s sight can have some positive 
impacts on social inclusion. They raise out-
put, lower the level of marginalization, and 
also help the workforce maintain skills and 
secure some income. But this comes at the 
cost of a diminished tax base, and hence 
lower budget revenues, unfair competition 
from the side of informal firms, large gaps 
in social protection for those employed in 
the shadow economy, and adverse long-
term financial implications for the social 
insurance system. By contrast, the outright 
‘black’ economy (criminal activities like 
smuggling, human and organ trafficking, 
drugs and arms trade) fractures the fab-
ric of societies and deepens social exclu-
sion. Tackling this problem will require the 
availability of more stable and sustainable 
growth patterns and income distribution. 
Figure 4.9 demonstrates a strong correla-
tion between informality in the labour mar-
ket and social exclusion.
Figure 4.9: The questionable benefits of informal employment 
Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009.
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Finally, data on spatial poverty show that 
growth models in the CIS that relied heavily 
on exclusive ‘growth poles’ promoted social 
exclusion rather than inclusion. The qual-
ity and rate of growth have been relatively 
poor in the countries where this form of 
highly unbalanced growth took place. Caz-
es and Nesporova, 2007 describe economic 
growth rates that don’t promote employ-
ment growth as ‘jobless growth’. The large 
employment losses stemming from the 
current crisis underscore the importance of 
making growth more sustainable and equi-
table.
Social policies as drivers
Social policies can promote social inclu-
sion. However, differences in political 
economies and governance structures 
driving social exclusion outcomes, as well 
as differences in the nature and impact of 
social policy choices, are evident across the 
region.74 Several Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries saw membership in the Eu-
ropean Union as their key policy goal. With 
some notable exceptions, these countries 
began to adopt more socially inclusive poli-
cies and programmes, emphasizing the im-
portance of social cohesion, redistributive 
taxation, contribution-based entitlements, 
and comprehensive social programmes. 
This combination of transition-related mar-
ketization, universalism, and contribution-
based social insurance formed the core ele-
ments of the new hybrid Central European 
welfare regime.75 The recent financial crisis 
has hit hardest those parts of the sub-re-
gion, notably the Baltic states and Romania, 
which have based their welfare systems, at 
least recently, on ‘radical economic reforms 
resulting in minimal states, low welfare 
spending, low taxes, strongly deregulated 
labour markets and widespread liberaliza-
tion’.76 
In countries of Southeast Europe, conflicts 
in the 1990s and the complexities of state 
fragmentation and (unfinished) state build-
ing have led to a rather complex web of re-
sponsibilities for social welfare. As a result, 
sub-national inequalities among capital cit-
ies, other urban areas, and rural or moun-
tainous regions grew. One of the defining 
characteristics of the region is the chal-
lenge of building social policies which en-
sure equal access for all ethnic groups and 
consistent delivery nationwide. 
Social policies are often designed to ben-
efit well-organized groups, such as war vet-
erans in countries emerging from conflict. 
In several countries, pensioners are also a 
powerful political lobby. Remittances from 
abroad, large-scale migration and dual resi-
dence in different states all contribute to a 
disconnect between citizenship and wel-
fare entitlements. In the short- and perhaps 
even medium-term, this sub-region is un-
likely to exceed a ‘minimal welfare state’77 
in which weak states seek to regulate, but 
where formal and informal marketiza-
tion dominate, and residual, targeted, and 
means-tested social protection systems 
persist. 
Another sub-regional grouping in social 
policy terms consists of the energy-based 
economies of the CIS, including the Russian 
Federation, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turk-
menistan, Azerbaijan, and to some extent, 
Belarus. The fiscal space created by oil reve-
nues is, of course, quite recent and volatile. 
The emerging social protection systems of 
the region are quite varied and frequently 
do not reach their full potential.  The sys-
tems tend to be skewed towards privileged 
entitlement for some groups, such as war 
veterans, the police and members of the 
political elite, and to rely on underfunded 
and at times dysfunctional Soviet-legacy 
institutions. Informal welfare provided 
through family and kinship networks are 
also typical.78 On the other hand, some of 
the countries have tried to use oil revenues 
to develop and extend social protection 
and in some cases, redistributive social pol-
icies. Belarus, for example, has a system of 
universal child benefits for children under 
three years of age which appears to have 
contributed to significant gains in terms of 
child well-being.79 On the whole, though, oil 
and gas revenues have been used predom-
inantly for short-term efforts, rather than 
to build sustainable rights-based systems. 
Parts of the sub-region have responded to 
the demographic crisis with pro-natal poli-
cies, which in some cases favour some eth-
nic groups at the expense of others, and to 
some extent deter women’s participation in 
the labour market. 
The other countries in the CIS region are 
all net energy importers, but their social 
protection systems are perhaps too diverse 
to be grouped together. They all exhibit 
features of the Soviet legacy, elite capture 
within a broad set of privileges, combined 
75/ Cerami 2006.
76/ Lendvai 2009.
78/ Cook 2007.
79/ Richardson et al. 2008.
74/ Cerami and Stubbs 
2010.
77/ Drahokoupil and 
Myant 2009, 2010.
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with a reliance on informal sectors for the 
majority of the population. 
The largely fragmented welfare systems 
also require people to take care of them-
selves. The correlation between the accep-
tance of individual responsibility and social 
exclusion can be seen in Figure 4.10, where 
social exclusion is higher in countries where 
a larger percentage of people believe that 
everyone has to take care of himself or 
herself. But correlation doesn’t imply cau-
sality—the high share of individualistic at-
titudes can result in more social exclusion; 
or equally, the high level of social exclusion 
can lead to a higher level of individualism 
(perhaps through disappointment in the 
existing ‘inclusion frameworks’). 
Targeting social protection is a critical issue 
in the region, with several associated diffi-
culties. Targeted schemes are problematic 
in contexts where informality and poverty 
are widespread and where there are weak 
institutional structures. This is particularly 
important in the ECA transition region 
where large parts of the middle class are 
vulnerable to poverty. Targeting on the ba-
sis of income can entail high administrative 
costs or a restrictive set of formal welfare 
conditions, it can lead to stigma amongst 
beneficiaries, and can ‘foster segmentation 
of social programmes and separation of 
middle and higher classes from the poorer 
strata’.80 
While social policy choices always involve 
trade-offs within a given fiscal space, rela-
tively little attention is paid to analysing 
the different impacts of policy options on 
various socio-economic groups. In the con-
text of the dramatic social impacts of the 
recent global crisis, there may be a new 
convergence with international financial 
institutions’ recognizing the need to move 
beyond informality to some basic safety net 
in those countries which spend the least on 
social protection while, at the same time, 
urging expansive welfare models in parts 
of CEE to concentrate scarce resources 
through targeting.81 The budget cuts after 
the crisis tend to erode and undermine 
broad political support for a welfare state, 
such that ‘welfare for the poor is likely to 
become poor welfare’.82
Most of the targeted social assistance/
minimum income schemes in the region 
are discretionary and involve judgements 
by front-line staff, posing risks, notably 
bias against certain groups, including mi-
norities, and even fraud committed by low-
paid officials. Moreover, making a claim re-
quires a large number of documents from 
different sources, and hence, considerable 
persistence. Many prospective claimants 
are discouraged by the stigma of applying 
or by the lack of the required documents. 
Roma, displaced persons and homeless 
often cannot access basic social services 
because they lack documents. In addition, 
support for vulnerable people and those 
from stigmatized groups to make a claim is 
insufficient; very little information is made 
available (especially accessible informa-
tion for persons with disabilities) and there 
are almost no proactive media campaigns. 
Means-testing in some parts of the region 
uses as criteria the ownership of land (with 
no reference to realizable income in some 
cases) or a car (which may be a necessity 
in some remote areas), as well as housing 
status (which has forced some claimants to 
sell their sole asset). 
Decentralization policies as 
drivers
Most ECA countries attempted to decen-
tralize power, but this was not always done 
in a comprehensive manner. When admin-
Figure 4.10: Declining solidarity goes hand in hand with 
social exclusion
 Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009.
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plans for regions to become cotton or corn 
exporters. This was achievable because the 
rural population could not relocate to cit-
ies because of the propiska system. Over 
the past 20 years, young people have been 
migrating towards larger cities in search of 
work and the receiving communities have 
been overwhelmed with increased service 
demand. At the same time, the sending 
communities are faced with the economic 
problem of trying to provide the same level 
of services, most of which have a fixed cost 
element, while the working-age popula-
tion that contributes to the tax base is de-
creasing. 
In countries where the decentralization 
process is already advanced, local govern-
ments are starting to learn how to address 
issues of social exclusion and improve ser-
vice delivery. Countries bordering the Eu-
ropean Union have greater capacity, both 
in terms of financial means and know-how 
to implement decentralization. However, 
in some cases in Central and Southeast Eu-
rope, service delivery may have been de-
volved to municipalities too small to deliver 
services efficiently. Inter-municipal coop-
eration (IMC) is a promising innovation to 
deliver services to multiple municipalities 
by benefiting from economies of scale. 
How decentralization is managed has di-
rect impact on social exclusion. Local gov-
ernments will need diagnostic tools which 
integrate national analysis with local fea-
tures in order to leverage decentralization 
policies to improve social inclusion. Chap-
ter 5 explores such an analytical approach 
in depth.  
Values and 
behavioural patterns 
as drivers of social 
exclusion 
Behavioural and value-based based drivers 
are caused by discriminatory attitudes and 
cultural practices that regulate norms and 
behaviour in society and among groups. So-
cial exclusion can result from, and persist in, 
social traditions and values among different 
social groups of the population. Thus, indi-
viduals, families and communities, as well 
as state institutions can promote exclusion 
among vulnerable groups. Behavioural and 
istrative decentralization preceded fiscal 
decentralization, local governments found 
themselves responsible for education, 
health care, and social assistance without 
sufficient fiscal authority or transfers allo-
cated. Such unfunded local government 
mandates occurred frequently in countries 
facing a difficult economic transition and 
insufficient resources to address multiple 
social and economic problems, e.g., in Ro-
mania when the central government de-
volved responsibility for care of orphans to 
local government.
Inadequately financed fiscal decentraliza-
tion ended up creating huge winners and 
losers. The legal framework did not sup-
port civil society and citizenry in exercising 
their rights to information and demand-
ing accountability from their local govern-
ment. Corruption, which already had fertile 
ground during the Soviet period, persisted. 
Resources for service delivery – particularly 
for vulnerable and marginalized popula-
tions who were least able to complain – 
were squeezed.  
In other cases, the design of the fiscal de-
centralization system reinforced existing 
inequities. Without an effective redistribu-
tion system, usually consisting of equaliza-
tion grants backed by a sufficient pool of 
funds, fiscal decentralization leaves those 
regions with weaker economies at a dis-
advantage in addressing social inclusion. 
In fact, regions or local governments with 
the weakest capacity to meet their citizens’ 
needs often have a higher proportion of 
citizens with special needs, a dynamic criti-
cal for fiscal systems to take into account. 
In the case of the former Yugoslav Repub-
lic of Macedonia, grants for education and 
health care are made based on existing 
infrastructure, leaving rural municipalities 
that historically ended up without such in-
frastructure greatly disadvantaged in pro-
viding these services to their citizens.   
More than 50 percent of respondents in 
Tajikistan and Ukraine and 43 percent in 
Serbia believe that the quality of education 
within their community has become worse 
compared to 25 years ago. One must rec-
ognize that the Soviet era made great ad-
vances in introducing services such as elec-
tricity, water, schools, and health care. The 
investments were not purely humanitarian, 
but were also intended to facilitate natural 
resource exploitation as part of centralized 
61
value-based drivers in ECA countries are 
strong enough to perpetuate exclusionary 
patterns and have the potential to under-
mine well-intentioned inclusive projects. 
Addressing these drivers require long-term 
approaches that focus on mindset changes 
within society as well as require changes in 
social and cultural norms.
Gender
Transition has affected women’s access to 
the labour market. During the period of 
rapid industrialization, there was a strong 
emphasis on the inclusion of women in 
the labour market. However, most women 
faced the triple burden of work in the for-
mal economy, being the main carers of 
small children and home workers, and of-
ten also working in the informal economy, 
including subsistence agriculture. Child 
care was, however, a partnership between 
families and the state with the provision 
of factory-based childcare; but sometimes 
agricultural workers were excluded. The 
vacuum caused by the collapse of the old 
workplace-related child care system was 
not filled by other forms of care, forcing 
many women to choose between profes-
sional careers and taking care of their chil-
dren. Especially in the case of marginalized 
groups, the net outcome is falling work-
force participation rates among women, an 
increasing number of children out of child 
care, and shortfalls in early childhood de-
velopment.
Prevailing gender or cultural norms cre-
ate exclusionary patterns. This often leads 
to difficult dilemmas for ethnic minority 
women and girls between acceptance and 
inclusion within their community and with 
the broader society. In more conservative 
circles in Central Asia, for example, the 
exclusion of women can follow from the 
traditional distribution of social roles in pa-
triarchal societies. More subtle discrimina-
tion often takes place in the labour market 
and in public institutions throughout the 
region due to the existence of gender ste-
reotypes within societies. Women of fertile 
age often face obstacles when looking for 
employment, as employers often prefer 
hiring men rather than face the risk of hav-
ing to shoulder burdens stemming from 
maternity rights. This restrains the career 
development of women and forces them 
to take low-paid jobs, which hamper their 
Box 10: Influencing local policies that impact women  
in Albania
Several local authorities in Albania have expressed an interest in 
integrating gender equality into the application of the Law on Social 
Services and Social Assistance in their municipalities. They were also 
interested more generally in capturing their experience of delivering 
social assistance to beneficiaries. Many local government partners 
felt that the decentralization process had stalled, and that the local 
level – which was experiencing firsthand the weaknesses of key social 
assistance policies – had something to say to the national level, 
based on their direct contact with citizens. 
UNIFEM therefore initiated a beneficiary analysis to assess how cen-
tral government policies work on the ground through case studies in 
two municipalities (Elbasan and Kukes). In so doing, it also provided 
a channel to raise the voices and concerns of local authorities to 
central authorities. 
The beneficiary analysis of the Law and the procedures for imple-
mentation use aspects of the Swedish 4R method.* The method 
involves the following elements: a) Representation – a quantitative 
mapping of the way in which men and women are represented; b) Re-
sources – a quantitative mapping of the way in which resources are 
distributed and utilized; c) “Realia” - looking at the reasons for the 
distribution of representation and resources from a gender perspec-
tive; and d) Realization – formulating new objectives and measures. 
The findings of the beneficiary analysis revealed not just women’s 
unequal access to social services but also the specific institutional 
barriers they face. For example, the Law on Social Services and Social 
Assistance assumes that the head of household is a man. Unlike men, 
women who apply as heads of household must first document that 
they fill this role. Women reported significantly greater difficulty than 
men in obtaining the documents to prove that they are household 
heads. In addition, only certain categories of women qualify as head 
of households. Women whose husbands are living abroad but who 
do not send remittances, and women who have left their husbands 
but have not been formally granted a divorce, do not qualify as 
heads of household and are not eligible for economic aid.
The primary recommendation of the analysis was that a head-of-
household approach enshrines an inherent gender bias. The Law 
should instead target individuals, and within this, their dependents. 
However, until this significant shift in thinking towards social protec-
tion takes hold, the recommendations focused on the need to expand 
the categories of female-headed households that are eligible for EA. 
Specific groups of women were suggested to be included. Through 
meetings between the central government and local authorities, 
and through UNIFEM advocacy, the recommendations were formally 
presented to the Ministry of Labour, Social Assistance and Equal Op-
portunity (MOLSAEO), as the institution with overall responsibility for 
the law. This process was timely in that it coincided with the national 
elections of June 2009, when the ruling party expressed a commit-
ment to amend the Law on Social Services and Social Assistance so 
as to ensure those in greatest need were being reached effectively.
Source: UNIFEM.
* Gender Mainstreaming Manual: A book of practical methods from the Swedish Gender Mainstream-
ing Support Committee (Stockholm: Swedish Government Official Reports, 2007). http://www.
sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/08/19/82/3532cd34.pdf.
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long term social and economic security. 
Gender stereotypes are also creating prob-
lems in accessing employment in branches 
of industries that are considered ‘a man’s 
job’.
Minorities
Social exclusion of ethnic minorities can 
stem from various sources. Participation in 
social, cultural, political and economic pro-
cesses can be put at risk for several reasons, 
but often because of prejudice and miscon-
ceptions, exacerbated by fears and insecu-
rities, especially in periods of crisis and un-
certainty. At the same time, however, when 
ethnic groups and minorities become the 
subject of state-sponsored programmes 
and benefits due to their ethnicity, they 
could become the subject of exclusion and 
non-acceptance by other communities that 
face similar socio-economic problems but 
do not benefit from such state support. 
For example, majority populations often 
view people from the Roma community 
working in the informal sector as ‘free-
riding’ because such unofficial work allows 
them to collect social assistance benefits, 
to which people in regular employment–
often the ‘working poor’ – contribute a sig-
nificant share of their income. Despite the 
limited scope of the phenomenon, the per-
ception of free-riding easily translates into 
xenophobic attitudes that further deepen 
people’s prejudices and their unwilling-
ness to give Roma a chance to improve 
their future. Such attitudes make it much 
more difficult to gain public endorsement 
of long-term strategies to improve educa-
tional opportunities for, and thus the em-
ployability of, Roma. 
People with different sexual orientation very 
often face forms of discrimination through-
out the ECA transition countries. An in-
creasing number of countries have adopt-
ed anti-discrimination legislation that also 
promulgates the rights of sexual minorities, 
yet these laws are rarely implemented in 
full. In Central and Eastern Europe, sexual 
minority communities are often exposed 
to violence and hate speech, but they con-
tinue to advocate for their rights. In most of 
the Caucasus and Central Asia, their rights 
are not even debated in political forums 
and in public. The issues related to sexual 
minorities are still taboo. These popula-
tions are exposed to severe discrimination 
and physical and verbal abuse, taking place 
in the labour market, in social clubs and as-
sociations, or even when accessing basic 
social services.
People with mental and physical disabilities 
also experience multiple forms of exclusion, 
ranging from discrimination in the labour 
market, social isolation, to lack of political 
power. Despite assistance efforts, econom-
ic exclusion among people with disabilities 
can reinforce stigma. For example, despite 
their numbers, many earthquake survivors 
with disabilities in Armenia reported feel-
ing ghettoized and isolated despite exten-
sive material aid. They explicitly described 
themselves as ‘poor’ because they were un-
able to earn money and saw no prospects 
for employment or integration into society 
at large.83 Limited access to public trans-
portation excludes persons with physical 
disabilities from shops, public facilities, 
employment, education, polling stations 
and cultural opportunities. Many countries 
in the region provide constitutional rights 
to persons with disabilities to support their 
ability to provide for themselves and pur-
sue professional training, and many have 
ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, or are in the pro-
cess of doing so. However, few have pro-
tected these rights in practice. 
An evaluation of the needs and demands for 
social services of vulnerable children and their 
families in Kazakhstan suggests that children 
with disabilities are typically educated in spe-
“Not at university, but in high school I had a problem. Because 
I was a lesbian, I was thrown out of class, and there was talk of 
transferring me to a different school. Then my mum came and 
sorted it out so I wasn’t transferred to a different school, but I was 
transferred to a different class” (Girl, Serbia).
“We do not feel any differences in the orphanage. We are all broth-
ers and sisters there; we face the same problems. But in school, 
parents of other children do not let their children socialize with 
us. “The children from the orphanage have lice, they are dirty, 
uneducated”, they say (Orphans, the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia).
“I worked while in school in order to pay for my education, but 
after I graduated I could not find a job, even though I applied 
everywhere. I graduated with a degree in graphic design, and 
in the school where I applied for employment, the position is 
held by a teacher. He has his job because of family connections” 
(Albanian youth, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).
83/ World Bank 2004.
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cialized institutions or at home, where the 
quality of teaching varies widely.84 
People in the region are not familiar with 
the idea of educating children with dis-
abilities in regular schools, which often lack 
the equipment and staff to accommodate 
them. In Kazakhstan, 16 percent of children 
with disabilities consider regular schools 
unsuitable for their safe and free move-
ment. 
In Tajikistan, most children with disabili-
ties cannot attend regular schools. Only 
200 out of 18,600 children with disabili-
ties under 16 years of age were enrolled 
in boarding schools in 2008.85 Schools are 
not accessible to children with disabilities, 
despite laws mandating that they be. Con-
centrating such children in special schools, 
Local communities have historically played an im-
portant role in Tajikistan, especially in maintaining 
and nurturing solidarity networks, which can act as 
shock absorbers when change happens. Traditional 
community structures (mahallas) had survived 
the Soviet period reasonably intact, especially in 
rural areas, and with the collapse or weakening 
of formal state structures in the transition period, 
represented a valuable source of protection and 
support for vulnerable sections of the population. 
The traditional strengths of communities are in 
maintaining social cohesion and stability. The au-
thority of the oldest and wisest of the community 
can be invoked to help solve inter- and intra house-
hold conflicts. The elders also provide economic 
support, such as helping households organize 
traditional ceremonies, including weddings. These 
are important rituals, almost obligatory for house-
holds participating in community life, but can put a 
massive strain on the household budget. Communi-
ties can also organize voluntary community help to 
families in building or repairing homes (hasher).  
Communities also play an important role in 
transmitting traditional values and roles, which in 
the past have underpinned their internal stability 
and social cohesion. Inclusion in the community 
can bring positive benefits for its members, but it 
requires adherence to traditional values, which 
can be contrary to individual rights and freedom 
of choice, especially for women. Since the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, the country has been striv-
ing to strike a new balance between secular and 
religious values. The dominance of secular values 
has receded, while the prevalence of traditional 
and religious values has increased. This has led to 
a reversal in some of the gains made by women in 
the Soviet period. Moreover, the loss of guaranteed 
employment and collective-farm and party struc-
tures has led to a decrease in the rights and securi-
ties of women outside family and community. 
In this situation, some women benefit from inclu-
sion in communities, but for others, the price of 
inclusion is accepting constraints on individual 
choices. Traditional values encourage women 
to stay at home, and to depend on the husband, 
meaning that women are not economically em-
powered, and have less voice in the home and com-
munity. Women who live alone – widows, divorcees 
and those with husbands working abroad – can 
suffer from lack of status or even exclusion from 
community life due to the lack of a male head of 
household. There is some evidence of young people 
suffering from the tradition whereby parents 
choose the husbands for their daughters (and wives 
for sons). And if a man has a position of power in 
the community, it is not culturally permissible to 
criticize his behaviour even if it involves mistreat-
ment of family members. 
Women may choose not to go against community 
pressures due to the prospect of loneliness and fear 
of social exclusion, given the lack of alternative 
sources of support. The establishment of crisis cen-
tres and shelters in some areas of the country, with 
support from local NGOs and donor organizations, 
are examples of structures outside the community 
that are helping women in these situations to exer-
cise their choice to go against tradition and the de-
cisions of their families and communities. Women 
who have turned to the centres include those being 
forced into marriage, divorcees, and those with 
husbands who have migrated for work.
Box 11: Inclusion in community structures versus the individual right to choose in Tajikistan
or denying them access to standard edu-
cational institutions, instils a feeling of 
isolation. By effectively removing children 
with disabilities from society, educational 
exclusion severely limits opportunities for 
advancement.
Attitudes towards including persons with 
“People with disabilities, especially women, need the help of social 
workers. Even if a person with a disability has the support of family 
or friends, he or she still needs the help of social workers. Currently, 
social workers only help those who live alone. For example, I became 
paralyzed two years ago, so my husband took care of me every day. 
Because I lived with family members and relatives, I was not allowed 
to use the services of a social worker. As a result, he was forced to quit 
his job and our living standards deteriorated rapidly” (Woman with a 
disability, Uzbekistan).
84/ Sange 2008.
85/ Statistical Yearbook of 
the Republic of Tajikistan. 
(Dushanbe: State Commit-
tee on Statistics, 2009).
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sion. Although openness towards inclusive 
measures is prevalent according to the sur-
vey, a wide range of capacity needs in the 
educational sector (and especially among 
teachers) would first need to be addressed. 
As a recent educational study shows, the 
reaction of many teachers to learning dif-
ficulties of children includes moralization, 
punishment, contempt towards children 
and other similar attitudes.86 According to 
the same study, pupils are more tolerant 
of children with disabilities and their in-
clusion into mainstream schools. Some 40 
percent of pupils absolutely agree that chil-
dren with disabilities should study in their 
schools; an additional 30 percent of pupils 
partially share this opinion. The rest do not 
support inclusive education. 
Some groups, such as people living with HIV/
AIDS, are stigmatized and often socially and 
economically excluded. The main cause of 
social exclusion of people with HIV/AIDS 
is fear by others who believe that they can 
contract the disease when interacting with 
people with HIV/AIDS. Stigma is equally 
important in exacerbating social exclusion 
risks for people with HIV/AIDS (see box 12).
There is limited openness in the six coun-
tries towards including children with HIV 
Figure 4.11: Should children with disabilities attend 
mainstream schools?
Figure 4.12: What school should children with disabilities or HIV attend?
What school should children with disabilities or HIV attend?
Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009.
Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009.
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86/ UNDP Moldova 2010.
disabilities into mainstream education 
correlate positively with social inclusion 
(see figure 4.11). This suggests that the 
attitude of the general population has a 
direct impact on mitigating social exclu-
%
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into mainstream education (figure 4.12). 
Fear and bias lead to rejection, isolation 
and the tendency to treat the people living 
with HIV as a threat to society. Such values 
and attitudes complicate the process of in-
clusion of people with HIV/AIDS in society. 
Prejudice and social exclusion go hand in 
hand. A larger share of the socially exclud-
ed compared to those who are not socially 
excluded have in the past three months ex-
perienced prejudiced treatment, indicating 
that discriminatory practices play an im-
portant and instrumental role in bringing 
about social exclusion (figure 4.13).
Alienation and withdrawal 
from society 
Forms of self-exclusion and withdrawal 
from society and social relations can also 
be a consequence of the lack of social net-
works, social capital and the feeling of ‘be-
ing left out of society’. Alienation, marginal-
ity and withdrawal are often the outcomes 
of deliberate institutional exclusion, when 
individuals and groups feel alienated from 
existing processes. But they can also be seen 
as a driver when extreme withdrawal ham-
pers possibilities to engage with society. At 
one level, this type of marginalization is a 
result of prolonged exclusion throughout 
the lifespan of individuals or groups, which 
“Recently I visited a private dental clinic in which a 
very good doctor refused to treat my teeth. We have 
a mutual friend, so I informed her about my status. 
But she told me frankly: “I am sorry, but you should 
understand that if anybody knows that I am assisting 
an HIV-infected person, nobody will visit me anymore”. 
She is not afraid of becoming ill but she is afraid that 
people will know”. 
The quote from a regional research on the exclusion of 
people living with HIV illustrates that the lack of basic 
training on HIV epidemiology (transmission and pre-
vention), explicit biases and unclear policies contrib-
ute to the unpreparedness of employers, educational 
institutions and health service providers outside of 
specialized AIDS centres to accept and serve people 
living with HIV. The research found that in fact, many 
people living with HIV in the region fear social stigma 
more than the health consequences of the disease. 
The root causes of stigma are lack of knowledge about 
HIV and AIDS, lack of personal familiarity with people 
living with HIV, and societal bias against marginalized 
groups.
The fear of stigma and discrimination is a major cause 
of reduced up-take of prevention, care treatment and 
support services, even when free, by people living with 
HIV or at risk of infection, which in turn diminishes 
the effectiveness of national responses and further 
contributes to marginalization. Stigma poses a large 
risk to the well-being of people living with HIV and 
contributes to putting others at greater risk. In order 
to be effective, social inclusion strategies therefore 
need not only to remove barriers in access to services 
but also to encompass efforts to reduce stigma. 
 “Social inclusion for people living with HIV means 
that we can lead longer, more productive lives as 
individuals and citizens, that we can better serve our 
families and better help prevent further HIV transmis-
sion. I think, what is good for people living with HIV 
and for populations at higher risk is good for society 
as a whole”, said Vladimir Zhovtyak, Head of the 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia Union of People living 
with HIV.
UNDP 2008. Living with HIV/AIDS in Eastern Europe and the CIS - The Human 
Cost of Social Exclusion.
Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009.
Figure 4.13: Share of people who have experienced 
prejudice in the past three months
Share of socially excluded and not socially excluded  
people who have experienced prejudice
Not socially excluded Socially excluded
Box 12: Social Exclusion of people living with HIV in Eastern Europe and the CIS
hampers the individual’s motivation and 
capacity to make use of opportunities. It 
can also result in the intergenerational re-
production of poverty, perpetuating social 
exclusion, and making it difficult for exist-
ing generations to provide better opportu-
nities for subsequent ones. 
0
5
15
25
10
20
%
66
“When you apply for a job, being long-term unemployed makes it 
more difficult. When I go somewhere now, I’m simply ashamed to 
say it’s been 11 years since I finished school and I don’t have a single 
day of work. I’m simply ashamed” ( Long-term unemployed youth, 
Serbia).
Major findings of this 
chapter
The chapter has analyzed how the three 
groups of drivers of social exclusion (a) 
structures and institutions, (b) policies and 
(c) values and behavioural patterns can in-
teract with individual risks to produce so-
cial exclusion. The analysis has shown that 
legacies of the past 20 years still dominate 
people’s perceptions and shape social ex-
clusion outcomes today. 
The political and economic transformation 
has led to new forms of governance and 
massive institution building, posing new 
challenges to institutional capacities. These 
developments have significant implications 
for social inclusion. For example, effective 
institutions and improved rule of law were 
found to be important for mitigating indi-
vidual risks with the potential to prevent 
social exclusion from occurring. Low wages 
in local government could make it difficult 
to improve the quality of governance—an 
essential ingredient for inclusive local de-
velopment. Old and new prejudices can in-
crease social isolation. Non-existent or un-
enforced anti-discriminatory legislation can 
encourage intolerance and make inclusion 
of minorities even more difficult. Labour 
market institutions are another important 
channel through which social exclusion 
risks materialize in the region. Unemploy-
ment agencies matter for decreasing social 
exclusion, which strengthens the case for 
improving active labour market policy in-
terventions in Europe and Central Asia. 
The chapter has investigated relationships 
between social exclusion and models of 
economic growth, decentralization and so-
cial policies. It finds that unbalanced, capi-
tal city-centred growth models have cre-
ated new exclusionary structures in some 
countries. These have been exacerbated 
by the legacy of centralized planning that 
left mono-company towns with very lim-
ited economic alternatives and excluded 
whole communities from economic and 
social and civic opportunities. Moreover, 
the large share of the population working 
in informal jobs and in insecure labour con-
ditions has also led to higher social exclu-
sion outcomes. 
Unfinished social policy reforms represent 
a critical gap in social inclusion tools and 
can even hinder social inclusion if they do 
not reach the socially excluded. Such social 
protection mechanisms are not very effec-
tive in fostering social inclusion. 
Decentralization policies, though intended 
to improve efficiency, can also undermine 
social inclusion. Assigning spending man-
dates to local governments needs to be 
accompanied by resource transfers and ca-
pacity building to ensure that decentraliza-
tion policies do not exacerbate sub-nation-
al inequalities. 
Behavioural and value-based drivers relat-
ed to gender or culture are strong enough 
to maintain exclusionary patterns and can 
even cause inclusive projects to fail. Ad-
dressing these drivers requires long-term 
approaches that focus on mindset changes 
within society as a whole, as well as chang-
es in social and cultural norms. 
The drivers discussed so far have focused 
on the national context. The subsequent 
chapter brings the local context into the 
analysis of the social exclusion chain.     
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s discussed in Chapter 1, individual 
characteristics (such as age and 
gender) can lead to social exclu-
sion. Whether they do depends on two sets 
of external factors: drivers and local context. 
The drivers have been analyzed in Chapter 
4. Now we will examine the local context, 
defined as the set of socio-economic fac-
tors that affect individual risks and drivers 
of social exclusion. For example, legislation 
supporting private sector development 
has nation-wide relevance, but its effec-
tiveness depends on local capacities, local 
infrastructure, environmental legacies, and 
spatial factors.
The local context
In order to investigate the impact of local 
conditions, we used data from the ‘Social 
Exclusion Survey’ on such issues as people’s 
tolerance of corruption or attitude to diver-
sity, and correlated these with the Social 
Exclusion Index. At the same time, we as-
sessed survey respondents’ locality accord-
ing to a number of criteria common to all 
respondents in the locality (number of em-
ployment providers; quality of transport; 
incidence of environmental or man-made 
disasters; proximity to an academic institu-
tion; and so forth). These location-specific 
data supplement respondents’ individual 
characteristics. We call this procedure ‘sec-
ondary source contextualization of the sur-
vey data’. 
This exercise allows us to disaggregate indi-
vidual data along a number of local charac-
teristics reflecting the major development 
and transformational patterns experienced 
by all countries in the region. This makes it 
possible to extrapolate our findings about 
the magnitude and character of social ex-
clusion beyond the six countries surveyed. 
Mono-company towns versus 
the knowledge economy
According to the survey findings, whether 
a town is characterized by one employer or 
multiple employers plays a large role in de-
termining the degree of social exclusion. It 
is highest in areas that had been dominat-
ed by one or two companies prior to 1989 
(figure 5.1). It is likely that most of these 
localities are still mono-company towns, 
where social exclusion is high (the third bar 
in figure 5.1). But some of these traditional 
towns have managed to provide more em-
ployment opportunities, thus decreasing 
the risk of social exclusion (the fourth bar).
Mono-company towns not only have more 
limited employment opportunities, but also 
suffer from reduced access to services and 
participation in social life and networks. 
The data indicate that each of the three 
dimensions of social exclusion contribute 
A
Chapter 5: The local context 
and social exclusion
Figure 5.1: Multiple employment opportunities decrease 
the risk of social exclusion
The magnitude and composition of social exclusion in areas 
with different numbers of employers
Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009.
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equally to the level of social exclusion in 
both mono-company towns and in those 
with multiple employers. This finding may 
be a consequence of the extended welfare-
state functions of enterprises in mono-
company towns. It also suggests that diver-
sifying employment opportunities in such 
localities could have marked benefits for 
social and civic participation.
When looking at how the recent financial 
crisis has affected these localities, we ob-
serve that social exclusion is lowest in areas 
characterized by multiple employers and 
by economic growth (figure 5.2). Notably, 
social exclusion is highest in mono-compa-
ny towns characterized by stagnation, rath-
er than by decline–contrary to what one 
would expect. The employment situation 
in these areas was unfavourable before the 
crisis, which may account for this finding.
Mono-company towns don’t convert eco-
nomic growth into reduced social exclu-
sion, at least in the short term. This is sup-
ported by the observation in figure 5.2 that 
social exclusion in mono-company towns 
that are characterized by economic growth 
is even higher than in similar areas charac-
terized by economic decline. This implies 
that economic growth in mono-company 
towns won’t reduce social exclusion in the 
near term if employment opportunities are 
not diversified.  By contrast, where there 
are multiple employers, economic growth 
reduces social exclusion. 
Proximity to an academic centre can de-
crease social exclusion.  The value of the 
Social Exclusion Index in academic centres 
is lowest compared with other localities. 
When an academic centre is only ‘nearby’ 
a given locality, the level of social inclu-
sion doubles; when an academic centre is 
far away, the level of social inclusion triples. 
Since many academic institutions are usu-
ally located in capital cities, where social ex-
clusion is generally lower, one may reason 
that the results are biased. But even when 
capital cities are filtered out of the sample, 
the data still point to a correlation between 
proximity to academic centres and lower 
social exclusion. 
How does the presence of academic centres 
reduce social exclusion? Better economic 
opportunities and public services typically 
characterize the areas that host academic 
centres. But the knowledge spread by aca-
demic institutions, and their advocacy for 
better social services, should also be taken 
into account. The findings suggest that in-
vesting in academic centres and ensuring 
their geographical distribution can help 
to mitigate social exclusion. More broadly, 
similar social inclusion benefits are likely 
to accrue by promoting the ‘knowledge 
economy’.
Poor transportation infrastructure can be 
an important contributor to social exclu-
sion (figure 5.3). Where transportation in-
frastructure is ‘good’ and ‘excellent’, the lev-
el of social exclusion is only 11 percent, but 
where infrastructure is ‘poor’ (where there 
is only one road, but in good condition) or 
‘bad’ (one road, in poor condition) the risk 
of social exclusion increases to 19 percent 
and 29 percent, respectively.    
The impact of environmental 
disasters on social exclusion 
Environmental disasters also affect social 
exclusion. According to the ‘Social Exclu-
sion Survey’, the magnitude of social ex-
clusion is 27 percent in areas affected by 
environmental disasters versus 12 percent 
Figure 5.2: Areas with multiple employers are more 
resilient to crisis 
The Social Exclusion Index, by employment opportunities and 
resilience to the recent economic crisis
Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009.
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in localities where such disasters have not 
occurred (figure 5.4). Moreover, in locali-
ties affected by environmental disasters, 
exclusion from economic life accounts for 
the biggest share (38 percent) of the Social 
Exclusion Index. In localities that have not 
been affected by an environmental disas-
ter, exclusion from social services accounts 
for the biggest share (36 percent) of the so-
cial exclusion index. Disruption of produc-
tion linkages, lower investment, and out-
migration of qualified workers may explain 
the diminished economic opportunities of 
areas affected by environmental disasters. 
Environmental disasters, however, may 
have unexpected positive externalities. The 
data also indicate that, in localities where 
an environmental disaster has occurred, 
exclusion from participation in civic and so-
cial life contributes least to social exclusion. 
This may be due to the fact that environ-
mental disasters encourage people to use 
informal networks and community action, 
thus strengthening social networks and 
civil society participation.
Individual risks and 
local context
Our analytical approach allows us to exam-
ine individual risks together with elements 
of the local context. This allows us to move 
beyond basic statistical categories such 
as ethnicity, low educational attainment 
and unemployment. Combining these el-
ements allows us to see deeper exclusion 
patterns that are relevant for social inclu-
sion policies. 
Food and housing risks 
People face a number of risks specific to 
their local context: chief among them are 
the risks of hunger and eviction from their 
home. The ‘Social Inclusion Survey’ finds 
that the risk of hunger is more pronounced 
than the risk of eviction among both the 
socially excluded and non-excluded popu-
lations (figure 5.5). This likely reflects the 
relatively high rates of apartment and 
home ownership in the region. Significant 
fear of hunger among the socially excluded 
in the Republic of Moldova and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia under-
scores the fact that food poverty is not only 
an issue for developing countries but also 
for middle-income ones. 
Figure 5.3: Better infrastructure promotes social inclusion
Figure 5.4: Environmental disasters contribute to social 
exclusion in three dimensions
Quality of local transportation infrastructure and the Social 
Exclusion Index
Impact of environmental disasters on the Social Exclusion 
Index
 Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009.
Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009.
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Figure 5.5: The risk of hunger, and eviction persists
Figure 5.6: Subsistence agriculture helps to decrease exclusion
Share of respondents, excluded and non-excluded, who are ‘very worried’ about facing  
hunger and eviction
Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009.
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Subsistence agriculture is an important sur-
vival strategy both for the socially excluded 
and for the non-excluded (figure 5.6).87 
People in small towns and rural areas can 
benefit from engagement in subsistence 
agriculture. However, these activities can-
not fully mitigate the deprivations associ-
ated with living in rural areas.     
Local schooling
Inferior education can pass social exclusion 
down from one generation to the next by 
87/ The missing values for the for-
mer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
indicate that respondents assessed 
the share of the products they 
produced themselves as less than 
50 percent of their household needs.
Share of people, excluded and non-excluded, who grow more than half their food
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
% 35
Excluded Non-excluded
Kazakhstan Moldova FYR Macedonia Serbia Tajikistan Ukraine
Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009.
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failing to provide the children of socially ex-
cluded adults with the knowledge needed 
to build a better life. The socially excluded in 
all surveyed countries think that their chil-
dren have fewer educational opportunities 
than other children (figure 5.7). As concerns 
Figure 5.7: Social exclusion leads to inferior education...
Figure 5.8: …but how much so depends on location
village education, similar percentages of 
excluded and non-excluded parents think 
that their children are receiving an inferior 
education (figure 5.8). But differences in 
perceptions emerge as we approach urban 
centres. Capital cities and regional centres 
Share of people, excluded and non-excluded, who think their children have worse educational chances than...
Non-weighted regional average
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ensuring a better future for their children. 
Social exclusion status contributes much 
more to poor education than location.
Tolerance of corruption  
Social exclusion is relatively low in commu-
nities that exhibit low tolerance for corrup-
tion (true across villages, towns and capital 
cities). Social exclusion is more prevalent in 
communities where people make informal 
payments to receive social services—such 
as medical care, education and social ben-
efits—and to facilitate business with local 
administrations (figure 5.9). Villages that 
tolerate corruption display a higher level 
of social exclusion than towns and capital 
cities. This does not necessarily mean that 
rural authorities are more susceptible to 
corruption. Higher tolerance in villages and 
small towns can result from the more lim-
ited range of social services available. Un-
der such scarcity, unofficial payments can 
be required for accessing social services. 
Such dynamics contribute to greater social 
exclusion in villages. 
When local context 
aggravates 
individual risks 
Standard research methods do not always 
capture the full range of multiple social 
Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009.
Note: Low acceptance of corruption denotes when less than 10 percent of the population finds 
unofficial payments acceptable; high acceptance is denotes when more than one third of the 
population finds unofficial payments acceptable.  
Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009.
Figure 5.9: Social exclusion is lower in communities that do not 
tolerate corruption
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Figure 5.10: Disability increases the risk of social exclusion, but not universally
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seem to better serve the children of non-
excluded parents. This suggests that even 
when excluded families migrate to urban 
centres, they continue to have difficulties 
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Box 13: Adults and Children with Disabilities 
In the Europe and Central Asia region, persons with disabilities 
face widespread social exclusion. Many are prevented from enjoy-
ing their right to education, political voice, movement, employ-
ment, and medical care – for they need special assistance to 
exercise these rights. Persons facing multiple forms of exclusion 
are particularly challenged. For example, a person with a dis-
ability living in a rural area is likely to be denied access to trans-
port, infrastructure, education, public health, social support and 
employment. 
Some 71 percent of survey respondents in the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia reported not having any close friends with 
disabilities. In Kazakhstan, 11 percent of respondents with dis-
abilities said they experience prejudice both from ordinary people 
and from government officials (who should be serving them). The 
highest levels of discrimination against persons with disabilities 
were reported in medical institutions (according to 67 percent of 
respondents), by ordinary people in public places (33 percent), and 
on public transport (17 percent). Similarly, persons with disabili-
ties in Serbia reported significant problems receiving health care 
(37 percent) and social security services (22 percent) – the services 
which they need the most. 
exclusion risks. Some risks are related to in-
dividual status, others to the local environ-
ment. All accrue in various combinations to 
produce different levels of social exclusion. 
We can better analyse these combinations 
by contextualizing the survey data with 
secondary sources. 
Disability and the local context 
Persons with disabilities experience the 
most severe risk of social exclusion in rural 
areas (figure 5.10). The risk falls by almost 
half in urban centres, and further in capital 
cities. Attitudes play a major role in deter-
mining whether people with disabilities ex-
perience social exclusion. Social exclusion 
risks for a person with disabilities doubles 
when a significant portion of the popula-
tion (at least one third) opposes inclusive 
measures. The impact of attitudes can in-
crease further when augmented by insti-
tutional drivers, which can interact with 
individual risks to produce social exclusion 
(box 13).
Education, location and job 
prospects
When young people lack employment op-
portunities, they have a heightened risk of 
social exclusion. If—on top of this—they 
live in a rural area, their risk increases fur-
ther. The data indicate that a young person 
with a primary education in a rural area 
with only one employment provider has 
the highest risk of social exclusion (figure 
5.11). The risk decreases with higher levels 
Figure 5.11: Individual risks and local specifics interact to produce social exclusion 
Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009.
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of education and increasingly urban set-
tings. But the data also indicate that higher 
education levels cannot significantly miti-
gate the risk of social exclusion in the same 
locality. The risk of social exclusion for a 
young person with secondary education 
in a rural setting where there is only one 
employment provider is higher than for a 
young person with only primary education 
in a small town with a single employer. A 
young person with primary education in 
a rural area or small town where there are 
multiple employers faces the lowest risk of 
social exclusion. Thus young people have 
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the lowest risk of social exclusion in locali-
ties with multiple employers.
Age, location and 
environmental disasters 
The legacy of environmental disasters ex-
acerbates social exclusion both for old and 
young alike, but especially for young peo-
ple. The difference in terms of social exclu-
sion risk between living in a village affected 
by an environmental disaster and living in 
a village that is not affected is significantly 
higher for youth than for the elderly (figure 
5.12). This is likely because environmental 
disasters reduce opportunities for employ-
ment and civic participation—a , a phe-
nomenon that affects young people most 
of all.
Adding more parameters would make the 
picture even richer, but also more difficult 
to visualize and analyse. Instead of detailed 
descriptive analysis, a social exclusion risk 
calculator is more appropriate for educat-
ing people about the challenge of social ex-
clusion. It provides a richer picture of how 
individual risks translate into social exclu-
sion. Such a social exclusion risk calculator 
is available online, at http://europeandcis.
undp.org/poverty/socialinclusion. Under-
standing the multidimensional nature of 
risks is a prerequisite for formulating effec-
tive and comprehensive policies for social 
inclusion. By allowing policy makers to 
quantify the trade-offs between various 
aspects of social exclusion, this knowledge 
helps them to formulate priorities.
Major findings of this 
chapter
This chapter has suggested that local char-
acteristics can compound individual vul-
nerabilities to increase the risk of social ex-
clusion. In so doing, the chapter completes 
our analysis of the social exclusion chain.
Examining local characteristics is important 
because it can illuminate patterns of exclu-
sion that national-level data often fail to 
capture. Policy makers need to understand 
these factors to effectively address social 
exclusion. Only with this knowledge can 
governments design targeted and relevant 
policies. 
Secondary source contextualization has 
been employed to factor in local specif-
ics. This approach opens the door to even 
richer analytics in conjunction with social 
exclusion indexes. With minor marginal 
cost, additional information can be collect-
ed on the status of political activity (such as 
voter turnout) and the style of local policy-
making (as expressed, for example, in the 
performance of municipal councils). Com-
plementing social exclusion indicators with 
data on school enrolment or social security 
outlays yields a richer picture, with greater 
dividends for policy makers. The next chap-
ter lays out a number of policy recommen-
dations designed to foster social inclusion 
that emerge from the analysis thus far.
Figure 5.12: Youth and the elderly living in villages are especially vulnerable to social exclusion
Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009.
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n inclusive society is one that rises 
above differences of race, gender, 
class, generation and geography to 
ensure equality of opportunity regardless of 
origin, and one that subordinates military and 
economic power to civil authority. In an in-
clusive society, social interaction is governed 
by an agreed set of social institutions’.88 The 
capability and empowerment of all citizens 
to act as agents to influence how those in-
stitutions function, is indeed a hallmark of 
an inclusive society. This capability, and the 
resulting opportunities for people to live 
lives they have reason to value, represent 
a major area of convergence between hu-
man development and social inclusion.
Previous chapters have analysed how and 
why social exclusion occurs, and estimated 
the level and intensity of social exclusion 
in six countries. This chapter reiterates the 
main conclusions of the report, then pro-
vides policy recommendations that pro-
mote inclusive human development in the 
ECA region. It takes into account the results 
of the research described in the report, and 
lessons from relevant social inclusion policy 
frameworks and practices in the region and 
in the European Union. 
Main conclusions  
of the report
The report has presented an integrated 
conceptual framework for social inclusion 
and human development. It has put forth 
a new measure for analysing social exclu-
sion that goes beyond income, thus offer-
ing a more comprehensive perspective. It 
integrates individual risks, drivers, and local 
context to create a policy-relevant tool for 
assessing social exclusion and its causes. 
Chapters 2 and 3 have suggested that social 
exclusion results not only from economic 
deprivations, but also from lack of access 
to public services, civic participation, and 
social networks. Exclusion from social and 
civic participation is sufficient to deprive 
people of the opportunities needed to de-
velop their capabilities. Social ties are in-
strumental for social inclusion, particularly 
in this region, given people’s high degree of 
reliance on a range of informal ways to gain 
opportunities and access to institutions 
and services. 
Economic growth has not always translated 
into increased job opportunities, improved 
social services or greater opportunities for 
civic participation. Despite the region’s 
heterogeneity in growth and development 
levels, the intensity of social exclusion is 
similar across countries. This finding sug-
gests that, despite the vast macro-level 
differences between Kazakhstan and the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
social inclusion policies in these two coun-
tries would need to simultaneously target 
the three dimensions of exclusion (eco-
nomic exclusion, civic exclusion and social 
services exclusion).
Pre-transition structures, institutional inef-
ficiencies and attitudes have played a ma-
jor role in determining whether a person 
experiences social exclusion or not. Large 
parts of the population have not been able 
to adapt to the new demands of the labour 
market, where exclusion has been strongly 
influenced by urban and sectoral biases. 
These factors can contribute to exclusion 
from economic life. 
Social exclusion can affect any member of 
society, not just those who are disadvan-
taged and marginalized. Individual risks, 
interacting with drivers and local contexts, 
can lead to social exclusion. Marginalized 
groups are overrepresented among the 
socially excluded, but not everyone from 
these groups is excluded. Neither are the 
excluded only from these groups. More-
over, social exclusion is dynamic: feedback 
loops can reinforce social exclusion over 
time, even over generations. But there is 
also movement in and out of this group. 
Policies can influence these movements 
over time, underscoring the important role 
governments can play in creating inclusive 
societies. 
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This report confirms earlier research that 
found that the determinants of social ex-
clusion are linked to, and reinforce, one an-
other.  Exclusion in one area can trigger a 
series of exclusions in other areas. It is rare 
when social exclusion can be mitigated by 
focusing policy interventions on a single 
vulnerability or driver. Instead, multiple 
interventions implemented in a concerted 
manner are needed, reflecting the com-
plexity and dynamic nature of social ex-
clusion. Improvements in economic, social 
services or civic inclusion can lead to mas-
sive and measurable human development 
dividends. But sustainable progress can 
only be achieved over the long run. 
To move beyond narrow interventions that 
target only one cause of exclusion, policy 
makers must understand the interaction 
between drivers and outcomes. Rarely do 
policies address the multiple causes of so-
cial exclusion. Formulating a mix of social 
inclusion interventions constitutes a major 
policy challenge. It is especially critical that 
this collaboration occur at the lowest level 
of government administration in order to 
ensure multi-dimensional outreach to so-
cially excluded groups.
Values are an important driver of social ex-
clusion. Under socialism, diversity was not 
often seen as benefitting society, and this 
view still prevails in much of the region 
today. Despite progress made during tran-
sition, intolerance and low levels of social 
solidarity are prevalent. For example, Cen-
tral Asia has seen a return to traditional 
gender and cultural norms, which has cre-
ated new sources of exclusion for women. 
Throughout the region, we find discrimina-
tion against ethnic minorities, persons with 
disabilities, people with different sexual ori-
entations, people living with HIV, and for-
mer prisoners. Changing mindsets requires 
long-term approaches.
Maintaining political support for social in-
clusion policies is a challenge. When the so-
cially excluded receive social benefits, some 
construe this as free-riding and an abuse 
of the tax-funded social assistance system, 
to which people in formal employment–
especially the working poor–contribute. The 
perception that socially excluded groups are 
free-riding easily translates into xenophobic 
attitudes that further deepen prejudices. 
Such attitudes make it more difficult to 
gain the public’s endorsement of long-term 
multi-sector strategies for social inclusion. 
The report also points out that govern-
ments play an instrumental role in the 
process of social exclusion and inclusion. 
During transition the state underwent a 
significant transformation ‘on the run’. After 
years of one-party rule, many desired to re-
duce the role of the state as much as possi-
ble. As a result, state responsibilities shrank 
considerably, but this left huge grey areas 
without a clear division of labour among 
government, emerging civil society and 
the business sector. This led to weak gover-
nance, law enforcement and, in some coun-
tries, entrenched corruption—all serving to 
foster social exclusion. The changing views 
on the role of the state contribute to policy 
swings that diminish the efficiency of social 
inclusion interventions. 
Real or perceived risks of exclusion can—
and often do—give rise to negative coping 
mechanisms. These include participation in 
illegal activities, migration for menial jobs, 
crime, (domestic) violence, alcoholism, and 
so forth. In contrast with demand-pull mi-
gration that responds to evolving opportu-
nities, ‘distress push’ migration is in part a 
response to social exclusion. It is expressed 
in migration from rural to urban areas, or 
from urban centres to the capital, and also 
in migration abroad. 
Social exclusion has contributed to low lev-
els of trust, especially in institutions that are 
seen as perpetuating exclusion. This has led 
many to believe that the state is not fully 
discharging its responsibilities. Social ex-
clusion has also diminished people’s sense 
of belonging to society in the six surveyed 
countries. The high rate of social exclusion 
among children and youth, a trend that has 
been exacerbated by the economic crisis, is 
a sign that we risk losing a whole genera-
tion. This could create serious consequenc-
es, including aggravated social tensions 
and unrest. 
Recommendations: 
the strategy level
The goal of social inclusion is not an incon-
sequential abstraction; its achievement is 
vital for sustainably stable and productive 
societies. Policies and activities promoting 
social inclusion are gaining prominence 
at the international and regional levels, 
through the EU, the Council of Europe, as 
well as the UN and its agencies. EU mecha-
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nisms in particular have contributed to-
wards the development of targets, indica-
tors and other monitoring frameworks that 
enable more coherent and harmonized ex-
amination of the dimensions and scope of 
social inclusion. 
Social exclusion results from a complex 
web of risks, drivers, and local context. 
Alone, no single policy change can bring 
about definitive and lasting social inclu-
sion. This is why the policy recommenda-
tions put forth here need to be seen as in-
terlinked, making sense only as a coherent 
whole. Individually, the recommendations 
can contribute only modestly. However, in 
aggregate—especially if combined with a 
coherent strengthening of both local- and 
national-level engagement—they will have 
meaningful impact. Still, results will only 
come over a longer period of time.
The current limits on fiscal space make it 
imperative to devise efficient policies to 
address the challenges of social inclusion. 
However, this will not be easy: promoting 
social inclusion requires a complex mix-
ture of political will, institutional fit (in-
cluding policy coherence and governance 
capacity); and fiscal space. Such complex-
ity demands careful attention to political 
economy, a concern with questions of gov-
ernance and coordination, and an explicit 
and long-term focus on issues of technical 
capacity development. Even during the re-
cent pre-crisis period of growth, which saw 
an increase in fiscal space throughout the 
region, social expenditures have not kept 
pace with needs. Social expenditures are 
too often designed without an evidence 
base, delivered with limited coherence and 
without full transparency in central and lo-
cal budgets. 
This report proposes a framework to inform 
policy makers, and sets out some key policy 
considerations on the basis of the analysis. 
Recent years have seen a plethora of multi-
sector strategic plans that have not always 
improved the lives of the socially excluded. 
This report aims to ensure that these plans 
do not exist only on paper but make a dif-
ference in people’s lives. 
Genuine policy commitment to 
social inclusion
Political commitment to social inclusion is 
a prerequisite for progress. Awareness that 
something needs to be done precedes the 
question what can be done. Promoting so-
cial inclusion must be recognized as a key 
policy goal alongside economic goals. A 
key ingredient for getting to this stage is 
the realization that reducing social exclu-
sion is not only morally right but also in so-
ciety’s long-term interest. 
The idea of social inclusion has sufficient 
momentum at the international level, but 
needs to be translated into political com-
mitment at national and local levels. The 
institutional framework for promoting 
social inclusion was set up by the Copen-
hagen Declaration and the Programme 
of Copenhagen—documents of the 1995 
World Summit for Social Development. 
Heads of State were encouraged to create 
a society ‘for all’, in which each individual, 
each with rights and responsibilities, has 
an active role to play. World leaders at the 
Social Summit in Geneva in 2000 restated 
their commitment to social protection as 
a core issue in poverty alleviation. This fo-
rum also highlighted the dangers of social 
exclusion and their impact on sustainable 
human development. 
It is through the EU that the idea of social 
inclusion has most vibrantly become an 
explicit policy goal, articulated in the Lis-
bon Strategy in 2000. Since then the EU 
has advanced this agenda by applying a 
coordinated policy and monitoring frame-
work. The EU path reflects not only the his-
tory and culture of the countries involved, 
but also the valuable experience of multi-
country cooperation. The EU’s 27 member 
countries have commonly agreed objec-
tives and yardsticks to evaluate and assess 
their achievements. As such, the nego-
tiations that have led to a common set of 
social indicators in the EU, at the national, 
sub-national and supranational levels, may 
offer valuable lessons for other countries 
(box 14). 
The EU accession process is a worthy 
precedent and good practice for the ECA 
region. Adopting inter-country commit-
ments could add value and momentum to 
national efforts to promote inclusion. Each 
country needs to have its own strategy for 
combating social exclusion, incorporating 
all relevant sectors with clear responsibili-
ties, a designated lead government agency, 
and a robust, transparent and independent 
monitoring and evaluation system. The 
strategy needs to be based on continued 
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Box 14: How the European Union seeks to achieve social inclusion
* The Social OMC is coordinated by the EU Social Protection Committee (SPC), which consists of officials from each member state and from the European Commis-
sion. The SPC reports to the EU Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs (EPSCO) Council of Ministers.
**  http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=547&langId=en (19.02.2010).
*** European Commission consultation on the promotion of the active inclusion of people farthest from the labour market, COM 2006, 544 final.
EU experience can offer lessons for countries engaging 
in social inclusion agendas by providing a basis for key 
strategy elements: principles and capacity needs for 
social inclusion policy design; monitoring and imple-
mentation; as well as coordination mechanisms and 
data requirements. These general practices provide 
useful precedents for countries in the ECA region, 
regardless of their individual European integration 
aspirations. 
Commonly agreed goal 
In 2000, EU Heads of State declared in the ‘Lisbon 
Strategy’ the objective of making a decisive impact 
on the eradication of poverty and social exclusion in 
member states by 2010. The Lisbon Strategy identified 
the EU’s primary goals as growth and employment, 
coupled with greater social cohesion. To these three 
pillars, an environmental dimension was added a year 
later in the form of a strategy for sustainable develop-
ment in which all four pillars should mutually reinforce 
each other. 
The year 2010 marks the end of the Lisbon Strategy 
and despite significant effort, progress has fallen far 
short of ambitions. For the EU as a whole, the poverty 
risk rate in 2008 was as high as 17 percent—a figure 
that has remained broadly unchanged over recent 
years (Frazer and Marlier, 2010). During 2010, the 
‘EU2020 agenda’, which sets out a vision for Europe for 
the 21st century, was adopted. The EU2020 strategy 
calls for smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth for 
the EU in the coming decade, and proposes an EU 
headline target for poverty reduction (EC, 2010). 
Commonly agreed method for monitoring strategies
Since 2000, the EU has coordinated the social inclusion 
process through the so-called Open Method of Coordi-
nation (OMC). The Social OMC, also referred to as the 
EU Social Protection and Social Inclusion Process, is 
now applied to social inclusion (covering both poverty 
and social exclusion), pensions, and health care and 
long-term care.* The Social OMC has essentially been a 
‘soft’ process, based on voluntary cooperation in pur-
suit of common objectives. Responsibility for develop-
ing and implementing policies remains with countries. 
Much of the emphasis is on information exchange and 
policy learning. However, peer pressure is present as 
a result of the regular monitoring and reporting and, 
more recently, some international benchmarking.
In 2008, the Commission adopted the Renewed Social 
Agenda, which shifted the focus to empowering and 
enabling individuals to realize their potential while at 
the same time helping those who are unable to do so. 
The agenda recognizes that it cannot be confined to 
traditional social domains but has to be cross-cutting 
and multidimensional, covering a wide range of areas 
from labour market policies to education, health, 
immigration and intercultural dialogue. The renewed 
social agenda is built around three principles: oppor-
tunities, access and solidarity.** 
To implement these principles, the EC has introduced 
the concept of Active Inclusion, a comprehensive 
policy mix combining three elements: (i) a link to the 
labour market through job opportunities or vocational 
training; (ii) income support sufficient for people 
to lead a dignified life; and (iii) improved access to 
services to remove hurdles encountered by some 
individuals and their families in entering mainstream 
society, thereby supporting their reinsertion into em-
ployment’.*** Social inclusion policies are to be based 
on all three elements and their interaction, with close 
involvement of all partners and stakeholders, includ-
ing from other policy fields. 
involvement of all stakeholders including—
crucially— persons and groups experienc-
ing social exclusion. It needs to encompass 
all policies that impact social exclusion, in-
cluding macro-economic policies, and not 
only those policies traditionally considered 
‘social’. It also needs to ensure improved 
horizontal and vertical coordination of poli-
cies, a balance between national, regional 
and local levels, and diversity in state and 
non-state service providers. 
To move beyond paper targets, social in-
clusion strategies need to address the spa-
tial dimensions of sub-national exclusion, 
prioritize disadvantaged locations, and 
be fiscally sustainable. Area-based inter-
ventions, such as local or regional action 
zones, should be considered in localities 
experiencing multiple deprivations. Ensur-
ing that the budgetary process is participa-
tory, inclusive, and responsive to concerns 
of excluded individuals and groups is a 
crucial component of an effective strategy. 
The resulting fiscal policy also needs to be 
sustainable. Given the challenges building 
a political constituency in support of so-
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cial inclusion, knowledge sharing is critical 
within the region and beyond. 
The EU’s social inclusion policy remains an 
evolving process whereby policies, their ac-
companying implementation mechanisms 
and measurements are continuously im-
proved based on experience. Policies were 
initially largely based on socio-economic 
aspects of poverty and exclusion, with 
considerable focus on labour markets. Nu-
anced themes such as child poverty and 
well-being, homelessness and housing ex-
clusion, the social inclusion of migrants and 
ethnic minorities (especially Roma) and the 
impact of the financial and economic crisis 
have subsequently enriched the social ex-
clusion framework. This report further ex-
pands upon the EU’s social exclusion frame-
work by offering a policy-relevant empirical 
approach with an increased focus on social 
services and civic participation, and using 
drivers and local context to capture dynam-
ic and causal elements. 
Learning from experience in 
the European Union
While this report proves that transition his-
tory makes the regional story unique, the EU 
experience still provides valuable lessons for 
ECA countries. It provides a set of basic prin-
ciples and capacities needed for promot-
ing social inclusion centred on broadening 
consultation, promoting coordination and 
cooperation across sectors and types of ac-
tors, and improving oversight mechanisms. 
It highlights the importance of several ad-
ditional aspects, notably of:
 the active participation of local and na-
tional authorities and civil society stake-
holders in designing multidimensional and 
coordinated policies with transparent bud-
get processes;
 mainstreaming social inclusion objec-
tives into all areas of national policy;
 collecting systematic feedback for policy 
makers and administrators from all imple-
menting levels and from the intended ben-
eficiaries to determine why policies are (or 
are not) working; and using this feedback 
to refine policies as needed; efficiently in-
volving both government and non-gov-
ernmental organizations in the delivery of 
public services;
 making the process evidence-based and 
using quantifiable targets, indicators, and 
baselines to measure progress and assess 
policy effectiveness;
 involving stakeholders in monitoring 
and reporting through a variety of meth-
ods, including local- and community-level 
monitoring systems to provide information 
on social inclusion intervention outcomes 
at the local level. 
The key principles, processes and mecha-
nisms of the European Social Inclusion 
Process to coordinate social policies and 
mutual exchange across countries can be 
of particular relevance to the wider Euro-
pean neighbourhood if tailored to fit local 
contexts. European views on social policy 
have had—and continue to have—a pro-
found effect on social policies globally, 
both in other OECD countries (which are in-
fluenced by the exchange of policy experi-
ence and expertise with EU countries), New 
Member States, and in the developing and 
transition economies that are recipients of 
development and technical assistance from 
the European Commission (EC). 
For example, EU candidate or potential 
candidate countries in Southeast Europe 
are expected to develop the institutional 
capacity needed to discharge their social 
inclusion obligations. Candidate countries 
in the pre-accession period work with the 
Director General for Employment to de-
sign the Joint Inclusion Memorandum (JIM) 
as a preparation for participation in the 
Open Method of Cooperation (OMC), an 
approach to governance that relies on the 
voluntary cooperation of Member States. 
JIMs analyse the situation of social exclu-
sion, identify key challenges, review the ef-
fectiveness of existing policies and identify 
key priorities for the future. However, while 
they build statistical capacity for monitor-
ing poverty and social exclusion, they come 
with no formal commitment to implement 
future actions. 
The countries of the Southern Caucasus 
and Western CIS that are the focus of the 
EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy and 
its Eastern Partnership are likewise influ-
enced by EU support for social policies that 
embody ‘European’ approaches to poverty 
reduction and social inclusion.89 Countries 
in Central Asia receiving budget support 
from the EC (the Kyrgyz Republic and Ta-
jikistan) are also strongly influenced by the 
EU experience through social protection 
89/ Frazer and Marlier 
2010.
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policy reform programmes, which consti-
tute integral parts of the budget support 
agreements.
The value of the social inclusion framework 
for countries in the region goes beyond 
possible funding and expertise from the 
EU. As the current report proves, social in-
clusion has intrinsic value. Reducing the 
risks of exclusion improves human devel-
opment opportunities and is in the long-
term political, economic and social interest 
of ECA societies.
Meeting the commitments set forth in 
these EU partnership frameworks not only 
sets in motion efforts to design and moni-
tor social inclusion strategies, but also ne-
cessitates institutional capacity develop-
ment among state, private sector, and civil 
society actors. Specific social inclusion pro-
cesses also require aligning poverty reduc-
tion strategies and other overarching mac-
roeconomic and development frameworks 
with social inclusion objectives. The prin-
ciples set out above have been promoted 
to a considerable extent through the MDG 
and poverty reduction agendas. It is now 
time to reinforce efforts in this regard and 
move towards inclusive policy frameworks 
in the countries of the region, building on 
the lessons learned in the EU context. 
Towards pre-emptive 
policies: decreasing 
individual risks to 
social exclusion
Rather than reacting to social exclusion 
once it materializes, a pre-emptive ap-
proach holds the promise of being more 
effective and efficient. Addressing individ-
ual vulnerabilities before they translate into 
actual social exclusion requires both active 
and passive interventions. The first type 
of interventions encompasses the entire 
range of social services that improve an in-
dividual’s capacity to respond to exclusion 
risks. Passive interventions refer primarily 
to social protection and social safety nets. 
Inclusive social services
Beyond improving quality and access, the 
first policy recommendation in the area of 
social services is to move beyond a sector 
approach. Most of those services are sector-
specific, but their outcomes spread across 
the entire spectrum of social exclusion 
risks. Better education means not just more 
knowledge but also better employability, 
higher incomes and lower risk of poverty. 
Better health services lengthen people’s 
productive time-span and hence raise soci-
eties’ productive potential. The recommen-
dations below are organized by sectors, but 
efficient policy packages should be based 
on a careful analysis of their linkages. 
Education, health and basic 
services accessible to all
As demonstrated in chapters 2 and 3, the 
provision of good quality and accessible 
education and health services is vital for 
breaking the intergenerational cycle of 
poverty and social exclusion in the region. 
Four strategic areas stand out: early child-
hood education, improving school infra-
structure and the transition from school to 
work, increasing access to adult education 
and life-long learning, and promoting e-
inclusion.
Educational inequalities based on ethnic-
ity, disability, or place of residence already 
solidify by the time of primary school enrol-
ment and become increasingly entrenched 
at later stages. Large out-of-pocket pay-
ments to accessing basic health care cre-
ates barriers for the poorer population in 
the region while stigma and discrimination 
prevent access to basic social services for 
persons with disabilities, people from Roma 
communities, and persons living with HIV, 
etc. This has to be addressed jointly with 
a range of other services, such as housing, 
water, sanitation and transportation that 
in many cases affect educational or health 
outcomes. 
High quality pre-school education is im-
portant for children’s development and for 
future performance in the school system. 
Hence, it should be readily available to all 
pre-school age children, particularly for 
those who come from poor and disadvan-
taged backgrounds, for whom early inter-
vention is crucial and in many cases cost-
effective. Making pre-school obligatory 
and affordable is only the first step; critical 
policy elements include training teachers, 
allocating resources for infrastructure and 
developing support services such as par-
ent counselling and transportation. Early 
education should be coupled with regular 
health check-ups for children. 
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Health services need to ensure that the 
principle of access for all to basic health 
services is genuinely delivered. In particu-
lar, access of those who are outside the cur-
rent basic health insurance system needs to 
be enabled, while making sure that out-of-
pocket expenditures and discrimination do 
not limit access of those most in need. From 
a social inclusion perspective, two issues—
both also backed by a compelling econom-
ic case—deserve emphasis. First, there is 
a need to develop preventive health care 
programmes. Second, there is a need to re-
move passive barriers to health care, such 
as lack of transportation for those living in 
more remote rural areas, notably by pro-
viding more mobile health centres or local 
health clinics to reach the socially excluded 
where they live.
This report has demonstrated that the lack 
of public transportation is a key determi-
nant of social exclusion, reducing opportu-
nities for participation. Other services, such 
as water, sanitation and housing can play an 
equally important role and need to be seen 
as critical elements of social inclusion poli-
cies. Given the legacy of institutionalized 
care, countries in the region should explore 
opportunities for community-based hous-
ing for persons with disabilities and other 
disadvantaged groups as an alternative to 
institutionalization. It is also important to 
develop, in conjunction with civil society 
where appropriate, a strategy for support-
ing the homeless, as well as increasing 
funding for shelters.
Improving the employability 
of the labour force
Active labour market policies are an impor-
tant area of state responsibility. Facilitating 
entry to the labour market and the transi-
tion from one employment to another in a 
dynamic economic environment is a crucial 
element of social inclusion. 
A precondition for labour market inclu-
sion is that people’s qualifications meet the 
needs of the labour market. School curri-
cula need to be adapted to the changing 
labour market and to the diverse needs of 
children. Particular focus should be given 
to ensuring that children from disadvan-
taged backgrounds, such as Roma children 
or children with disabilities, are fully inte-
grated into and supported by the school 
system. This means developing effective 
support services such as counselling and 
mentoring for all parents, ensuring that 
schools are sufficiently equipped, and have 
trained staff to work with children with 
special needs. It is also important to ensure 
that the costs associated with education 
(e.g. books, transport) do not act as barriers 
to attendance. 
The transition from school to work requires 
deliberate policies in flexible form. Voca-
tional education is often the bridge be-
tween formal education and employment. 
It needs to adapt to labour market needs 
and provide opportunities to acquire de-
sirable new skills, such as internet literacy. 
Broader inclusion into education and train-
ing will also help address widespread youth 
unemployment—one of the main chal-
lenges for regional labour markets. 
While pre-emptive educational policies are 
the most strategic, developing accessible 
adult education and life-long learning op-
portunities can help people escape the low 
education-unemployment trap. Particular 
attention needs to be given to increasing 
engagement in life-long learning by those 
who are unemployed or are members of a 
disadvantaged group. In this regard, new 
information and communication technolo-
gies can be extremely useful. 
While measures to increase the employabil-
ity of disadvantaged individuals are clearly 
critical, diversifying growth opportunities 
and thereby increasing the overall supply 
and quality of jobs is another equally im-
portant part of the solution. One way to 
promote employment opportunities for 
population groups at risk of social exclusion 
is through developing or strengthening the 
social economy (see box 15). In this respect, 
governments should ease the legal require-
ments for establishing social enterprises 
and—fiscal space permitting—should pro-
vide financial incentives to encourage their 
setup. Finally, physical and other barriers to 
workplaces or public transportation faced 
by persons with disabilities need to be re-
moved. 
An open question with regard to social 
enterprises is the scope of government in-
volvement. Should the system of training 
and requalification services be entirely mar-
ket-driven, or should individual services be 
provided within an overall framework that 
sets strategic priorities more closely aligned 
with the intended recipients’ needs even if 
82
Revisiting social protection
This report has shown that exclusion from 
access to social services is a critical contrib-
utor to social exclusion outcomes in the six 
countries surveyed. This calls for creating 
an inclusive social system with access to a 
wide range of social benefits and services 
adapted to the different needs of various 
population groups. 
There is a need for a thorough review of 
social protection in the region. Transition 
has eroded the availability of low- or no-
cost public services and traditional forms 
of solidarity, notably inter-household sup-
port and community networks. The en-
suing formal and informal marketization 
of key social services has excluded many 
people. In addition, some groups in the 
region have managed to maintain a rela-
tively privileged position in terms of social 
protection priorities and expenditure. The 
legacy of category-based social protection 
benefits and privileges, together with the 
mix of formal rights and de facto discretion 
of the front-line bureaucracy in allocating 
benefits and services, along with stigma 
and discrimination, increasingly constrain 
access for the excluded. 
One option is to introduce a ‘social floor’ 
or ‘minimum social protection package’ 
which was endorsed by the UN system in 
2009. The basic components of the social 
floor are the establishment of a minimum 
guaranteed basic income for those capable 
of work; universal child benefits; a social 
pension for all over a certain age and for 
those incapable of work, and sufficient and 
adequate access to quality social services, 
including health, education, and social 
services. The inter-linkages between these 
components are crucial in the region, with 
sufficient access of particular importance. 
The fiscal feasibility of such a package for 
the region should be explored. A good 
short- to medium-term approach would be 
to focus on universal child benefits and the 
provision of quality social services and ad-
equate social pensions. 
Introducing a ‘social protection floor’ is not 
easy when fiscal space is limited, but much 
could be achieved within the existing fis-
cal envelope, if reallocation of resources is 
based on sound first principles. This would 
be clearly preferable to cutting the overall 
level of social spending, which would not 
Box 15: Social enterprise: U Pana Cogito Inn in Poland
In Poland about 60 social enterprises are in operation. Many were es-
tablished between 2004 and 2008 with start-up funding from the EU’s 
EQUAL* programme. Despite strong beginnings, a significant number 
ceased to operate once the EQUAL funding dried up. (Some put the 
failure rate at 60 percent.) Experience demonstrates the importance 
of sustained support.
A successful Polish social enterprise is the U Pana Cogito Inn in Cra-
cow. It provides employment opportunities for people with schizo-
phrenia by creating jobs adapted to their needs. Employment allows 
them to play a positive role in society and to feel needed, thus improv-
ing their relationship with their immediate community. 
To form the venture, local NGOs teamed up with governmental bod-
ies. The partners include: Limerick Institute of Technology, Association 
for the Development of Psychiatry and Community Care, National 
Disabled Persons Rehabilitation Fund, the Polish-German Society for 
Mental Health, the Municipality of Cracow, and the City of Edinburgh. 
The inn has 34 beds and a 90 percent occupancy rate during high sea-
son. Some 2,500 people frequent the hotel and restaurant annually. It 
employs 21 people with disabilities. They work as kitchen staff, room 
cleaners, receptionists and accountants. In addition, through the proj-
ect dozens of people have learned how to operate a social enterprise.
In 2006 the tourism industry recognized U Pana Cogito as ‘Simply the 
Best 2006’. Advisor Hotelier, a trade publication, awarded the head of 
the Inn, ‘Manager of the Year 2006’.
The experience of U Pana Cogito suggests that in order to succeed, 
a social enterprise needs significant start-up funding. In addition, it 
cannot be seen as a pure market entity, as it requires a subsidy for 
psycho-social support. But from a human development perspective, 
the subsidy is an investment that bolsters the dignity of vulnerable 
people. The investment also yields savings for the state, in terms of 
lowered social support for the employees of the inn. The state also 
collects employment taxes.
* The EU EQUAL Initiative seeks to ensure that no person is deprived of access to the labour market. 
This initiative to help implement the goals of the European Employment Policy and the Social 
Integration Process derives 75 percent of its funding from the European Social Fund (ESF) and 25 
percent from the state budget. EQUAL differs from the mainstream ESF by serving as an instrument 
for developing new, innovative methods for fighting labour market discrimination and inequality. 
As a result, EQUAL is often referred to as a ‘labour market experiment’.
Source: Social Economy Good Practice Handbook and information at www.ekonomiaspoleczna.pl. 
that does not maximize profits? The answer 
to this question has immediate fiscal impli-
cations, and varies from country to country. 
The experience from recent years—and in 
particular from the pre-crisis boom in some 
sectors in the region—suggests that mar-
kets do not automatically factor in a longer 
term social inclusion vision despite it be-
ing optimal in the long run. Such a market 
failure could be overcome through govern-
ment incentives that align autonomous 
private entities’ rational short-term choices 
with societies’ long-term interest.
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make the currently inefficient social protec-
tion systems more efficient. That would re-
quire carefully crafted reforms of the social 
safety net and the provision of public sec-
tor social services. Two aspects that could 
create fiscal space for more inclusive provi-
sion of social services include revoking ill-
targeted social transfers and subsidies, and 
diversifying the provision of social services 
by providing beneficiaries with the oppor-
tunity to choose private providers if those 
are more efficient.    
Raising the average targeting performance 
of social protection systems is feasible. 
While some programmes should remain 
universal, others that can rely on observ-
able characteristics of the poor and vulner-
able can effectively target those in need. 
The use of incentives to self-select in apply-
ing for social assistance can also enhance 
overall targeting efficiency of some social 
programmes. For instance, incentives can 
encourage people to rely on employment 
in public works or social enterprises, rather 
than receiving cash transfers.
Better targeting of social safety nets should 
go hand-in-hand with efforts to reduce de-
pendency. Programmes to reduce depen-
dency on social support have been tested in 
various contexts. The problem is that many 
people don’t have an incentive to move off 
welfare, which provides a small–but regu-
lar–income that is not taxed. For many it is 
irrational to switch to formal employment, 
which can be low paid as well as unstable. 
The availability of informal employment 
opportunities while receiving public sup-
port also discourages people from taking 
on a formal job.
Services for the elderly
The high share of elderly considered to be 
socially excluded—almost twice the nation-
al average in most countries surveyed—
argues for policy interventions on their 
behalf. The absence of tailored and com-
munity-based care, especially long-term 
care and accessible transport and health 
care for the elderly, is a major contributor 
to social exclusion, which is exacerbated 
by declining family support networks. The 
report also found that elderly generations 
feel increasingly lost in today’s societies, 
distanced from mainstream society. Poli-
cies addressing these aspects can markedly 
advance social inclusion.
Another central issue is the sustainability 
of pension systems in light of rising depen-
dency ratios in the majority of the region’s 
countries. Obviously, there is no ‘one-size-
fits-all’ solution. Some countries have in-
troduced three-pillar pension systems, and 
many have increased, or are considering 
increasing, the pension age. More flexible 
pension systems could also foster social 
inclusion, e.g., by allowing a combination 
of basic protection through pensions and 
part-time employment as additional in-
come and inclusion opportunities. But the 
bottom line remains that countries will 
need to have resources to cover pension 
outlays in the future. These resources will 
need to come from pension contributions 
and from accumulated funds in the funded 
pension pillars. At present most countries 
lack these resources.
Child benefits 
In the poorer parts of the region, where 
the cost of moving to universal benefits 
may be prohibitive in the short run, the 
emphasis may have to be on categorical 
child benefits. These could concentrate ini-
tially on family types with above-average 
poverty risk, such as households with two 
or more children, households with young-
Box 16: Conditional cash transfers can promote social inclusion  
Conditional cash transfers have a number of important features. 
They require the recipients of social assistance or child benefits to 
fulfil certain conditions, such as taking a job, studying in school, or 
ensuring that their children have regular health check-ups (Stubbs, 
2009). Conditional cash transfers can promote social inclusion by 
encouraging people to take advantage of networks of employers 
and schools. Conditionality can also help to reduce the prejudices of 
people who regard beneficiaries as ‘free riders’ merely living off the 
state. 
Like other middle income countries such as Brazil and Mexico, 
some countries in the Europe and Central Asia region have piloted 
conditional cash transfer programmes. Experience has found that 
conditional cash transfers can yield results, but they need to be 
accompanied by other measures such as improving education or 
expanding job opportunities. Otherwise, the programmes will not 
increase human capital and promote social integration (Friedman 
et al., 2009). Evidence also suggests that conditional cash transfers 
have not helped to mitigate social exclusion among Roma house-
holds. 
Schools must be receptive to the idea that tying state transfer pay-
ments to school attendance can enhance educational performance. 
Similarly, requiring work in return for social assistance is only half 
the answer; recipients must have work opportunities. Without them, 
conditional cash transfers will not increase social inclusion.
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er children, or lone parent households.90 
However, to sustainably reduce the risk of 
exclusion among children, focused efforts 
are also needed to improve the availability 
and quality of education, health and social 
services.  
Child benefits can also be used to motivate 
socially desirable behaviour, along the lines 
of conditional cash transfers used success-
fully in Latin America. This could involve 
measures to remove incentives for children 
to drop out of school. Children are still in-
volved in seasonal work in agriculture or in 
other income-generation activities, espe-
cially in Central Asia and in marginalized 
populations. Introducing elements of sim-
ple conditionality by linking child benefits 
to school attendance could be an effective 
way of decreasing drop-out rates, particu-
larly among marginalized populations for 
which both the drop-out rates and the rela-
tive weight of benefits in the household 
budgets are the highest.
Social services for vulnerable 
families
There is a legacy in the region of a large 
number of residents in institutional care—
including children lacking adequate family 
care, and children and adults with disabili-
ties. Such care is often of poor quality and 
lacks links to families and communities. As 
a first step, reforms could aim for deinstitu-
tionalization and in parallel the provision of 
diverse community-based social services, 
especially for families at risk, as well as for 
adults and children with disabilities and 
persons with mental health issues. Such 
support and care services for families need 
to encourage burden sharing between 
genders to care for children, the elderly, 
persons with disabilities or other depen-
dent persons. Integrated social services of 
this sort would require effective coordina-
tion across areas such as social housing, 
health services, education and training ser-
vices and employment services. Thus, they 
also require cooperation and partnerships 
among a wide variety of actors, including 
state agencies, local authorities, NGOs and 
the private sector.
An outcome-oriented and comprehensive 
system of social services would particularly 
benefit those who tend to be marginalized, 
directly improving their human develop-
ment opportunities through improved ac-
cess to mainstream services. This is not only 
beneficial for individuals and households 
in helping them to cope with risks stem-
ming from a globalized market economy 
in a more effective manner through skills 
development, but would also benefit soci-
ety at large. The range of services needs to 
be extended, depending on context, to in-
clude housing, water, sanitation and trans-
port which, in their present state, increase 
social exclusion outcomes. 
Unemployment benefits
Unemployment insurance benefits con-
stitute an important element of the social 
safety net, particularly in economically de-
pressed and remote regions where they 
tend to have the largest effect. Their cov-
erage in the region is sparse and uneven, 
with large sections of the unemployed ren-
dered ineligible by obstacles to registration. 
These obstacles stem from the lack of prior 
contributions (e.g., youth and those with 
informal jobs), or from efforts to avoid pay-
ing unemployment benefits to recipients 
simultaneously taking on informal sector 
employment. 
Unemployment benefits should provide 
basic protection without creating disincen-
tives to look for new jobs. They have been 
reformed several times in most CEE coun-
tries, mainly to reduce incentives for ‘living 
on welfare’ and increasing the appeal of ac-
tive employment. But while labour supply 
disincentives are now less marked, the risk 
of the ‘unemployment trap’ has not mark-
edly receded. This is the case especially in 
backward regions, where benefits account 
for a high proportion of the prevailing mar-
ket wage of low-skilled labour. The socially 
optimal way of addressing these problems 
is providing the right incentives by increas-
ing the returns on efforts to obtain active 
formal sector employment, rather than by 
decreasing unemployment benefits. 
Turning drivers of 
social exclusion into 
drivers of inclusion 
Social inclusion strategies should be pre-
ventive and empowering. Policies need to 
divert individual risks from materializing 
into actual social exclusion, best done by 
building and expanding people’s capacities 
90/ Hoelscher and Alexan-
der 2009; Hoelscher 2009.
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and opportunities. For the most part, the 
region’s institutions and norms are still not 
structured to respond to people’s capaci-
ties, which are critical for success in social 
inclusion. 
Towards inclusive institutions
The report demonstrates that institutions in 
the ECA region matter for social inclusion. 
Institutions have been generally weak in 
terms of accountability, transparency and 
flexibility, which led to a high level of dis-
trust towards public institutions and pub-
lic service systems. In addition, high levels 
of intolerance in society and exclusionary 
forms of social capital fail to promote a 
culture of responsive and inclusive institu-
tions. As a result, government institutions 
are often incapable of engaging with mar-
ginalized and disadvantaged groups and 
communities. 
For inclusive societies to develop, appro-
priate policies are necessary, but not suf-
ficient. This also requires the support of a 
minimum critical mass of citizens, non-gov-
ernmental organizations, the business com-
munity, trade unions and political parties. 
A common vision and coordinated actions 
are required to create a genuinely inclusive 
society in countries of the region. A mean-
ingful dialogue is needed that reaches out 
to women, minorities, indigenous peoples, 
adolescents and young people, displaced 
persons, vulnerable and disadvantaged 
communities, and other poor, excluded or 
marginalized groups. Public institutions 
need to make genuine efforts to actively 
engage with traditionally marginalized 
and excluded groups or those who are less 
amenable to democratic transition and de-
velopment discourse rather than focus on 
engaging a small group of likeminded na-
tional actors, as is often the case. 
Defining an appropriate role 
for the state 
A major challenge in the wake of transition 
is to correctly define the role of the State. 
Governments have their responsibilities in 
defining and enforcing equal ‘rules of the 
game’ and addressing market failures. Pro-
gressing towards higher levels of social in-
clusion and human development requires 
appropriate state interventions at the na-
tional and sub-national levels. The way 
in which public administration operates, 
provides or restricts information, delivers 
services and provides or prevents opportu-
nities for engaging the policy debate has a 
direct impact on citizens’ perception of how 
legitimate the governance system is.
Strengthening the rule of law is equally 
important. It is a principle of governance 
in which all persons, institutions and enti-
ties, public and private, including the State 
itself, are accountable to laws that are pub-
licly promulgated, equally enforced and 
independently adjudicated, and ideally 
consistent with international human rights 
norms and standards. It requires measures 
to ensure adherence to the principles of su-
premacy of the law, equality before the law, 
fairness in its application, accountability to 
the law, separation of powers, participation 
in decision-making, legal certainty, avoid-
ance of arbitrariness, and procedural and 
legal transparency. 
Legal empowerment contributes critically 
to social inclusion. Legal empowerment 
involves the use of legal services, legal ca-
pacity building, and legal reform by and for 
disadvantaged and marginalized popula-
tions. In combination with other activities, 
it increases freedom, improves governance, 
and significantly contributes to alleviating 
poverty and social exclusion. It makes the 
rule of law approach more balanced and 
inclusive, thereby enhancing state legiti-
macy. 
Improving government 
effectiveness 
Low government effectiveness is associ-
ated with social exclusion. The quality of 
public services, of the civil service and the 
degree of its independence from politics, 
the quality and credibility of policy formu-
lation and implementation are the central 
building blocks of government effective-
ness. Low government effectiveness in 
policy formulation and implementation 
wastes resources, institutionalizes barriers 
and discriminatory practices, which further 
generate inequalities between individuals 
and groups. These are particularly impor-
tant in times of a crisis-induced shrinking 
of the fiscal space when governments need 
to do more with less. Effective civil service 
reforms can strengthen government insti-
tutions and enable them to also take into 
account special conditions facing the ex-
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cluded. One means of accomplishing these 
goals is through e-governance whereby rel-
evant information and public services can 
be provided to citizens instantaneously.
To achieve real institutional change sup-
porting social inclusion, public-sector over-
sight needs to be strengthened. The Office 
of the Ombudsman, public information 
offices, parliamentary committees, effec-
tive and accountable judicial systems, civil 
society and media are all important for pro-
moting accountability and fighting against 
corruption. These institutions work better if 
they can function independently, are man-
dated with specific decision-making or in-
vestigative and reporting powers, and are 
adequately resourced. Finally, transparency 
and access to information about public af-
fairs need to be guaranteed by appropriate 
legislation. 
Local councils and inter-
municipal cooperation
Social exclusion is fundamentally a local 
phenomenon, implying a critical role for 
local governments. Converting these from 
passive service providers into drivers of 
social inclusion requires detailed data on 
the local social exclusion dynamics, as well 
as institutional capacity and behavioural 
transformation. This report has proposed a 
way to compile survey data that could be 
used in planning and delivering enhanced 
public services at the local level. 
Local governments need to better con-
sider exclusion patterns when designing 
and budgeting for municipal services. With 
chronically insufficient resources, they need 
to explore innovative instruments of ser-
vice delivery to increase the effectiveness 
and efficiency of local public services. One 
of these tools is more local government 
empowerment with greater local partici-
pation. This combination will achieve two 
critical objectives: involving citizens and 
strengthening local administrative capaci-
ties. Another tool is improving inter-mu-
nicipal cooperation (IMC). This could be an 
important vehicle for knowledge sharing 
and learning that can reduce the cost and 
increase the quality of public service de-
livery. IMC is particularly relevant for small 
municipalities which, taken individually, 
do not have the requisite population size, 
capacity and resources to perform certain 
functions efficiently. Transparent reporting 
mechanisms and public hearings can help 
strengthen the council’s role vis-à-vis the 
executive, particularly with regard to allo-
cation of resources. Elected representatives 
should ally themselves with civil society 
organizations and local media in these ef-
forts, notably by inviting them to important 
council meetings.
Building social capital
An inclusive society requires functioning 
social networks. The report has shown that 
there is a need to build structures which re-
duce ‘network poverty’ and, in particular, to 
ensure that public interventions strength-
en or, at least, do not further erode, existing 
networks. Social accountability measures 
are essential in this regard. They rely on civ-
ic participation, in which citizens and civil 
society organizations participate directly or 
indirectly to demand accountability. These 
can contribute to building broader and 
more inclusive networks as well as to po-
litical participation and empowerment. The 
latter in turn can help push back the use of 
informal connections to secure advantage 
and other corrupt activities. Initiatives that 
involve citizens in the oversight of govern-
Box 17: The Shared Society Project
The Club de Madrid, an independent organization that brings 
together 81 democratic former presidents and prime ministers, 
promotes the idea— through its Shared Society Project—that an 
inclusive and shared society is an important contributor to human 
well-being and peace.
The Shared Society Project provides leaders with a greater under-
standing of the benefits of social cohesion; offers new approaches 
on how to achieve a shared society; and gives support as societies 
advance towards that goal. The project underscores the belief that 
societies will be peaceful, democratic and prosperous when lead-
ers and citizens recognize the value of diversity and actively build 
a shared society.
Through its Expert Working Group, the project has produced 
research and policy recommendations on the economics of shared 
societies, highlighting the link between inclusion and economic 
growth. Experts believe that shared societies release economic po-
tential and thereby increase the well-being of their people. Shared 
societies and improved economic well-being reinforce one other 
and create a virtuous circle that strengthens society as a whole.
The project aims to achieve this vision through, i) dissemination 
of project materials and follow-up on expressions of interest, ii) 
participation in selected international forums and on the promo-
tion of partnerships and relationships with multilateral agencies 
and civil society organizations, iii) engagement with leaders.
More information can be found at http://www.clubmadrid.org/en/
programa/the_shared_societies_project.
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ment, e.g., citizen report cards or commu-
nity score cards, participatory budgeting, 
and social audits can make governance 
processes more participatory and inclusive. 
They are also a means for building more in-
clusive social capital. 
Economic policies for inclusive 
growth
Inclusive economic growth is a long-term 
concept that focuses on productive em-
ployment, rather than attaining income 
equality through redistribution. It refers to 
sustained pro-poor growth that allows all 
people (in particular those in the bottom 
quintiles) to contribute to and benefit from 
growth as employees, and consumers, re-
spectively. Inclusive growth tends to be 
broad-based both in terms of its sectoral 
coverage, and in terms of increasing in-
comes for excluded groups.  
Inclusive growth and employment address 
economic exclusion, so on their own they 
will not succeed in reducing social exclu-
sion. That will require addressing all the 
structural drivers leading to social exclu-
sion as presented in this report. To this end, 
macroeconomic policies will need to be 
reconsidered, and action is also needed at 
the micro level to move away from territori-
ally unbalanced development models that 
concentrate growth largely in capital cities 
at the expense of remote regions. 
Redefining growth in a human 
development context
The focus on people and their well-being 
as the ultimate objective of growth is what 
makes the concept of human development 
intuitive and appealing. Prospects for the 
enhancement of people’s potential to be 
and do are placed at the core of the human 
development paradigm. In the post-crisis 
environment, this implies a need to ‘‘rein-
vent’ the traditional development logic, 
putting human capabilities at the centre of 
its incentive systems’.91
Policies supporting inclusive growth need 
to be explored. The policy agenda will need 
to test economic growth strategies ex-ante 
for their effects on inclusiveness and sus-
tainability of economic growth. Placing 
such an emphasis on the quality of growth 
would help in revamping the predominant 
unbalanced growth models.92 
Diversifying growth 
opportunities 
The previous chapter suggested that ru-
ral areas, small towns and settlements 
dominated by one or two employers score 
highest in terms of economic exclusion. 
Policies aiming to enhance social inclu-
sion should focus on these areas, and on 
preventing the process from turning into 
a self-reinforcing one. Such policies would 
stimulate local economic development by 
increasing the chances for starting small—
and medium—sized enterprises in these 
localities, improving financial capacity of 
local authorities, and ‘crowding in’ private 
investment by providing improved infra-
structure and communication. These poli-
cies are more important—and sustainably 
effective—than increasing transfers from 
central budgets. Self-employment and 
even subsistence agriculture are preferable 
alternatives to unemployment. 
Similarly crucial for social inclusion are the 
creation of effectively enforceable property 
rights and the legal empowerment of the dis-
advantaged. The former can unleash devel-
opment in areas where the absence of such 
rights had choked off private investment 
and entrepreneurship. The latter can vastly 
increase the pool of potential contributors 
to economic and human development. 
One example for this in the post-socialist 
context is the high rate of ownership of 
assets—housing, land, and in cases of resti-
tuted property, production facilities—that 
stand idle as largely frozen capital. This is 
mainly due to the absence of liquid mar-
kets and of the ability to use these assets 
as bank collateral when property rights are 
not enforceable. Filling such gaps can be a 
powerful tool for boosting bottom-of-the- 
pyramid productivity, self-employment 
and income generation, and in concert with 
other tools, for reducing social exclusion. 
It is increasingly clear that in a medium-
term perspective, the growth trajectory 
needs to move away from its current car-
bon-intensive path. This entails major re-
structuring in some countries. The region 
needs employment opportunities that 
are carbon-neutral or even help to reduce 
emissions (green jobs). Climate change ad-
aptation also needs to be integrated better 
into central and local level development 
policies. Support of governments in that 
matter can be instrumental, both in pro-
92/  ‘..…growth can be 
also jobless, ruthless, voice-
less, rootless, and futureless 
and thus not contributing to 
people’s capabilities’ (UNDP 
1996).
91/  Ivanov 2009.
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viding appropriate regulatory frameworks 
encouraging ‘green jobs’ ventures, as well 
as investing in research and development, 
for instance aimed at developing and roll-
ing out new crops that are more suitable to 
changing vegetation patterns.
Optimizing the scope of 
government involvement in 
economic activity 
Public investment in productive and social 
infrastructure that will provide larger op-
portunities for the private sector to create 
jobs is one example of desirable state in-
tervention. In crisis cases it can be matched 
with ‘food for work’ projects and Keynesian 
public works programmes providing tem-
porary jobs for populations most at risk of 
unemployment. Indeed, such schemes can 
serve as a cushion in periods of job losses 
but on their own, their economic impact 
is short-term with questionable sustain-
ability. They only have sustainable benefits 
if they strengthen human capital (through 
re-training and transfer of technology). If 
they do, they will also impart important 
intangible benefits, notably improving the 
appeal of certain communities for potential 
investors, providing long-term unemployed 
with a sense of hope, decreasing the threat 
of marginalization, etc. The higher relative 
weight of intangible aspects and subjective 
measures of individual well-being has been 
also identified by independent assess-
ments of public employment programmes. 
Improving labour market institutions is an 
equally important aspect. It enhances flex-
ibility and mobility in the labour market 
while increasing security through protec-
tive measures and sufficient unemploy-
ment benefits.93  
Public employment schemes require a cau-
tious approach also because they are prone 
to sectoral bias. So far, the majority of re-
cent public work programmes was imple-
mented in construction, involving a strong 
gender bias and, given the post-crisis re-
trenchment, imparting less marketable 
skills. If such outcomes are to be avoided 
in the future, public works will need to 
be opened for new areas, ideally related 
to sectors providing marketable skills to 
women and sustainable activities such as 
environmental projects, e.g., forestation, ir-
rigation, sewage works, small-scale renew-
able energy generation).
Changing mindsets: 
towards tolerant 
societies
The analysis of social exclusion in the ECA 
region illustrates how values and behav-
ioural drivers of exclusion can solidify social 
exclusion patterns, which become difficult 
to break with single-purpose interventions 
and single-sector policies. Values shared by 
constituencies translate into policies pro-
moted by political actors seeking re-elec-
tion. Increasingly, policies now need to be 
sold to the public and the public needs to 
be willing to accept them. Seen from that 
perspective, changing mindsets has imme-
diate policy relevance.
Realistic approaches to anti-
discrimination 
To tackle prejudice and intolerance—still 
prevalent in many countries of the region—
existing laws, policies and mechanisms 
need to be amended to ensure non-dis-
crimination, in line with existing European 
and international standards. Meaningful 
participation of the socially excluded in this 
process is of key importance. Adequate fi-
nancial as well as human resources should 
be set aside for this to bring about real 
change. In this regard, countries in the re-
gion should also ratify and implement in-
ternational and regional human rights trea-
ties, including the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
Disadvantaged and marginalized groups 
should have access to information on their 
rights and be supported through legal ad-
vice and advocacy services when necessary, 
while the capacity of disadvantaged groups 
for their own advocacy and representation 
should be strengthened wherever pos-
sible. Introduction of legal empowerment 
and access to justice programmes will di-
rectly contribute to the achievement of this 
goal. Broad-based training and targeted 
capacity development initiatives should 
be put in place for public servants to create 
awareness and foster a culture of respect 
for the rights of all including the most dis-
advantaged and marginalized groups, set-
ting an example to wider society. Regular 
reviews and the right to redress through 
well-resourced and politically indepen-
93/  The International 
Labour Organization (ILO) 
calls this combination 
“flexicurity” (Cazes and 
Nesporova 2007a).
Box 18: Social inclusion in Turkey: the Dreams Academy  
project
The methodological framework and social exclusion measure 
presented in this report are also useful for countries without tran-
sition experience. Social exclusion resulting from the interaction of 
drivers, local context and individual vulnerabilities is also appar-
ent in other countries, such as Turkey.
In Turkey the number of persons with disabilities is estimated at 
8.5 million. They experience exclusion in their daily lives. In order 
to promote their inclusion into society, Vodafone Turkey, the mu-
nicipality of Besiktas, the Alternative Life Association, and UNDP 
initiated the ‘Making Dreams Come True’ project in 2008. The 
project has aimed to help persons with disabilities take part in the 
arts. It has supported their participation in music, dance, film and 
theatre. As a result, the ‘Social Inclusion Band’ and the ‘Dreams 
Academy Dance and Theatre Company’ have been established. 
All initiatives have one important component. They conclude with 
an exhibition or a concert to show the public that persons with 
disabilities can perform just as well as those without disabilities. 
The project shows that it is in society’s interest to utilize the talent 
of persons with disabilities. In the long-run, the project is expected 
to be mainstreamed into educational programmes, rather than 
remain a short-term project. In 2009 it won a Golden Compass 
Award from the Turkish Public Relations Association. The project 
has changed not only the lives of persons with disabilities but also 
the attitudes of society at large.
Source: Dreams Academy Project, http://www.undp.org.tr/Gozlem2.aspx?WebSayfaNo=1707 
and www.duslerakademisi.org.
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dent ombudsperson institutions should be 
an integral part of any anti-discrimination 
policy package. 
Public awareness campaigns are also 
needed to address the consequences of 
discrimination and to ensure wide-ranging 
support for anti-discriminatory measures. 
Robust and independent systematic evalu-
ation systems need to be in place, involving 
those experiencing discrimination. Regular 
reporting to relevant UN treaty monitoring 
bodies – such as the Human Rights Com-
mittee, CEDAW or CERD – is another useful 
mechanism in the exercise of anti-discrimi-
nation efforts.
Anti-discrimination frameworks will not 
work unless the roots of discrimination are 
addressed. In this regard, changing mind-
sets is also important for socially excluded 
populations. Most of the efforts targeted at 
inclusion are based on the assumption that 
the excluded groups want to be included. 
This assumption is not always correct. Inclu-
sion is a two-sided process in which both 
the excluded and the majority population 
must accept and accommodate the char-
acteristics of the other side. The ultimate 
success or failure depends on the ability 
of both sides to reach a mutually advanta-
geous deal on mutually acceptable terms. 
They must also be aware of the short and 
long-term costs and benefits of inclusion. 
To sustain support for social inclusion 
policies, a case needs to be made of the 
long-term costs of exclusion and for public 
spending on fostering social inclusion as 
a sound investment. Society incurs large 
costs in terms of foregone investment and 
employment opportunities, additional out-
lays on policing and prison detention, etc., 
if social tensions are allowed to soar as a 
result of rising social exclusion. Not only 
would the society that emerges be less vi-
brant, but also less productive and stable. 
This makes it optimal to devote additional 
resources today to enhance social inclusion 
over time. 
Inclusive education and labour 
markets
Inclusive education needs to become a 
priority reform area. Measures are needed 
that not only provide school structures that 
are inclusive but also promote respect, tol-
erance, interethnic dialogue, and non-dis-
crimination among the general population 
with the goals of reducing social distance 
among various groups and promoting a 
culture of social inclusion. Collaboration 
among all stakeholders should begin with 
the strategic planning process at school 
level and extend through programme 
planning, curriculum development, meth-
odological training, and support for teach-
ing staff. This reform agenda needs to go 
beyond compulsory education to also 
include vocational and educational train-
ing programmes. Women and girls must 
be afforded equality of opportunity in any 
chosen education and employment field, 
especially in the cases of cross-sectional 
vulnerability under threat of discrimination 
on multiple grounds. 
Addressing labour market discrimination 
needs to involve both enforcing anti-dis-
crimination legislation and implement-
ing broad programmes of education and 
awareness-raising. Policies need to be in-
formed by relevant indicators based on 
disaggregated data. Particular barriers also 
need to be identified and addressed, in 
close dialogue with the communities af-
fected, such as physical barriers to build-
90
ings or to public transport that people with 
disabilities face. In extreme cases, when ac-
cess to normal employment may not be an 
immediate possibility, other options need 
to be developed, such as sheltered employ-
ment and community work to benefit local 
communities. In this regard, civil society or-
ganizations can provide insights based on 
their rich experience and good practices, 
including cooperating with governments. 
Finally, local actions and plans should be 
encouraged and developed, in order to tai-
lor broad solutions to the specific needs of 
local communities.
Fine-tuning policies 
to the local context
Local development actors need to enhance 
their role in providing better development 
opportunities beyond just the capital cit-
ies. To do so, in most countries of the re-
gion they need to improve their capacity to 
identify opportunities, formulate adequate 
policy responses and implement them ef-
fectively. The development of operational 
community networks could effectively fa-
cilitate people’s access to markets. All these 
could markedly increase the stock of social 
capital in most countries of the region. 
Strengthening community 
capacities and integrative 
social planning
Local development actors need to think in 
economic and result-based terms, prioritiz-
ing goals and allocating resources efficient-
ly. This can be achieved only through prac-
tice, in the process of doing and scaling up 
from small pilots to bigger endeavours. The 
promotion of local inclusive planning is cru-
cial, through inclusive processes of setting 
objectives, mobilizing resources, providing 
services and, crucially, providing feedback 
on what works and what does not. 
Individual entrepreneurship 
and sense of community 
The government should primarily focus on 
creating a supportive environment for indi-
vidual entrepreneurship, facilitating com-
munity and market-driven activity. Such 
approaches are particularly effective at the 
local and community level. Involving com-
munities in projects—starting from joint dis-
cussions on local areas of need and reaching 
consensus on urgent priorities—has proven 
time and again to be simple but effective. 
Community-based interventions bring to-
gether individual actors in their efforts to 
enter the market through credit, supply or 
retail cooperatives, or through implement-
ing small-scale community infrastructure 
projects. These are particularly effective if 
combined with public investment in sustain-
ably reducing communal costs or opening 
income-generation opportunities for the lo-
cal economy. Appropriate incentives could 
help channel a part of remittances towards 
investing in shared community facilities 
instead of using it all for consumer goods. 
Examples of such projects include school 
refurbishment that reduces energy costs, 
installation of sustainable energy sources, or 
building small packaging and food process-
ing facilities. In all cases, the project not only 
provides employment benefits but also ex-
pands long-term opportunities. 
A good example is the Rights-based Muni-
cipal Development Programme94 in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. It has markedly strength-
ened the capacity of local governments for 
more inclusive and participatory planning 
and service delivery. To achieve this goal, 
the project applied a human rights-based 
approach to local policy design, develop-
ment planning and implementation. This 
example illustrates that social inclusion oc-
curs at the local level, and requires partner-
ships and a wide set of capacities among 
the local authorities. 
Experience from the local level, however, 
rarely feeds back into national—level 
policy discourse. Another example from 
Albania shows how gender equality was 
integrated into the application of the Law 
on Social Services and Social Assistance in 
municipalities and how the experience of 
delivering social assistance to beneficiaries 
influences national policies.
The impact of local-level interventions can 
be substantially augmented if they are im-
plemented in the framework of area-based 
development. Focusing social inclusion 
interventions on vulnerable areas—rather 
than on vulnerable groups—can prevent 
group-based competition over resources. 
Such competition runs counter to the 
goals of efficiency and optimal allocation 
of resources, and can have negative human 
development implications. Experience sug-
94/  http://www.
undp.ba/index.
aspx?PID=21&RID=59.
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gests that area-based development inter-
ventions have positive potential for allevi-
ating ethnic or religious cleavage that often 
reappear in times of crisis, contributing to 
social exclusion.
Such local interventions can also be cli-
mate-friendly. Decreasing energy costs 
through buildings refurbishment, invest-
ing in renewable energy sources on a scale 
needed by the local economy and utilizing 
local resources can all provide additional 
employment opportunities, and markedly 
improve social cohesion at the local level. 
Integrating 
monitoring and 
evaluation into the 
social inclusion 
policy process
Evidence-based policies, data 
and indicators
Throughout the region, there is a clear 
need to strengthen policy makers’ capacity 
to choose among policy options based on 
relevant data evidence that is up to date, 
credible, and accurate. Stereotypes can only 
be effectively challenged by bringing fac-
tual evidence to the table. Data identifying 
specific barriers to inclusion can generate 
‘policy-actionable’ information. Rigorous 
impact assessments (ex-ante and ex-post) 
also need to rely on clear and agreed indi-
cators on social inclusion at national and 
local levels. The local level is particularly 
critical as often this is where the data gap 
is binding. The indicators proposed in this 
report can act as guiding examples and 
starting points for developing and further 
tailoring indicators to national and sub-
national contexts. 
Statistical systems in the countries of the 
region need to implement innovative 
methods to adequately capture the mul-
tidimensionality of social exclusion and 
inclusion. Innovative ways to bridge de-
partmental silos and link data from differ-
ent sources should be explored as in the 
Republic of Moldova and in Poland.  Ad hoc 
modules to existing survey instruments 
(e.g., the household budget survey) can 
inexpensively provide useful data on social 
exclusion. At the local level, innovative and 
new data collection mechanisms through 
service providers or in public places could 
be introduced to collect and update infor-
mation about social exclusion. In addition, 
independent research studies need to be 
encouraged which help to extend the evi-
dence base, involve the views of persons 
and groups experiencing exclusion, and 
contribute to informed policy decisions.
More work needs to be done with regard 
to the census, which in most countries fails 
to capture the multiple identities of many 
ethnic and social minorities. The work of 
the Washington Group on Disability should 
be taken into account in the forthcoming 
census rounds in the region. Active and 
meaningful involvement of ethnic and so-
cial minorities in census design should also 
be introduced. 
A sub-regional open method 
of coordination
Regional and sub-regional approaches to 
social policy are seen as an increasingly im-
portant counterweight to adverse effects 
of globalization, through strengthening 
learning, sharing best practices and the 
establishment of regional standards.95 The 
EU is currently introducing explicit targets 
on poverty reduction and social exclusion 
within their ‘2020 agenda’. The Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), which act as a 
framework for measuring progress in sev-
eral human development dimensions, can 
be useful for comparing countries’ perfor-
mance in social inclusion, especially if dis-
aggregated MDG targets and indicators 
by key personal characteristics and sub-
national levels are available. With the year 
2015 marking the end of the MDG agenda, 
there is momentum to establish a (sub)-
regional social inclusion framework with 
common objectives, indicators and targets. 
The report has shown that social inclusion 
can provide an operationally useful frame-
work for the countries in the region to iden-
tify inherent inequalities and people at risk 
of exclusion. The UN and the EU should 
provide tangible incentives for countries 
to use this framework, e.g., by including 
these indicators—suitably amended to re-
flect local circumstances, if necessary —in 
their progress assessment criteria, and us-
ing them in determining eligibility for their 
various funding sources. The EU experience 
95/  Deacon et al. 2007b.
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demonstrates the large potential for effec-
tive regional social policies where countries 
share similar traditions, development paths 
and objectives. 
A regional (or sub-regional) Open Method 
of Coordination (OMC) could be a use-
ful approach. For example, in the Western 
Balkans the OMC has been instrumental in 
facilitating an exchange of knowledge and 
experience among countries. The OMC has 
focused attention on the importance of sub-
regional cooperation. Such cooperation is 
particularly effective when buttressed by 
specific policies that are pursued system-
atically. A similar approach can be adopted 
elsewhere in the region to promote social 
inclusion. It would provide a platform for 
open and frank policy debate, knowledge 
exchange and learning. Policy makers, in-
ternational organizations, donors and civil 
society could promote its use for peer re-
view and impact assessments based on 
agreed explicit targets, indicators and mon-
itoring tools. The conceptual and empirical 
framework presented in this report offers 
a comprehensive human development-
centred foundation that can underpin such 
a (sub)-regional platform. Clearly, the set of 
policies that emerges as critical could differ 
among the sub-regions.
This report has offered a new methodologi-
cal framework for defining and measuring 
social exclusion. It has also elaborated the 
links between the human development 
and social inclusion paradigms, rooting 
them in the specific context of the region. 
Based on this analysis, the report has pro-
posed a broad array of reforms that are nec-
essary for creating a more inclusive society. 
The process of implementing these reforms 
will differ from country to country, but the 
result everywhere will be a more efficient 
and sustainable society—one where peo-
ple can realize their full potential.
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Methodological annexes
Annex 1: Social Exclusion Survey (2009)
Methodological note
1.1. Background
The Social Exclusion Survey (2009) has produced data on the magnitude and deter-
minants of social exclusion. The survey has proceeded from the hypothesis that so-
cial exclusion results from inequalities in access to economic resources, education 
and employment, as well as in access to social services, social networks, and political, 
cultural and civic participation. The objective of the survey was to address both the 
drivers and outcomes of exclusion, seeking to identify causal relationships between 
the two.
The survey did not sample pre-defined ‘excluded groups’—such as ethnic minorities, 
the unemployed or people with disabilities—for three reasons. First, not all group 
members are excluded in all dimensions. Second, the group-focused approach un-
derestimates the incidence of multiple identities (being unemployed and a minority) 
– and potentially multiple deprivation risks. Third, the size and distribution of such 
‘excluded groups’ are not always evident. Thus, building a representative sampling 
model is difficult. 
For these reasons, we have taken a different approach to identifying the excluded. 
We assume that most members of society face some level of exclusion in at least one 
dimension. The magnitude of this exclusion and its determinants are unknown (they 
are the subject of a mapping in the survey). Instead of defining ‘excluded groups’ and 
sampling them individually, larger representative samples have been interviewed to 
identify various types and magnitudes of exclusion drivers. 
1.2. Coverage and timing
The Social Exclusion Survey was carried out in six countries of the Europe and Central 
Asia (ECA) region – Kazakhstan, Serbia, the Republic of Moldova, Tajikistan, the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Ukraine. The preparations took place in Sep-
tember 2009, and the field work was conducted in November and December 2009. 
The fieldwork in Ukraine—and to a certain extent in the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia—coincided with the outbreak of the H1N1 virus. Therefore, data from 
these countries (especially respondents’ perceptions) should be interpreted with cau-
tion.   
Countries were selected for the regional survey based on their willingness to par-
ticipate. The six selected countries represent a balance with respect to income levels, 
incidence of conflict, and geographic location. They do not constitute a ‘statistically 
representative sample of countries in the region’. Russia was not included in the sur-
vey, owing to its size and large internal disparities, which would have affected cross-
country comparisons. But the six selected countries reflect the region’s major chal-
lenges. Thus, while the survey findings cannot be automatically applied to the region, 
they are valid for areas facing the same challenges, that were captured by the survey 
(for example, the implications of conflict, high unemployment, disparities in educa-
tion, and environmental degradation).
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1.3. Unit of observation and analysis, sample size and sampling 
method  
The unit of observation was the individual (15 years of age and older). In each country ex-
cept Serbia, 2,700 interviews were conducted. In Serbia, 3,001 interviews were conducted 
(2,401 with members of the general population, plus two boosters with 300 Roma, and 300 
internally displaced persons (IDPs)).
The survey employed a multi-stage random sample divided into 450 clusters represen-
tative by age, gender and territorial distribution (at the first sub-national level) with the 
random route method for household selection and nearest birthday method for selecting 
respondents in the household. 
Table A1: Survey respondents by country and sex
1.4. The questionnaire 
The questionnaire, that was employed for face-to-face interviews comprised 136 questions 
reflecting 500 variables. An identical questionnaire was used in all the surveyed countries 
(adjusted to accommodate the different currencies). It was translated into a number of 
local languages (Serbian, Macedonian, Albanian, Moldovan, Ukrainian, Kazakh, Tajik and 
Russian). The questionnaire was divided into three sections:
Section I – status questions:  Section 1 collected demographic information on the surveyed 
individuals and their households (as well as asked respondents to self-identify across a 
number of parameters). It captured the status of individuals across the three dimensions 
of social exclusion (from economic life, from social services, and from civic and social par-
ticipation). 
a. Respondent’s demographic information: sex, age, education level, income, citizenship, 
ethnicity, country of origin, mother tongue, marital status
b. Household information: expenditures, sources of income
c. Data on the socioeconomic status of respondents (employment, housing, standard of 
living)
Section II – practices, attitudes and perceptions: Section 2 covers the practices, attitudes and 
perceptions that contribute to social exclusion across the three dimensions (drivers). This 
section gathered information to close data gaps in existing surveys and datasets related to 
social exclusion drivers. 
Section III – external attributes of exclusion: This section covers individual household 
characteristics, the status of respondents’ dwellings and the immediate surroundings. 
In an annex to the questionnaire, the survey enumerators filled in the description of the 
neighbourhood, including the quality of the street and adjacent public infrastructure. 
 Kazakhstan Moldova Serbia Tajikistan FYR  Macedonia Ukraine Total 
Male 1316 1145 1209 1164 1284 1196 7314
 % 49 42 50 43 48 44 46
Female 1384 1555 1192 1536 1416 1504 8587
 % 51 58 50 57 52 56 54
 Total 2700 2700 2401 2700 2700 2700 15901
 % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
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1.5. Characteristics of the sampling clusters
Local experts also collected additional data on the external attributes of individual sam-
pling clusters, which comprised the source of the ‘secondary source contextualization’. The 
first area of interest was the economic area. Each location was assessed from the perspec-
tive of the general economic profile (major sectors of the economy), both before transi-
tion (prior to 1989) as well as from 2005 to 2009. Changes in the economic environment 
were addressed through the question ‘How has the local economy changed in the past five 
years?’ and ‘How did the current crisis affect the local economy?’ In both cases the options 
for this parameter were ‘experienced decline (many industries closed)’, ‘no major changes’ 
and ‘economy growing (new employment opportunities, increased production)’. The third 
economic parameter was employment supply—to determine whether employment over 
the preceding five years had been provided by a single enterprise or multiple firms in the 
given locality. 
Given the importance of academic institutions and R&D centres, information was collected 
on this aspect by noting whether there was a university or other academic centre in the 
sampling cluster, in close proximity or not. Finally, each sampling cluster was tagged ac-
cording to environmental criteria. (Is the cluster in an area affected by a major man-made 
environmental disaster, by natural disaster, or by neither of these?) The quality of local 
transportation infrastructure in the sampling cluster was assessed as ‘Bad’ when there was 
only one road in poor condition, ‘Poor’ when there was only one road but in good condi-
tion, ‘Average’ when there was a good road but no railway station or airport at e reasonable 
distance, and as ‘Excellent’ when the there was a main road as well as a railway station or 
airport at e reasonable distance. 
The characteristics of the sampling clusters were encoded and added as additional vari-
ables to the dataset of individual household status. This was done not only to expand the 
individual profiles but also to go beyond country analyses and build typologies of chal-
lenges that are relevant from a social exclusion perspective. The six countries covered 
by the survey (and the big sample sizes in each of them) to a large extent represent the 
major development and transformational patterns of the region. Given the similarity of 
challenges across areas (be they environmental disasters, history of conflict, or dominance 
by a single enterprise), conclusions can be drawn for areas with similar characteristics in 
countries not covered by the survey. This approach enables the methodology to be open-
ended: local characteristics do not change overnight, and additional parameters can be 
added in the future, serving to enrich the database with new dimensions.
1.6. Qualitative aspects of social exclusion
In all six surveyed countries, focus groups were interviewed. The resulting qualitative 
data complemented the quantitative data and captured those population groups that fall 
outside the scope of traditional surveys. In-depth dimensions and experiences of social 
exclusion that are specific to major vulnerable groups were collected through a series of 
focus groups interviews. The focus groups or individual interviews were implemented by 
local NGOs or specialized moderators that had a working relationship with the selected 
sub-population groups in each country. Each group consisted of 6 to 12 members, most 
of them recruited through NGOs or though the snowball method. Gender perspectives 
and gender representation were ensured in each focus group. The focus group discussion 
guidelines built on the areas of the survey questionnaire (employment, access to assets, 
housing, living standards and attitudes to life, access to education, health care and social 
services, social relations, cultural and political participation). But it focused on social exclu-
sion in these areas, feelings of marginalization, as well as on suggested solutions.
The questionnaire, the raw survey dataset, the technical report, the frequency report and 
focus group reports can be found at: http://europeandcis.undp.org/poverty/socialinclu-
sion.
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Annex 2: Multidimensional social exclusion 
measurement
2.1. Construction of the index and selection of the indicators 
The literature provides no clear and straightforward algorithm for the construction of a 
multidimensional social exclusion index. It rather provides some general guidance and 
suggestions of good practices in the area.96 The index in this report was constructed using 
these guidelines. The index encompasses three dimensions: exclusion from economic life, 
social services, and civic and social participation. Each dimension contains eight indica-
tors, in total 24 indicators. Equal weights are assumed, as the chosen indicators are of rela-
tively equal importance. As Atkinson et al (2002) observe, equal weighting has an intuitive 
appeal: ‘The interpretation of the set of indicators is greatly eased where the individual 
components have degrees of importance that, while not necessarily exactly equal, are not 
grossly different’. On the one hand, there was no evidence for using relative weights of 
dimensions and indicators, i.e. that people more seriously regret deprivation in housing 
than in social participation. On the other hand, the situation in the six countries covered 
by the survey is so different, that finding any common relative weights of dimensions or 
indicators would be an impossible task. 
The indicators for each dimension were selected on the basis of research findings, expert 
opinion and availability of data. A number of iterations were performed to ensure the se-
lection of the most appropriate set of indicators. Since data on total household expendi-
tures were missing in many cases, they were imputed using personal income range and 
share of personal incomes in total household income for the “At risk of poverty rate” indica-
tor. For the selection of material deprivation indicators, a regression analysis was made first 
that linked current incomes of the household (as a proxy of current income poverty) with 
possession of certain durable items. The results showed that these relationships are highly 
country-specific. In a second step, a factor analysis was made to select the most meaning-
ful items, and reflect different living standards in the countries of the region. The results of 
both suggest that material deprivation indicators could be clustered into three groups—
housing, amenities and ICT. Such a combination of indicators best reflects the diversity of 
living standards in the countries of the region. Table А2 provides the list of indicators used 
to construct the multidimensional social exclusion measure and the percentage distribu-
tion of the population by each indicator.
Table А2. Indicators for the multidimensional social exclusion index and distribution of population by 
indicator and country
Dimen-
sions Indicators
Kazakh-
stan Moldova
FYR  
Macedo-
nia
Serbia Tajikistan Ukraine
A. Eco-
nomic 
exclusion
Inequality: At-risk-of-poverty rate 
(60 percent of median equivalent 
expenditures in a country)
30% 29% 30% 28% 29% 22%
Subjective basic needs: In the past 
12 months the household has not 
been able to afford three meals a 
day, or pay bills regularly, or keep 
the home adequately warm, or buy 
new clothes and shoes
4% 6% 4% 14% 14% 8%
Employment: Being unemployed or 
a discouraged worker
10% 9% 12% 11% 6% 7%
Financial services: Lack of access to 
a bank account on one’s own name
76% 78% 32% 33% 96% 61%
96/ See for example 
UNDESA 2010; Alkire and 
Foster 2007; Gordon and 
Pantazis 1997. 
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Dimen-
sions Indicators
Kazakh-
stan Moldova
FYR  
Macedo-
nia
Serbia Tajikistan Ukraine
Material deprivation_housing: The 
household cannot afford a bed for 
every member of the household 
13% 17% 3% 4% 76% 7%
Material deprivation_amenities: 
Household needs a washing ma-
chine, freezer or microwave but 
cannot afford one
40% 44% 14% 16% 83% 25%
Material deprivation_ICT: House-
hold needs a computer or internet 
but cannot afford one
53% 47% 14% 21% 72% 34%
Overcrowding: Household with less 
than 6m2 per person
3% 3% 1% 0% 16% 1%
B. Exclu-
sion from 
social 
services 
Public utilities: Household with no 
running water or sewerage system 
65% 55% 14% 26% 82% 33%
Public utilities: Household heats 
with wood or with no heating de-
vice 
7% 56% 68% 52% 53% 4%
Education: Low educational 
achievements (basic schooling) and 
early school leavers
15% 19% 18% 18% 25% 6%
Education: Household could not af-
ford to buy school materials for ev-
ery child in the past 12 months
29% 28% 16% 30% 15% 37%
Education: Household with young 
children not in school or pre-school
3% 1% 7% 2% 18% 1%
Health care: Household could not af-
ford medication or dental checks for 
every child in the past 12 months
23% 20% 10% 13% 37% 30%
Health care: Medical needs not be-
ing met by the health care system
42% 58% 28% 30% 60% 55%
Social infrastructure: Lack of oppor-
tunities to attend events due to dis-
tance (lack of transportation)
47% 48% 25% 33% 40% 41%
C. Exclu-
sion from 
participa-
tion in 
civic and 
social life 
and net-
works
Social capital: Rare or infrequent so-
cial contact with family or relatives 
3% 16% 4% 7% 4% 6%
Social capital: Rare social contact 
with friends
4% 8% 1% 2% 7% 9%
Social capital: Lack of support net-
works that could help in the event 
of emergency
20% 12% 11% 13% 12% 19%
Social participation: In the past 
12 months the household has not 
been able to afford inviting friends 
or family for a meal or drink at least 
once a month 
8% 9% 9% 3% 22% 13%
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Dimen-
sions Indicators
Kazakh-
stan Moldova
FYR  
Macedo-
nia
Serbia Tajikistan Ukraine
Social participation: The household 
has not been able to afford to buy 
books, cinema or theatre tickets in 
the past 12 months
51% 49% 38% 46% 65% 37%
Civic participation: Inability to vote 
due to lack of eligibility or distance 
to polling station
2% 2% 1% 1% 6% 1%
Civic participation: No participa-
tion/membership in associations, 
teams or clubs 
92% 83% 78% 88% 86% 85%
Civic participation: No participation 
in political/civic activities
77% 59% 54% 59% 65% 69%
2.2. Robustness checks of indicators for the Social Exclusion 
Index 
A factor analysis of the indicators of the index was run to check the quality and robustness 
of the index. The results (see table А3) showed a very high uniqueness of the variance of the 
individual variables indicating the importance of each individual indicator. The uniqueness 
of variance for individual variables typically ranges from 0.75 to 0.99, with just a couple of 
exceptions for which this indicator is around 0.50. The results remain similar for the factor 
analyses run using the merged regional sample and by individual countries. The results 
of factor analysis therefore suggest that the index, as a combination of the 24 individual 
variables, is robust. These results were also confirmed by a Principal Components Analy-
sis, which also showed that many components were needed and they together explained 
most of the variance, both for the whole regional dataset and for individual countries.
Table А3. Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
Indicators Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Uniqueness
Inequality: At-risk-of-poverty rate 
(60 percent of median equivalent 
expenditures in a country)
ex_incpov 0.2763 -0.0557 0.1824 0.8873
Subjective basic needs: In the past 
12 months the household has not 
been able to afford three meals a 
day, or pay bills regularly, or keep 
the home adequately warm, or buy 
new clothes and shoes 
ex_subjpovbn 0.2683 0.2045 -0.1071 0.8747
Employment: Being unemployed or 
a discouraged worker ex_labmark 0.0777 -0.0200 0.1527 0.9702
Financial services: Lack of access to 
a bank account on one’s own name ex_bank 0.4733 -0.0626 0.0551 0.7691
Material deprivation_housing: The 
household cannot afford a bed for 
every member of the household 
ex_living 0.5146 -0.3432 -0.2044 0.5756
Material deprivation_amenities: 
Household needs a washing ma-
chine, freezer or microwave but 
cannot afford one
ex_housing 0.6016 -0.2677 -0.1216 0.5516
99
Material deprivation_ICT: House-
hold needs a computer or internet 
but cannot afford one
ex_ictxs 0.4807 -0.3168 0.0015 0.6685
Overcrowding: Household with less 
than 6m2 per person ex_crowd 0.2076 -0.1592 -0.0896 0.9235
Public utilities: Household with no 
running water or sewerage system ex_water 0.5173 -0.1665 0.0662 0.7003
Public utilities: Household heats 
with wood or with no heating de-
vice 
ex_heating 0.1780 -0.1534 0.0931 0.9361
Education: Low educational 
achievements (basic schooling) and 
early school leavers
ex_lowedu 0.3262 0.0915 0.0949 0.8762
Education: Household could not af-
ford to buy school materials for ev-
ery child in the past 12 months
ex_nobooks 0.1764 0.5577 -0.0837 0.6509
Education: Household with young 
children not in school or pre-school ex_nosch 0.1309 -0.1461 -0.0623 0.9576
Health care: Household could not af-
ford medication or dental checks for 
every child in the past 12 months
ex_hlthaff 0.3834 0.4404 -0.1881 0.6236
Health care: Medical needs not be-
ing met by the health care system ex_hltsrv 0.3047 -0.0398 -0.0825 0.8988
Social infrastructure: Lack of oppor-
tunities to attend events due to dis-
tance (lack of transportation)
ex_culturev 0.2861 0.0081 0.2031 0.8768
Social capital: Rare or infrequent so-
cial contact with family or relatives ex_norelnet 0.0988 0.1883 -0.0848 0.9476
Social capital: Rare social contact 
with friends ex_nofrdnet 0.1775 0.2392 -0.0493 0.9088
Social capital: Lack of support net-
works that could help in the event 
of emergency
ex_nohelp500 0.2005 0.2584 0.0377 0.8916
Social participation: In the past 
12 months the household has not 
been able to afford inviting friends 
or family for a meal or drink at least 
once a month 
ex_noout 0.2984 0.2345 -0.1309 0.8388
Social participation: The household 
has not been able to afford to buy 
books, cinema or theatre tickets in 
the past 12 months
ex_nocultr 0.5050 0.2248 0.1021 0.6840
Civic participation: Inability to vote 
due to lack of eligibility or distance 
to polling station
ex_voting 0.0709 -0.0343 -0.0652 0.9896
Civic participation: No participa-
tion/membership in associations, 
teams or clubs 
ex_nomem-
ber 0.2988 0.1790 0.3071 0.7843
Civic participation: No participation 
in political/civic activities ex_nocivact 0.1214 0.1033 0.2205 0.9260
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Correlation analysis (see table А4) also showed a lack of excessively strong correlations 
among the constituent indicators of the index. The only exceptions are housing and ICT 
indicators, which show a correlation close to 0.45. This could be explained by similar costs 
of items households cannot afford (washing machine, freezer or microwave on one hand 
and computer and internet connection on the other hand). However, taking into account 
the limited correlation, the essentially different nature of the items and significant country 
differences, it was decided to keep both these indicators in the index.
Dimension A. Economic exclusion
ex_incpov ex_subjpovbn ex_labmark ex_bank ex_living ex_housing ex_ictxs ex_crowd
ex_incpov 1.0000
ex_subjpovbn 0.0740 1.0000
ex_labmark 0.1169 0.0166 1.0000
ex_bank 0.1267 0.0736 0.0939 1.0000
ex_living 0.0921 0.1104 0.0023 0.2619 1.0000
ex_housing 0.1245 0.1142 0.0290 0.2821 0.4793 1.0000
ex_ictxs 0.1231 0.0481 0.0481 0.2575 0.3613 0.4692 1.0000
ex_crowd 0.0735 0.0593 -0.0110 0.1040 0.2114 0.1526 0.1594 1.0000
Dimension B. Exclusion from social services
ex_water ex_heating ex_lowedu ex_nobooks ex_nosch ex_hlthaff ex_hltsrv ex_culturev
ex_water 1.0000
ex_heating 0.1818 1.0000
ex_lowedu 0.1669 0.1618 1.0000
ex_nobooks -0.0126 -0.0792 0.0827 1.0000
ex_nosch 0.0740 0.0913 0.0550 -0.0944 1.0000
ex_hlthaff 0.1363 -0.0367 0.1218 0.4408 0.0223 1.0000
ex_hltsrv 0.1385 0.0298 0.1066 0.0345 0.0285 0.0998 1.0000
ex_culturev 0.1398 0.0439 0.0611 0.0286 0.0046 0.0757 0.1398 1.0000
Dimension C. Exclusion from participation in civic and social life and networks
ex_norelnet ex_nofrdnet ex_nohelp500 ex_noout ex_nocultr ex_voting ex_nomember ex_nocivact
ex_norelnet 1.0000
ex_nofrdnet 0.1412 1.0000
ex_nohelp500 0.0938 0.1710 1.0000
ex_noout 0.0627 0.1540 0.1311 1.0000
ex_nocultr 0.0737 0.1177 0.1493 0.2036 1.0000
ex_voting 0.0517 0.0207 0.0174 0.0046 0.0008 1.0000
ex_nomember 0.0320 0.0926 0.1242 0.0806 0.2275 -0.0142 1.0000
ex_nocivact -0.0378 0.0171 0.0533 0.0027 0.0720 0.0051 0.2309 1.0000
Table А4. Partial correlation matrixes97
97/ Variable names as per 
previous table.
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2.3. Constructing the multidimensional Social Exclusion Index
The report follows the methodology proposed by Alkire and Foster (2009). The identifica-
tion step uses two forms of cut-off: within each indicator, and across indicators (k). The first 
cut-off determines whether a person is deprived in the individual indicator as presented in 
table А2. As most information was collected on the level of the household or respondent 
only, the respondent’s answers were assumed to be valid for all household members. Other 
characteristics (age group, gender, education) were available for all household members. 
Respondents with missed observations on the 24 indicators were excluded. The final data-
set for the construction of the multidimensional Social Exclusion Index therefore includes 
in total 6,185 respondents, who represent 23,091 household members (see Table А5).
Country Number of respondents Number of household members
Kazakhstan 1,274 4,595
Moldova 932 2,878
FYR Macedonia 995 3,878
Serbia 865 2,874
Tajikistan 953 5,371
Ukraine 1,166 3,495
Total 6,185 23,091
The second cut-off k identifies the ‘socially excluded’ by ‘counting’ the number of indicators 
across the three dimensions in which a person is deprived. All possible values of k starting 
from 1 (union approach) and ending with 24 (intersection approach) have been tested. As 
noted in Alkire and Foster (2009), the cross-dimensional cut-off k is less tangible, since it re-
sides in the space between dimensions rather than within a specific domain. The literature 
typically gives no specific multidimensional identification procedures, except the union (a 
person is deprived in at least one indicator) and the intersection (a person is deprived in all 
indicators) approaches. Setting k reflects a judgement regarding the maximally acceptable 
multiplicity of deprivations. A person with a greater multiplicity of deprivations is given 
higher priority than someone with only one or two deprivations. According to Alkire and 
Foster (2009), the choice of k could be a normative one, reflecting the minimum depriva-
tion count required to be considered ‘poor’ or in our index ‘socially excluded’ in a specific 
context under consideration. The choice of k could also be chosen to reflect specific policy 
goals and priorities. For example, in order to focus on the most ‘socially excluded’ decile 
of the population, one could select a k cut-off whose resulting headcount was closest to 
10 percent. Taking into account all these considerations, the cut-off k at the level of 9 was 
chosen for the social exclusion index, which is close to 3 deprivations per dimension. 
The social exclusion index is built using the 24 indicators. Three measures were 
constructed: First, the social exclusion headcount ratio (H) is defined as the share of 
people who are deprived in at least k indicators for any given k (in this report k=9). It 
reflects the incidence of social exclusion. Second, the average deprivation share across 
the ‘socially excluded’ (A) is calculated as the average number of deprivations divided by 
the maximum possible number of deprivations (24 in our case). The average deprivation 
share reflects the fraction of possible indicators in which the average ‘socially excluded’ 
person endures deprivation. In other words, it provides additional information on the 
intensity of social exclusion. Third, the adjusted headcount ratio, or Multidimensional 
Social Exclusion Index, M0 are calculated to solve the issue of violation of ‘strict 
dimensional monotonicity’98. The adjusted headcount ratio, M0 combines information 
on the incidence of social exclusion and the average intensity of a socially excluded 
person’s deprivation. As a simple product of the two partial indices H and A, the measure 
 Table А5. Final working sample for the construction of the Social Exclusion Index
98/  The property of strict 
dimensional monotonicity 
implies that if a ‘socially 
excluded’ person becomes 
newly deprived in an ad-
ditional indicator, then the 
overall social exclusion level 
should increase. The social 
exclusion headcount H vio-
lates this principle, because 
when an already socially 
excluded person becomes 
deprived in a new indicator, 
H remains unchanged. 
The adjusted headcount 
ratio, M0, however clearly 
satisfies strict dimensional 
monotonicity by taking into 
account the intensity of 
social exclusion (how much 
a person is deprived).
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M0 is sensitive both to the incidence and the intensity of social exclusion. Thus, the 
M0 measure satisfies the property of dimensional monotonicity: if a ‘socially excluded’ 
person becomes deprived in an additional indicator, A rises and so does M0. All three 
multidimensional social exclusion measures were calculated on the basis of household 
members. When disaggregating these indices by certain population groups (i.e. by the 
unemployed), calculations were based on the number of household members who 
belong to the respective population group (i.e. unemployed) living in households that 
are deprived in at least 9 indicators. The social exclusion measures were calculated using 
Stata (the programme code is available upon request).
2.4. The selection of thresholds
The social exclusion headcount in Figure A.1 refers to the share of individuals living in 
households that experience an absolute number of overlapping deprivations higher than 
a certain threshold. The choice of the threshold determines the headcount: the lower the 
threshold, the higher the number of people who meet the criterion of being considered 
‘socially excluded’ (and vice versa). Figure A.1 illustrates how the share of persons 
identified as socially excluded declines with an increasing threshold of deprivations, 
albeit at a decreasing rate. All three thresholds used in the figure, however, produce a 
similar relative distribution of countries.  The ranking of countries by the magnitude of 
deprivation is robust to the cut-off (i.e., it essentially never changes) as the threshold is 
varied between 9 and 14. At every cut-off value, Tajikistan faces a larger share of socially 
excluded people than the other countries. 
Figure A.1: Different thresholds but a similar outcome 
The literature recommends checking the robustness of the index values near the original 
cut-off, or even to opt for dominance tests that cover all possible values of k. Results of 
dominance tests are shown in Figure A.2. The x-axis plots all possible values of k and the 
y-axis plots the adjusted social exclusion headcount, M0. As one can see, virtually for all six 
countries the ranking remains the same for all values of k. The only exception is Ukraine, 
which changes ranking with Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for k 
above 12. However, the working values of k in this report lay in the range from 8 to 11. In 
addition, the primary purpose is to analyse drivers and patterns of social exclusion, rather 
than ranking countries by their level of social exclusion, so these changes in ranking do not 
affect the conclusions made in this report. 
Source: Social Exclusion Survey 2009
Social exclusion headcount for three different thresholds
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The literature recommends checking the robustness of the index values near the original 
cutoff, or even to opt for dominance tests that cover all possible values of k (see the dis-
cussion on dominance test below in the section ‘Multidimensional social exclusion mea-
surement’) were made for the 24 indicators and for 21 indicators. In the latter case, the 
three variables, which showed the higher number of relatively high correlation (more than 
.15)—exclusion from financial services (ex_bank), housing deprivation (ex_living), and ex-
clusion from social participation—inability to afford buying books, cinema or theatre tick-
ets (ex_nocultr) were excluded. Finally, the robustness of the index was tested by removing 
the poverty variable. The results, summarized in table А6 below suggest that the index is 
robust to the exclusion of these variables. It shows a similar magnitude of social exclusion 
and maintains the ranking of countries for the cut-off threshold k=9.
Table А6. Testing the robustness of the Social Exclusion Index for cut-off threshold k = 9
All 24 indicators 21 indicators (three 
excluded)
Poverty variable 
excluded (full 
dataset*)
Income variable 
excluded (working 
dataset)
Kazakhstan 14% 6% 12% 12%
Moldova 18% 10% 17% 17%
FYR Macedonia 5% 3% 4% 4%
Serbia 8% 5% 7% 7%
Tajikistan 33% 15% 33% 33%
Ukraine 9% 4% 7% 8%
*All cases with missed income were excluded from the working dataset. As the other exclusion variables were available for these cases, calculations were also 
made for the full dataset.
Figure A.2: Testing the robustness of the adjusted social exclusion headcount, M0 for cut-offs k
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2.5. Regional averages – weighted or unweighted?
At times the analysis has relied on regional averages to capture social exclusion patterns 
that are common to more than one country. After much deliberation, unweighted averag-
es were used for these calculations. This has implications for our analysis. The value of the 
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Social Exclusion Index obtained using weighted averages is slightly lower than the value 
obtained using unweighted averages. (This is because Tajikistan has both very high exclu-
sion indicators and a small population.) However, the difference is so small that it does not 
affect the report’s conclusions on the relationship between higher unemployment, lower 
education, and rural location with social exclusion. At the group-level, the only difference 
is the estimate of children experiencing exclusion. Applying weighted averages yields a 
slightly lower level of child exclusion – once again, due to Tajikistan.  Using weighted aver-
ages is generally preferable, but the team concluded that the benefits of using them are 
offset by the noise that can be introduced by imprecise population data. 
Figures A3 - A7 illustrate the differences between weighted and unweighted averages.
Figure A.3: Social exclusion headcount - regional averages (population-weighted and non-weighted)
Figure A.4: Average deprivation index - regional averages (population-weighted and non-weighted)
Deprivation cut-off value
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f p
eo
pl
e 
co
ns
id
er
ed
 ‘s
oc
ia
lly
 
ex
cl
ud
ed
’ f
or
 e
ac
h 
cu
t-
off
 v
al
ue
1
1
0
0
10
0,1
30
0,3
50
0,5
70
0,7
90
0,9
100
1
%
20
0,2
40
0,4
60
0,6
80
0,8
9
9
17
17
5
5
13
13
21
21
2
2
10
10
18
18
6
6
14
14
22
22
3
3
11
11
19
19
7
7
15
15
23
23
4
4
12
12
20
20
8
8
16
16
24 
24 
Regional non-weighted
Regional non-weighted
Regional weighted
Regional weighted
k=9
k=9
105
15-29  youth 65+ pensioners
National average
0-14   children 30-64  working age
Low education
Figure A.5: Multidimentional Social Exclusion Index - regional averages (population-weighted and non-weighted)
Figure A6: Social exclusion and age
Table A.7: Social exclusion and education
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Annex 3: Social exclusion profiles of individual countries
Table A8: The contribution of individual deprivations
Economic exclusion Exclusion from social/public services Exclusion from participation in civic 
and social life and networks
Dimensions
At risk of income poverty
Overcrowding
ICT
Housing
Amenities
Financial services
Unemployment
Unmet basic needs
Water
Transportation
Health care
Medication
School drop out
School materials
Low education
Heating
Social ties family
Civic participation 
Social 
participation
clubs
Political 
participation
Social participation culture
Social participation 
private
Support 
networks
Social ties friends
Kazakhstan
At risk of income poverty
Overcrowding
ICT
Housing
Amenities
Financial services
Unemployment
Unmet basic needs
Water
Transportation
Health care
Medication
School drop out
School materials
Low education
Heating
Social ties family
Civic participation 
Social 
participation
clubs
Political 
participation
Social participation culture
Social participation 
private
Support 
networks
Social ties friends
Serbia
At risk of income poverty
Overcrowding
ICT
Housing
Amenities
Financial services
Unemployment
Unmet basic needs
Water
Transportation
Health care
Medication
School drop out
School materials
Low education
Heating
Social ties family
Civic participation 
Social 
participation
clubs
Political 
participation
Social participation culture
Social participation 
private
Support 
networks
Social ties friends
Moldova
At risk of income poverty
Overcrowding
ICT
Housing
Amenities
Financial services
Unemployment
Unmet basic needs
Water
Transportation
Health care
Medication
School drop out
School materials
Low education
Heating
Social ties family
Civic participation 
Social 
participation
clubs
Political 
participation
Social participation culture
Social participation 
private
Support 
networks
Social ties friends
Tajikistan
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Economic exclusion Exclusion from social/public services Exclusion from participation in civic 
and social life and networks
Dimensions
At risk of income poverty
Overcrowding
ICT
Housing
Amenities
Financial services
Unemployment
Unmet basic needs
Water
Transportation
Health care
Medication
School drop out
School materials
Low education
Heating
Social ties family
Civic participation 
Social 
participation
clubs
Political 
participation
Social participation culture
Social participation 
private
Support 
networks
Social ties friends
FYR Macedonia
At risk of income poverty
Overcrowding
ICT
Housing
Amenities
Financial services
Unemployment
Unmet basic needs
Water
Transportation
Health care
Medication
School drop out
School materials
Low education
Heating
Social ties family
Civic participation 
Social 
participation
clubs
Political 
participation
Social participation culture
Social participation 
private
Support 
networks
Social ties friends
Ukraine
At risk of income poverty
Overcrowding
ICT
Housing
Amenities
Financial services
Unemployment
Unmet basic needs
Water
Transportation
Health care
Medication
School drop out
School materials
Low education
Heating
Social ties family
Civic participation 
Social 
participation
clubs
Political 
participation
Social participation culture
Social participation 
private
Support 
networks
Social ties friends
Six-country average
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Annex 4: List of abbreviations
CEDAW - Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women
CEE – Central and Eastern Europe 
CERD - Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination
CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States 
CoE – Council of Europe
CSO – Civil Society Organization
DAC – Development Assistance Committee 
EBRD – European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development
ECA - Europe and Central Asia 
EC – European Commission
EU – European Union
ESF - European Social Fund
FBiH – Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
FDI – foreign direct investment
FGT – Foster Greer Thorbecke
FOREX – foreign exchange market 
GDP – gross domestic product
HDI – Human Development Index
HDR – Human Development Report
HRBA – human right-based approach
HIV – human immunodeficiency virus 
HBS – household budget survey 
ICT – information and communication technologies 
IDP(s) – internally displaced person(s)
ILO – International Labour Organization 
IFIs – international financial institutions 
IMC – inter-municipal cooperation
JIM – Joint Inclusion Memorandum
LFS – labour force survey
MDGs – Millennium Development Goals 
MTEF – medium-term expenditure framework 
NAP(s) – national action plan(s)
NGO – non-governmental organization 
NUTS - Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics
ODA – official development assistance 
OECD – Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 
OMC – Open Method of Coordination
OPHI – Oxford Poverty and Human Development 
Initiative
PAYG – pay as you go 
PIN –  personal identification number
PWD – people with disabilities
RHDR – Regional Human Development Report 
RS – Republika Srpska 
SEE – Southeast Europe 
SILC – statistics on income and living conditions
SME(s) – small- and medium-sized enterprises 
UK – United Kingdom
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF - The United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIFEM - United Nations Development Fund for 
Women 
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VET -  vocational and educational training 
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